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Abstract
The land west of the Alleghany Mountains and along the Ohio River and Great Lakes 
was an area of hotly contested land and sovereignty claims during the colonial period, complete 
with shifting loyalties and highly factionalized alliances. Warfare and diplomacy in the western 
territories often hinged on the actions of just one man or a small group of people, with 
consequences that could cause the collapse of entire empires. The long-standing battle for land 
and power throughout the Ohio Valley has been called the Long War because once conflict 
began between the French, British, and Indians in 1754, no one power was truly able to claim the 
land and its people until the British were forced out of their Great Lakes forts in 1815.
George Rogers Clark uniquely united these groups for a short moment in history, a feat 
made all the more impressive when we consider how long the region remained contested ground 
between empires. These factions united only once prior the era of American control. During the 
expedition of George Rogers Clark in 1778, backcountry settlers, French habitants, Indian chiefs, 
and Spanish officials all united during a small window of time to overthrow British control of the 
Illinois Country. Clark moved freely from the top political circles of Virginia to the remote 
frontier outposts of the Illinois Country. This thesis argues that George Rogers Clark was 
especially successful at gaining the cooperation of diverse groups of populations and 
coordinating those groups to work together toward his own goals. Clark certainly owesdpart of 
his success to being the right man in the right place at the right time, but it must be remembered 
that he was the only man to ever bring all of these factionalized groups together. 
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vPreface
The land west of the Alleghany Mountains and along the Ohio River and Great Lakes 
was an area of hotly contested land and sovereignty claims, shifting loyalties, and highly 
factionalized alliances. In 1778, George Rogers Clark led an army of volunteers down the Ohio 
River to the remote Illinois Country and took control of several British outposts that were 
undefended by the British. Clark entered an area that had long been factionalized, but for a short 
time Clark created harmony among Indians, French, Spanish, and backcountry settlers. He also 
briefly stopped Indian raids into Kentucky, while making the only claim the United States would 
have on the territories of the Old Northwest, as that region was decidedly not a natural American 
territory. It was in fact culturally diverse and claimed by numerous peoples, but Clark’s transient 
presence proved to the first in the long American wave of attempts to control the area. The Ohio 
Valley though had also been a hot spot as conflicting claims over the valley ignited the French 
and Indian War and the frontier struggle that continued through the War of 1812. Warfare and 
diplomacy in the western territories often hinged on the actions of just one man or a small group 
of people, with consequences that could cause the collapse of entire empires. The long-standing 
battle for land and power throughout the Ohio Valley has been called the “Long War” because 
once conflict began between the French, British, and Indians in 1754, no one power was truly 
able to claim the land and its people until the British were forced out of their Great Lakes forts in 
1815.1
                                                
1 Francois Furstenberg, “The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History,” American 
Historical Review, 113 (June 2008): 650.
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The early battles for European control of the Ohio Valley were small, but complicated. 
Settlers, soldiers, merchants, and officials from France, Great Britain, Spain, and the various 
American colonies were all active along the frontier. Numerous groups of Native Americans 
became intertwined with European conflicts, or as was often the case, became the cause of 
European conflict as they shifted alliances and sought out their own rewards.2
Large shifts in power and influence hinged on the actions taken by small groups of 
settlers or ambitious Indian chiefs as great empires rose and fell far away from the Atlantic 
centers of power in Boston, Philadelphia, and Quebec.  The shifting nature of alliances and 
interests made it difficult for any single group to control the Ohio Valley. For example, the 
French prior to and during the French and Indian War, 1754-1763, went to great lengths to stop 
British influence and trade goods from reaching their Indian Allies.3 Once the British gained 
victory over the French, they struggled to secure control of the West, battling undefeated Indian 
warriors under Pontiac’s leadership, a remaining French presence throughout the Ohio Valley, 
and the emergence of Spanish power as they occupied Louisiana and the new French town of St. 
Louis.4 The West continued to be a factionalized frontier that was difficult to control, especially 
along the Ohio River. The American Revolution did little to create unity as backcountry settlers 
from the American colonies continued to offer little loyalty to anyone outside of their local 
communities. This trend continued through the War of 1812 as international intrigue and 
sectional conflict remained common.5
In the end, the United States did take complete control of the West and the Ohio Valley, 
but it was only because of events around the globe that allowed a single power to dominate this 
                                                
2 Ibid., 650, 663-664.
3 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-
1766, (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 25-30.
4 Ibid., 518-527, 535-546.
5 Furstenberg, “Trans- Appalachian Frontier,” 663-664.
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factionalized region. As Napoleon and France were defeated in Europe, the British withdrew 
from the Great Lakes, and the Spanish came under internal pressure from independence 
movements in their own colonies, little support was left for Native Americans to resist the United 
States.6 Before 1815, all of these powers were active, and any could have tipped the balance of 
power in a potential conflict.
George Rogers Clark launched an expedition into the Illinois Country during the 
American Revolution that briefly united these extraordinarily contentious factions in order to 
achieve the conquest of and occupation of land coveted by many different groups,, a feat made 
even more impressive when one considers how long the region remained contested ground 
between empires. The various groups living or trading in the Illinois Country were united only 
once prior the era of American control. During the expedition of George Rogers Clark in 1778, 
backcountry settlers, French habitants, Indian chiefs, and Spanish officials all united for a small 
window of time to overthrow British control of the Illinois Country. In light of Clark’s 
accomplishments, it is important to take a closer look at Clark as a leader and a negotiator. He 
moved freely from the top political circles of Virginia to the remote frontier outposts of the 
Illinois Country. This George Rogers Clark was especially successful at gaining the cooperation 
of diverse groups of populations and coordinating those groups to work together towards his own 
goals. Clark certainly owed part of his short-lived success to being the right man in the right 
place at the right time, but one must be remember that he was the only man to bring all of these 
factionalized groups together. He was also an opportunist and his ambition drove many of his 
decisions, including his move to the frontier, acceptance of military command, and his land 
claims. All of these factors played a part in Clark’s life from the peak of his military career to his 
                                                
6 Ibid., 675.
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desperate attempts at redemption in his debt-ridden middle age. Clark was wildly successful for a 
short period and it is important to remember that the American Revolution was just a short phase 
in the long conflict over the Ohio Valley and Old Northwest that began as the British and French 
battled for the fur trade and allies and lasted well into the nineteenth century. The Revolution in 
the West did very little to solidify the identity of the area or who would control it, and Clark’s 
ability to do so for any amount of time is a remarkable feat.
Since the people who occupied the Ohio Valley during the American Revolution were 
such a factionalized lot, the scholarship on Clark’s expedition and the area is rather factionalized 
as well. Historians have focused on Clark and his men, with little regard to the complexities of 
French habitants or Miami Indian warriors.7 Other historians have focused on only the French 
inhabitants or the Spanish officers in St. Louis.8 Scholars focusing on native peoples spend little 
time discussing the complexities of Clark’s achievements and instead focus on his brutal style of 
warfare and diplomacy.9  The key that is missing from the historical literature of Clark is an 
overall assessment of accomplishments that examines his interactions with Indians, Frenchmen, 
Spaniards, and backcountry settlers. Many historians examine small pieces of Clark’s 
accomplishments, but without an in-depth look at his interactions with all of these groups 
simultaneously, it is impossible to appreciate his accomplishments.
                                                
7 For Clark as a hero see John Bakeless, Background to Glory: The Life of George Rogers Clark, (Philadelphia: J.B. 
Lippincott Company, 1957); Lowell H. Harrison, George Rogers Clark and the War in the West, (Lexington, 
Kentucky: The University of Kentucky Press, 1976); For the standard work on Clark’s life see James Alton James, 
The Life of George Rogers Clark, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1928).
8 For more traditional interpretations of the French see the introduction to Clarence W. Alvord, Cahokia Records 
1778-1790, (Springfield, Ill: Illinois State Historical Library, 1907); John Francis McDermott, The French in the 
Mississippi Valley, (Urbana, Ill: University of Illinois Press, 1965); For more modern scholarship on the French see 
Carl J. Ekberg, French Roots in the Illinois Country: The Mississippi Frontier in Colonial Times, (Urbana, Ill: 
Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 1998); For the Spanish see, , Abraham Phineas Nasatir, “The Anglo-
Spanish Frontier in the Illinois Country During the American Revolution,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical 
Society 21 (1928): 291-358.
9 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Collin G. Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis 
and Diversity in Native American Communities, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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Clark constantly operated with the need to appease simultaneously the French, Spanish, 
and Indian allies along with his own soldiers who were primarily backcountry settlers. Clark 
lacked the strength to conquer and occupy the Illinois Country without support, which made it 
impossible for him to keep everyone happy and cooperative indefinitely.  Clark’s ability to create 
alliances for nearly a year made his feats extraordinary. Without a close examination of all these 
influential factors at once, one cannot grasp the magnitude of Clark’s alliances, and many 
historians, because of their narrow approach, have overlooked the complexities Clark faced.
A common factor in the West that united and divided different groups of people was 
control of land. In Clark’s case almost every group he was dealing with was seeking a clear title 
to land their either occupied or wanted to occupy. Indians wanted to keep most whites off their 
land, the backcountry settlers often sought out land retroactively while speculators were seeking 
legal title to the same lands.10 In wartime settings, might often makes right and that was the case 
in the Illinois Country. Clark not only had the largest army and the element of surprise, but many 
of the nearby Indians and French were just as dissatisfied with the British as Clark and his
settlers were, leading to the creation of effective alliances until the British were thrown out of the 
Illinois. The removal of the British left Clark with no way to pacify his allies, as it became clear 
to all the parties involved that only one group would eventually have a valid claim to the land, 
leading his coalition to crumble as self preservation became the key motive for most involved.
In highlighting Clark’s skill with diverse groups of peoples from Virginia to Illinois, one 
must draw on a large amount of scholarship from the Revolutionary period. Clark and especially 
his interactions with diverse groups of peoples brings out the complicated story of the American 
Revolution, with various social groups struggling toward diverse visions of liberty, as Gary 
                                                
10 Collin G. Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 59-65.
xNash has depicted in his work., Clark also had to deal constantly with the ramifications of the 
French and Indian War that Fred Anderson has identified as a continuing strain of conflict.11
Francis Frustenberg’s work on the interior of North America clearly illustrates how Clark’s 
expedition and his failure to hold together his coalition is part of larger and longer struggle for 
identity and power in the Ohio Valley.12  The standard work on Clark is the biography written by 
James Alton James, which neglects the complexities of Clark’s accomplishments. Although it 
does at least acknowledge the existence of Spanish and French influences. Other biographies of 
Clark, such as John Bakeless’, tend to turn Clark into a hero with little critical analysis. John 
Barnhart takes the opposite approach of Bakeless in his evaluation of Henry Hamilton, the 
British commander who orchestrated British Indian policy in the Great Lakes region and led the 
counter-attack against Clark by downplaying Clark’s accomplishments and focusing on the 
problems the British faced in maintaining their Indian alliances.13
Scholarship on Native Americans provides the backbone for much of this study. Perhaps 
the key conflict in Clark’s alliance was managing backcountry volunteers’ hatred for Indians and 
their culture regardless of the situation. Peter Silver’s work illustrates that the development of an 
Indian-hating culture fueled much of the conflict between whites and Indians, and Clark had to 
balance this hatred with his need for the French and their Indian allies’ support.14 Other works 
such as Richard White’s Middle Ground, establishes the complex situation of created identities 
and competing factions, which complicated any attempts at building alliances. Collin Calloway 
carries these complex identities across North America during the American Revolution 
                                                
11 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War;  Gary B. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of 
Democracy and the Struggle to Create America. (New York: Viking, 2005).
12 Francois Furstenberg, “Trans-Appalachian Frontier,” 650.
13 James Fisher, “A Forgotten Hero Remembered, Revered, and Revised,” in The Life of George Rogers Clark, 
1752-1818: Triumphs and Tragedies, edited by Kenneth C. Carstens and Nancy Son Carstens, 273.
14 Peter Rhoads Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2008).
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illustrating that native communities across the continent were fractured, creating opportunities 
and tragedies alike as many groups spilt amongst themselves over local concerns.15 The struggle 
over choosing sides and being tempted by false promises did not just happen in the Ohio Valley. 
Clark was met with complex societies in transition in many places. Clark also had to deal with 
Indian nations on the edges of the Illinois Country, like the Sac and Mesquakie nations which 
maintained independence from Euro-American demands and alliances as Kathleen DuVal has 
examined with Arkansas River Valley nations.16 Even the French, who were closely intertwined 
with Indian societies, have to be examined carefully, as modern scholars like Carl J. Ekberg have 
fundamentally changed how history views the French settlements in the Illinois Country.17
The frontier or backcountry settler was also a complex character, and one with whom 
Clark had constantly to deal. Not only did Clark work diligently to form alliances with French, 
Spanish, Indians, and frontiersmen, but he also had to win the support of gentry class leaders in 
Virginia. At the same time, he had to earn and maintain a frontier creditability that was key to the 
respect of the frontiersmen compromising his army. Clark had to deal with all the troubles 
involved in recruiting in a southern state, as Woody Holton and Michael A. McDonnell have 
explored, while also balancing the complex interactions between gentry government leaders, 
Indian leaders, and frontiersmen whom often rejected leaders who they felt were not one of their 
own.18
                                                
15 Calloway, Revolution in Indian Country; White, The Middle Ground.
16 Kathleen, DuVal. The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent. (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).
17 Ekberg, French Roots, 263.
18 For recruiting difficulties see Woody Holton, Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves and the Making of the 
American Revolution in Virginia, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999); John Resch and 
Walter Sargent, ed., War & Society in the American Revolution: Mobilization and the Home Fronts, (DeKalb, 
Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2007); For the complexities in Indians negotiations see James H. Merrell,  
Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
1999); Jane T. Merritt, At the Crossroads: Indians & Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 1700-1763, (Chapel Hill, 
NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003); For the nature of frontier leaders and frontier culture see 
xii
In examining Clark’s career in the West it is important to understand a wide range of 
background information, for in the end Clark was an opportunist, albeit one with considerable 
personable advantages, and to truly appreciate Clark’s accomplishments it is critical to 
understand the situations he stepped into and his ability to take advantage of long standing power 
struggles. We will begin our look at Clark by exploring his roots in Virginia and then his early 
adventures and investments in the West. From here, Clark’s political involvement in Virginia 
and Kentucky politics illustrates his first successful attempt to gain support from groups of 
people while advancing his own interests at the same time. It will also take a close look at the 
recruiting difficulties Clark faced as he tried to appeal to different social groups. The second 
chapter will examine the situation on the ground in the Illinois Country, including the French 
settlements and the Spanish, British, and Indian people who lived and interacted with each other 
and Americans prior to the American Revolution. There were many complex situations with 
roots going back a hundred years or more, and to understand the magnitude of rivalry that Clark 
was stepping into is impossible without(?) a closer look at what was actually happening on the 
ground in the Illinois Country; winning the support of all these diverse groups was crucial to 
Clark’s success. The third chapter will look at Clark’s actual campaign in the Illinois Country, 
his initial occupation, his legendary counter-attack against the British at Vincennes, and the 
general amount of cooperation between Clark and his allies. This is the sole event that made 
Clark famous, and the culmination of his success in this study; but even at his peak, some of the 
pressures that will eventually break Clark’s alliance began to show. Finally, the fourth chapter 
will demonstrate how Clark lost the support of his previous allies and how the Americans could 
                                                                                                                                                            
Andrew R. L. Cayton and Fredrika J. Teute, ed., Contact Points: American Frontiers from the Mohawk Valley to the 
Mississippi, 1750-1830, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Elizabeth A. Perkins, Border 
Life: Experience and Memory in the Revolutionary Ohio Valley, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1998).
xiii
no longer maintain an occupation of the Illinois or even muster the forces necessary to attack 
British held Detroit. The removal of the British as a common enemy once again split the 
coalition Clark had worked to build and no comparable situation existed or ever would exist as 
long as different groups occupied the area that allowed anyone to control the area as effectively 
as Clark had.
Throughout his career, George Rogers Clark remained a complex man with the ability to 
appeal to different people. His expedition to the Illinois Country highlighted an ability to 
accomplish much in frontier society. The Revolutionary War ruined Clark financially as it did 
many of the officers that served the American cause.19 Clark’s driving force for many years was 
his opportunistic and restless nature and in the end, he succumbed to the same temptations for 
fabulous gain that lured in men like James Wilkinson and Aaron Burr in their attempts to seize 
power in Louisiana. As late as 1793, Clark received a commission as a Major General of the 
Armies of Revolutionary France from French agent Edmund Genet. Clark even claimed to have 
an army of several thousand frontiersmen ready to seize New Orleans from the Spanish and 
declare loyalty to the French.20 Although the French invasion never materialized, Clark still 
maintained his skill at finding a common path for different factions to follow. Clark’s success 
was based on his ability to face the localism of frontier communities successfully as he turned it 
into opportunity, just as other Revolutionary leaders across the continent did.
                                                
19 For example see the biography of Mary Fish and her husband’s struggles. Joy Day Buel and Richard Buel, Jr. The 
Way of Duty: A Woman and her Family in Revolutionary America. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company).
20 Furstenberg, “Trans-Appalachian Frontier,” 667.
1CHAPTER 1 - Ambition and Opportunity: Surveyor to General
The American Revolution ushered in dramatic changes for many Americans, yet for 
some it was just another chapter in a long struggle. Settlers from Virginia had been pouring into 
Kentucky since the 1760s, and by 1776 the nearby Shawnees had begun striking back leading to 
the report that “From [the] Back Countries we have certain intelligence that the Nations are 
Joined and are Killing, sculping, and Driving our people from their plantations, in a surprising 
manner.”21 George Rogers Clark’s brother John wrote these words as he passed along the latest 
news he had heard regarding conditions on the frontier. That violence was escalating should not 
have been “surprising” to Clark and his contemporaries. 
During Clark’s famous campaign in the Illinois Country, he was able to see the needs of 
potential allies and successfully provided them with the motivation they need to join Clark’s 
fight without alienating any of the other members of his coalition. While this is an impressive 
accomplishment in itself, Clark dealt with divisive forces and conflicting motives from the very 
beginning of his journeys in the West. This chapter will examine the complex situation that 
existed in the Fort Pitt area where Clark attempted to recruit many of his soldiers as well as the 
equally complex political dealings taking place in Kentucky prior to the American Revolution. 
To illustrate Clark’s accomplishments this chapter begins with Clark’s ventures into the West 
and his rise to the status of leader. Clark’s next task was to recruit his army. To understand the 
difficulties he overcame it is first necessary to understand the tensions and resistance to authority 
                                                
21 John Clark to Jonathan Clark, 12 August 1776, in James Alton James, George Rogers Clark Papers, 1771-1781. 
Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, Volume VIII. Springfield, Ill: Illinois State Historical Library, 
1912, 17. (Hereafter cited as Clark Papers)
2that existed on frontier, so the chapter will jump backwards chronologically to explore the 
relationship between Virginia and Pennsylvania and its relevance to recruiting in the Fort Pitt 
region. The chapter will then close by examining how Clark dealt with the difficult situation that 
existed.  The drive for success that Clark possessed combined with his family connections in 
Virginia and his personal persuasiveness all combined with the unruly situation he faced in the 
early years of conflict and before illustrate Clark’s genius at uniting groups for his own purposes.
The Shawnees, and later the other nations along the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes, 
reacted to the aggressive actions of white settlers who were moving into an area that the 
Shawnees believed had been stolen from them by force. Conflict between whites and Indians 
occurred throughout the 1760’s with Pontiac’s War and came to a head again in the early 1770’s 
with Lord Dunmore’s War in 1774. Violence continued into the American Revolution as well 
with the flow of American settlers not stopping. Conflict near Fort Pitt and the Forks of the Ohio 
can be traced back to the 1740’s as the imperial ambitions of Great Britain and France mixed 
with the colonial trade and expansion efforts of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New York, 
and North Carolina. As the American colonists first fought the French and Indians, they also 
competed with one another for control of trade and lands—native inhabitants like the Delawares, 
Shawnees, and Mingoes controlled and contested these lands as well.
No one colony gained a strong enough claim to oust the others, and as the British Board 
of Trade refused to mediate the conflicting borders and land claims by different companies, a 
flurry of activity to arrange private land grants occurred by the outbreak of the American 
Revolution. While colonial investors battled one another and the ministers in London, individual 
settlers continued illegally crossing the Alleghany Mountains, which created friction between 
whites and natives. These long standing feuds were also a major factor in pushing colonies like 
3Virginia into the American Revolution. Conflict with the natives and land speculation dominated 
the motives of many of the most prominent leaders in colonial society, leading them to consider 
their personal and local interests above all else, even patriotism.22  George Rogers Clark also 
sought his own enrichment in Western lands. He chose a course that attempted to bring these 
different forces together to secure the West for Virginia. Clark, who deemed it necessary to 
launch an expedition against the British held Illinois County in order to stop native attacks on 
Kentucky, faced many difficulties from the outset. The long history of conflict around Fort Pitt 
made it especially difficult for him to create the necessary types of relationships that were 
required in outfitting an expedition to the Western territories, specifically recruiting soldiers and 
supplying his army.
One of the most difficult aspects of George Rogers Clark’s Illinois expedition was the 
initial formation of his small army. The Illinois expedition targeted the old French settlements 
along the Mississippi and Wabash Rivers controlled by the British. Many of the colonial settlers 
also saw the people and officers in the region as stirring up Indian resentment against the 
colonial frontiers.  In the opening years of the Revolutionary War, Clark very quickly became 
one of the primary leaders of the frontier settlements in Kentucky. He achieved his high stature 
by encouraging the settlers to appeal to Virginia for their protection, as opposed to North 
Carolina proprietor Richard Henderson. Following the official decision of a convention of the 
Kentucky settlers to make an appeal to Virginia, Clark was elected to deliver this message to the 
Governor of Virginia, Patrick Henry. Clark successfully appealed to Governor Henry and the 
Virginia Assembly, and again took the initiative and proposed an expedition to the Illinois 
                                                
22 Woody Holton, Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves and the Making of the American Revolution in 
Virginia, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), xii-xxi. 
4Country with the goal of providing relief from the constant Indian raids on Kentucky. Kentucky 
had been threatened from north and west of the Ohio River as the British began to support all the 
natives who would come to council at Detroit. They hoped their efforts would lead to the 
expulsion of settlers in Kentucky. With the necessary orders in hand, Clark set out to secure the 
men and supplies he needed for his expedition.
Many problems faced Clark as he set about raising his army. Throughout these 
difficulties, Clark drew on both his gentry upbringing in Virginia and his frontier experiences as 
a surveyor and soldier in the Ohio Valley. First and foremost, he convinced the frontier settlers, 
many of whom had moved along with the frontier from Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the 
Carolinas to Kentucky. These men were driven by cheap land and were encouraged to settle on 
the frontiers as a buffer between white settlements and Indians. They were constatnely moving 
west with the frontier, and found the need to come under the protection of Virginia as Indian-
White conflict escalated. No record of exactly why the settlers wanted to be part of Virginia 
exists, but it is a safe assumption that as the largest and most powerful colony, only Virginia 
could provide the resources that the isolated settlers needed for their protection. This also 
happened to align with Clark’s own interests for his pending land claims with that colony. He 
also used his understanding of frontier life to proactively work around the common frontier 
resistance to military service. He was especially successful in overcoming soldiers’ fears of 
joining a far ranging expedition that would be difficult and of  long duration. Clark’s gentry 
upbringing allowed him access to the highest levels of Virginia’s government and gave him the 
necessary credibility to establish and lead his expedition to the Illinois Country. Clark, like most 
officers who served in the Fort Pitt region (present day Pittsburg), also struggled with the 
factional boundary disputes resulting from the long-standing claims of Virginia and 
5Pennsylvania, but he did understand the limitations he faced in regard to recruiting, and he 
actively worked toward better methods of recruiting and then retaining his soldiers in the service. 
Clark’s ability to work among the various social classes was absolutely critical in his efforts to 
outfit and then hold together any expedition into the Illinois Country. Attracting the support of 
these different social groups was Clark’s first successful attempt in gaining cooperation for his 
plans.
George Rogers Clark marked his twenty-fifth birthday in 1775, just as the conflict 
between Great Britain and the American colonies was heating up. Clark also had a wide range of 
life experiences as he sought to make his way in the world. He was excited about and involved in 
the migration of colonists into the interior of North America, and he played an active role in the 
various attempts at developing a colony west of the mountains. As a member of the planter class 
of Virginia, Clark’s desire to become rich through the acquisition of western land was common. 
Unlike many other speculators, he went West in person.  He worked as a surveyor while he also 
staked out his own personal claim. This in turn aided in the development of new settlements as 
well. Here, Clark took his gentry upbringing and used the advantages and authority that were 
accorded a man of his position, while also learning about survival and the people in the West. 
This taught him valuable lessons in the leadership of frontier settlers.
The West into which George Rogers Clark plunged was one filled with conflicting claims 
of ownership and authority. The conflict between Virginia and Pennsylvania over the hotly-
contested Forks of the Ohio had hindered not only the growth of trade at times, but had been 
especially problematic in terms of native diplomacy and the defense of white settlers in the 
6area.23 The issues of conflicting borders, competing trading companies, and shifting loyalties 
based on personal gain all affected Clark’s efforts at recruiting and maintaining his own army.
 Clark’s efforts were closely linked to those of his home colony of Virginia. His first trips 
to the West mirrored those of many Virginians, passing through the Fort Pitt area and down the 
Ohio River. While Fort Pitt served as conduit for westward bound Virginians, it had also served 
as a locus of conflict for much of the eighteenth century. At the time Clark moved west, only 
Virginia and Pennsylvania (not withstanding the presence of Shawnee and Delaware claims to 
the area) were active in attempting to claim the area around Fort Pitt, but these colonies had 
competed with one another as well as the French since the 1740s. The two colonies came into 
conflict as both laid claim to the area according to their founding charters. Conflict also arose 
because Pennsylvanians, commonly interested in trade, wanted to preserve the native hunting 
grounds that yielded valuable deerskins, while the companies organized in Virginia, namely the 
Ohio Company, were most interested in obtaining large tracts of land and selling it to settlers 
from that colony.24
Diplomatic relationships with Native Americans, like the nearby Delawares, Shawnees, 
or Mingoes, were made more difficult because settlers and traders from Virginia and 
Pennsylvania competed with one another to establish a colonial claim to the new lands, which 
were key to gaining a legal title. Traders from the two colonies often fought one another for 
supremacy in the area as well. With the growth of settlements around the newly created outposts, 
whether for trade or defense, new settlers continually created conflicts with the natives living and 
hunting on the same lands.25 Clark took employment with the Ohio Company of Virginia, and 
                                                
23 Anderson, Crucible of War, 284.
24 Ibid., 29-31.
25 Ibid., 284.
7looked to further his own interests, which were like those of many Virginians, linked to the 
fortunes of the company. 
The Ohio Company served as a motivator for many Virginian politicians, as many men 
held stock in the company, with conflicting claims over the Ohio River Valley coming to the 
forefront of relations between Great Britain and France. As the Ohio Company pushed into the 
Forks of the Ohio (present day Pittsburg), negotiators hired by the company manipulated the 
Delawares, Shawnees, and Mingoes into allowing construction of a trading post. They falsely 
claimed to have been acting with the consent of Pennsylvania. Renowned Pennsylvania trader
George Croghan even was present with the Ohio company delegation because he had acquired a 
large land grant around Fort Pitt. It was illegal under the laws of Pennsylvania to acquire land as 
far West as the Forks of the Ohio, so he joined the other delegates from the Ohio Company to 
push for land cessions and trading rights.26
The Ohio Company also was one of the keys to igniting the French and Indian War. As 
the French pushed to counter the movements of the Ohio Company and the Pennsylvanian 
traders (that the colonies were also competing with each other was not apparent to France) the 
Governor of Virginia, Robert Dinwiddie, who also happened to be a stockholder in the company, 
ordered troops to the frontier to establish defensive posts. In fairly quick secession, George 
Washington, also a company stockholder, was dispatched to the frontier where he mistakenly 
attacked a French envoy, igniting the spark of what turned into a world wide war. The actions of 
men like Washington who were reluctant to ally themselves with Native Americans were 
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8partially driven by their desire to clear the original Indian inhabitants from the land for their own 
financial gain.27
Efforts were made during the early years of the French and Indian War to reclaim the 
French post Fort Duquesne (later renamed Fort Pitt by the British). Surprisingly, Pennsylvania 
and Virginia managed to cooperate to a small degree in military affairs. With the fort retaken and 
the native raids ceasing because of the fall of Fort Niagara due to a lack of French supplies to 
their allies, resistance by the Shawnees, Delawares, Miamis, and Potawatomis became pointless. 
Peace with the Shawnees, Delawares, and Mingoes was achieved officially in 1758 at the Treaty 
of Easton, and upon resumption of trade, Virginian and Pennsylvanian interests immediately 
began clashing once again.28
The French were isolated from native attack because for generations they had married 
into the various villages as a part of the fur trade and were connected through family, which was 
also a political connection in these societies, to the villages across the Great Lakes along the 
Missouri River in ways that the British failed to full comprehend.29 Those nations located further 
in the interior, like the Mesquakies, Illini, Miamis, and others still had contact with French 
traders and still had not seen an increased flow of British trade goods or of British soldiers. The 
pleas to royal authority failed to provide justice to any natives that appealed, and the increasing 
likelihood of frontier warfare began to worry many of the white settlers. 
As far as Euro-Americans were concerned, Clark had descended into an ill-defined and 
violent world. The Treaty of Paris, which ended the Seven Years War between Britain and 
France in 1763, appeared to guarantee Indians the right to their land, but official promises were 
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9worth little. The spark that led to the French and Indian War was conflict over control of the 
Ohio Valley, and at the end of the war, exactly who controlled western lands was at the center of 
most ongoing conflicts. Indian nations from Pennsylvania to Louisiana wanted to prevent white 
encroachment into their lands and hunting grounds. Even the government sanction of Indian 
rights to their land in the West by the Proclamation of 1763, which forbade settlement in the 
West by whites, did little more than annoy those seeking legal title to land. In turn this created 
inevitable conflict between whites and Indians.30 The British government issued the 
proclamation as they attempted to tighten control over their North American colonies at a time 
when the colonists were hoping for more freedom. This included their desire to settle the interior 
lands occupied by natives, and while the Proclamation Line was intended to preserve Indian 
land, the British inability to control white settlers created more white-Indian conflict as squatters 
moved into the land, while land speculators saw their potential land claims being occupied 
without being able to gain legal title to the land.31 The British attempt to better control their 
empire and maintain peace had quite the opposite effect.
Clark’s western activities are documented as early as 1772, when he joined a party of 
explorers who pushed their way west along the course of the Ohio River. He explored land that 
was capable of “surpassing any thing you ever saw.”32 As the following map shows, trading 
posts and forts already existed, occupied by Frenchmen and British soldiers, throughout the Ohio 
Valley, and by 1778 a number of settlements existed in Central and Eastern Kentucky as well. 
Clark’s passion for pushing west might have been inherited from his father, who had himself 
helped to push the Virginia frontier closer to the interior of the continent before being pushed 
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eastward again by fears of Native American raids during the French and Indian War. Regardless 
of the origins of his desire to push westward, Clark might have felt the desire to acquire a greater 
fortune than his family had thus far achieved. He was a member of the planter class and well 
connected; Clark grew up very near Thomas Jefferson and was later introduced to George Mason 
by his father. His family was also connected to some of the highest members of Virginia’s 
society, and the abundant correspondence between these men and Clark throughout his life 
attests to these relationships.33 Clark was comfortably established as the eldest of ten children 
and had the ability to invest in the West. It appears that the opportunity to enlarge his wealth in 
the west was too great for Clark to resist.  
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Figure 1.1: Source: University of Texas Libraries, 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/united_states/exploration_1675.jpg, accessed on 9 May 2009.
12
Although the motivation for large financial gains existed, speculating was risky because 
companies had to receive official recognition for the land grants, many of which were dubiously 
obtained in fraudulent treaties with natives falsely claiming to represent their nations or villages. 
So while settlers continued to stream into the western territories claiming land, the speculators 
could not sell the title to the land without recognition of their large tracts. This created frustration 
as investors became convinced that the royal government was deliberately keeping them from 
their rightful profits, which many expected from the profits tied to selling western land gained 
from France thanks to colonial efforts in the French and Indian War. Also frustrating was that 
gaining official recognition was a matter of who could most effectively influence the most 
powerful ministers in London. 
This frustration was another key element that pushed Virginia into the American 
Revolution. The gentry class in Virginia was not necessarily ready for independence, but was 
angry with the British government’s attempts to limit western expansion. The British 
government had also frustrated the white gentry investors while siding with the Shawnees and 
Cherokees in efforts to preserve their lands as well. The formation of a new and independent 
government, the gentry thought, would give them unrestricted access to western lands and ensure 
better control over the non-white (Native American and slave) and poorest parts of the 
population. It is also important to note that the lower classes were in some cases also pushing for 
independence as they saw an opportunity to gain more influence and power as well as greater 
access to native lands.34
While gentry interests were pushing Virginia to war, the various land companies 
competed among themselves to legalize their land claims west of the Alleghany Mountains. For 
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example, the initial claims of the Ohio Company were relatively small, amounting to about 
200,000 thousand acres in present day West Virginia. The Loyal Company of Virginia made a 
conflicting claim for much of Kentucky and West Virginia. This in turn overlapped part of the 
Ohio Company’s claim. Still others had bought, negotiated,  swindled, or been granted land by 
the Shawnees and Delawares, such as the grant held by George Croghan around Fort Pitt or 
North Carolina Judge Richard Henderson’s purchase of Kentucky from the Cherokees. Much of 
the political maneuvering involved in receiving official recognition of these claims took place in 
London, with royal authorities. This in turn spurred the creation of even larger companies, such 
as the Greater Ohio Company, which combined several different claims as speculators worked 
together to gain royal recognition. 35 Other companies had plans to settle in the Illinois Country 
and along the Mississippi River. All these groups were competing with one another, not only in 
London, but also in colonial circles as stockholders of different companies often promoted their 
own interests at the cost of others, and sometimes at the cost of their prescribed governmental 
duties. People had many reasons to become involved in speculating, as men like George 
Washington and later George Rogers Clark did. In Virginia, many planters were caught in a 
cycle of indebtedness from growing tobacco. Speculating in land offered an opportunity to invest 
and make large profits without selling off assets, such as slaves and cultivated 
plantations.36Following his early exploring expeditions, Clark returned to the West to stake out 
his claim and continue working there. Clark took a job working for the Ohio Company of 
Virginia in 1775 and was engaged in surveying lands for newly arriving settlers. He was also 
eagerly staking out his personal claim as well. In a letter to his brother, Clark stressed the 
importance of sparing “no Money nor pains to get that patent for me as soon as possible as it will 
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be of [the] greatest importance to me.” Clark was so anxious to have his land claims registered in 
his name that he repeated his desire for a patent just a few lines later in a letter that was no more 
than a short paragraph.37 While working for himself, he was also helping to expand the new 
settlements that formed along the Ohio River in Kentucky as well. Optimistic as always, Clark in 
a letter dated July, 1775 again told his brother of the “Beautifull Cuntry” and of his own efforts 
at speculation, “Ingrossing all the Land I possibly Can,” while Clark and others “laid out a Town 
seventy Miles up [the] Kentucke [River] whare I intend to live.”38
While Clark laid claim to lands for himself and his family, he also banded together with 
new settlers streaming down the Ohio River into Kentucky. The new settlers sought him out 
because of his role as surveyor. He also firmly embedded himself in the growing western 
community by his active participation in Dunmore’s War in 1774. Dunmore’s War was triggered 
by the Shawnees’ and Mingoes’ violent reaction to the continued expansion of white settlers into 
the Ohio Valley. In 1768, the Iroquois, at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, sold the rights to the 
hunting grounds in Kentucky used by the Shawnees and other Ohio natives.  Of course, the 
Shawnees disputed the right of the Iroquois to sell this land out from under them, but settlers 
continued to pour into the disputed area, which in turn led to isolated incidents of violence 
between settlers and natives. After a group of traders murdered the sister of the Mingo chief 
Cornstalk, the Mingoes and later the Shawnees launched retaliatory attacks on the settlers. This 
provided an excuse for Lord Dunmore, Governor of Virginia, to send an army to Fort Pitt to 
confirm Virginia’s land claims as Dunmore had personal interests in western land companies as 
well. The resulting Battle of Point Pleasant forced the Shawnees to cede their claims to 
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Kentucky.39 This left bitter resentment among many Shawnees that drove some of their warriors 
to be among the first to resume hostilities when open conflict broke out between the British and 
the American colonists. It was during this conflict, which was the culmination of pre-
revolutionary white manipulation and aggression against the Western Indians,that Clark served 
as a captain. His position as captain allowed him to share in the defeat of the Shawnees by 3,000 
Virginia militiamen, and even though Clark did not see combat,, he did make important 
connections. He became acquainted, for example, with Joseph Bowman, who later recruited a 
company of soldiers for the Illinois expedition and served as Clark’s most trusted subordinate.40
Participation for Clark also clearly showed the settlers of the area where his interests would lie 
(with Virginia) and that he was more than a mere speculator seeking profits.
The settlements continued to grow in Kentucky, especially with Lord Dunmore’s 1774 
victory. Most of the settlers who came down the Ohio River were from Virginia. These settlers 
felt ties to their home colony, much as Clark did, but their interests ran counter to those of 
Colonel Richard Henderson, a former high court judge from North Carolina. Henderson was a 
well connected lawyer who played a prominent role in putting down (?) the North Carolina 
Regulator Uprising. The Regulators were a group of frontier farmers in North Carolina that saw 
their economic and legal rights curtailed by the North Carolina gentry and eventually turned to 
violence to address their concerns when peaceful means did not work. Henderson, appointed as a 
judge to help maintain order in the backcountry, was hated by the Regulators, who stormed his 
courthouse at Hillsboro, and later burned his barn. No sooner had the Regulator crisis passed 
then Henderson negotiated a land sale with the Cherokees and justified purchasing land declared 
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off limits by the Proclamation of 1763 by a precedent set in a British legal decision in India. 41  
The precedent held that a grant from the British government to land purchased directly from 
indigenous peoples was not necessary for use of that land. This meant that Henderson did not 
need government sanction to acquire land from Cherokees. Henderson, at least through his self-
interested interpretation of the law, did not need government approval of his purchase of  title to 
land because he was dealing with independent people. The British government, however, did not 
consider the Cherokees independent in the same way as  they did the various groups in India, 
although that was of little concern to Henderson. With this in mind, Henderson purchased a large 
part of the present day states of Kentucky and Tennessee and hoped to establish a new colony 
named Transylvania.42 A divided group of Cherokees met with Henderson at Sycamore Shoals 
and agreed to sell their Kentucky hunting grounds for 10,000 pounds. Although they were 
divided about the sale, they hoped that the settlers could be directed away from the Cherokee 
villages and give them some separation. The Cherokees were disappointed in two ways. First, 
Henderson only delivered two wagonloads of goods for the land, and second a group of young 
warriors led by Dragging Canoe broke away from the Cherokees’ elder leadership. The men led 
by Dragging Canoe became known as the Chickamaugas and continued to fight American 
settlers throughout the Revolution.43 Since the initial legal precedent justifying this massive land 
transfer came from India, it created controversy almost immediately. Henderson was a powerful 
man politically, but his claims did not proceed without any challenges from the competing
claimants waiting for the British government to legalize their land claims. 
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Clark’s records and correspondence indicate that he was ambivalent at first about the 
legality of the purchase, and he noted in the margins of his memoirs that “The Cherokees [had] 
no…Right to Kentucky.” This indicated that Clark believed the Cherokees had no right to sell 
the land to Henderson. Clark’s Memoir, which was written in 1791, illustrates that Clark in 
hindsight agreed with the decision of the Virginia Assembly that the purchase was of dubious 
legal standing. At the time the purchase occurred, however, Clark was less sure who was legally 
right, noting “Many thought [Henderson’s Claim] was good [whereas] otheres doubtd wheter or 
not Virginia could…have any pretentions to the Cuntrey.”44 Clark had no problem with the legal 
justification that Henderson used to dispossess the Cherokees, but it is likely that he was opposed 
to Henderson controlling the lands that he thought belonged to Virginia because of the Point 
Pleasant concessions. According to his interests, Clark chose to accept the claims of the 
Shawnees over those of the Cherokees.
Clark eventually called for a meeting of Kentucky settlers to determine whether or not to 
send delegates to make an appeal to the Virginia Assembly, but despite action against 
Henderson, he was not initially opposed to the proprietorship. While he was establishing his 
initial land claims, Clark wrote that “Col. Henderson is hear and Claims all [the] Cuntry…If his 
Claim should be good, land may be got Reasonable Enough.”45 Even writing sixteen years later 
in his memoir, he remembered Henderson and his associates taking “great pains to Ingratiate 
them selves in the favor of the people.” Clark attributed their decline in popularity to an attempt 
to raise quit-rents on the land, a practice that many saw as a form of vassalage.46 As long as 
Clark saw a fair chance for his own prosperity in land dealings to continue, he was willing to 
                                                
44 “Clark’s Memoir,” in James, Clark Papers, 208. (Hereafter cited as Memoir)
45 G.R. Clark to Jonathan Clark, 6 July 1775, Ibid., 10.
46 “Memoir,” in Ibid., 209; James, The Life of George Rogers Clark, 24.
18
accept the rule of Henderson. But with the threat of economic deprivation staring him squarely in 
the face, he was one of the first and most important to call out for recognition as a part of 
Virginia.47
Clark’s decision to work against Henderson opens up an interesting area of speculation. 
While Clark did not write at length, either for or against Henderson’s colony, it appears several 
conclusions can be drawn from his few words and actions. Henderson was a member of the 
North Carolina elite and enjoyed the support of the royally appointed governor, lawyers, and 
merchants in his home colony, and at the same time he antagonized the farmers and settlers, or 
Regulators, in the North Carolina Piedmont in almost every attempt they made to receive legal 
redress.48 Clark as a landed gentlemen had few initial misgivings with Henderson and his colony 
or his reputation for stifling the economic rights of small land holders, as Clark saw his own 
chances for success. The North Carolinians invited to settle in Transylvania refused for the most 
part because of the potential of abuse by Henderson, and hence the colony became an extension 
of Virginia.49 Despite Henderson’s initial gestures to lure settlers to his colony, his fees that 
stymied economic independence were antagonistic to the goals of the settlers. In Kentucky, as in 
North Carolina, the settlers and farmers chose legal redress as their first avenue of complaint, 
and led by Clark this appeal was made to Virginia and not an unsympathetic Henderson as had 
been the fate of the Regulators.
Henderson’s attempts to control the land and settlers in Kentucky would not been 
surprising, considering his involvement in the Regulator crisis in North Carolina. Settlers in 
upstate New York also had protested the control of proprietors and their vast estates, and 
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continued that fight beyond the American Revolution.50 Although the Kentuckians did not have 
to resort to violence to wrest control of their land from Henderson, they had the support of 
another colony, which settlers in New York and North Carolina did not. Violence did not erupt 
from settlers in Kentucky because, unlike their peers in other colonies, the settlers themselves 
were immersed in the speculation system seeking their own profits, and with the constant threat 
of Indian attack, little opportunity or reason to revolt against the Virginia land system before or 
during the Revolution existed.51  Some similarities can also be drawn between George Rogers 
Clark and the famous Vermont settler, Ethan Allen; the boisterous and often violent leader of the 
Green Mountain Boys was willing to initiate direct conflict with the Governor of New York, but 
was at the same time fighting to preserve his own land claims and speculating ventures.52
Another question to be resolved was who would control the profits from issuing title to 
the newly acquired lands. Defense of the new settlements was also a vital issue. Initially the 
western frontier was relatively quiet as British and American forces clashed along the Atlantic 
Seaboard, but this changed in June 1777 when Henry Hamilton received orders from the ministry 
in London. Hamilton, as Lieutenant Governor of Detroit and head of Indian Affairs in the West, 
was ordered to dispatch Britain’s native allies to attack the frontier settlements in Kentucky. The 
Shawnees and others in Ohio needed little motivation, and Hamilton also held conferences with 
the loyal nations from the Great Lakes region located nearer to Detroit, arranging for raids from 
nations such as the Ottawas, Hurons, Chippewas, and Potawatomi.53 Kentucky was sparsely 
populated and poorly stocked with military supplies. This created a state of paralysis, forcing 
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many settlers to flee back to the East, with a clear need for outside military aid to those who 
remained. As the different Indian nations from all across the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes 
converged on Kentucky, they were just continuing a fight to protect their lands that had been a 
part of native thinking and diplomacy since the earliest conflicts between Britain and France. 
Just as the French had armed Indian allies from their Great Lake military posts in earlier 
conflicts, so too did the British. This led to a wave of fear on the frontier, sending settlers fleeing 
east to safer settlements as warriors now had both supplies and European sanction to attack 
encroaching settlers.54
Clark called for a meeting at Harrodsburg and was elected deputy to Virginia, as was 
John Gabriel Jones. The newly elected deputies were charged with carrying a petition to the 
government of Virginia. Two appeals to Virginia have been preserved. The first was signed by 
the inhabitants of Kentucky at Harrodsburg on June 15, 1776, and the other was signed five days 
later by the “gentlemen” leaders of the community, George Rogers Clark included. The 
documents were similar. Both claimed that Henderson’s purchase from the Cherokees was illegal 
and that land was being sold at “exhorbitant” prices, while the proprietor’s system of government 
did not “at all harmonize with that lately adopted by the United Colonies.”55 Common to both 
also was a statement legitimizing Virginia’s claim to western lands under the colony’s original 
charter and by the military victory over the Shawnees. Each also stated the willingness of the 
settlements to bear the burden of filling their fair share of recruitment quotas and the cost of the 
war against Great Britain as well.56 By controlling the public gathering, Clark was able to secure 
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his own land claims through Virginia’s legal system and gain prestige among the Kentuckians by 
being elected to deliver their appeals to Virginia.
Those that had settled in Kentucky by 1776 were not preoccupied with the Independence 
movement like colonists in the East were. At the same time the Declaration of Independence was 
being written in Philadelphia, the settlers of the Transylvania Company were attempting to 
achieve their own “independence” from proprietor Richard Henderson. Their major concerns 
were establishing clear titles to the land they had improved and protecting themselves from 
Shawnee raiders from the Ohio Country. Once the settlers were under Virginia’s law, it was the 
British effort to arm Indians across the Ohio Valley against Kentucky settlers that goaded them 
into the fight. In Kentucky, as across North America, local interests trumped national calls to 
patriotism, and joining Virginia’s fight against the British was seen as better than watching 
friends and neighbors be slaughtered by Shawnee raiders.57
While Clark was successful in convincing the settlers of Kentucky to reject the claims of 
Henderson and his partners, it was still necessary for the Virginia Assembly to accept their 
appeal and recognize Kentucky as a county of that state. By the time they arrived in Virginia, 
Clark and Jones had missed the legislative session as it had adjourned for the summer. While 
Jones set off for Holton to fight Cherokees, Clark began immediately to advocate Kentucky’s 
claims by visiting Patrick Henry, then Governor of Virginia, at his home in Hanover where 
Henry was recovering from sickness.58 The settlers of Kentucky had done well to send Clark, as 
he received a favorable audience with Henry and received written instructions from the governor 
that were presented to the state council when the Virginia Assembly reconvened in the fall. 
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During the fall legislative session, Clark again showed his adroitness, appealing to the Virginia 
Assembly and “imploreing their immediate Protection” for the greater interests of Virginia.59
Although gunpowder was voted as aid to Kentucky, the House expected Clark and Jones 
to transport the powder at their own expense. Clark rejected this premise, claiming that if a 
“Cuntrey was not worth protecting [,] it was not worth Claiming,” while he also threatened to 
apply for aid and protection to other colonies. This seemed to convince the members of the 
House, as Clark, “being a little prejudiced in favor of [his] Mother Cuntrey [Virginia]” was 
happy to accept the compromise offer of delivering the goods to Fort Pitt.60
Despite gaining supplies and partial transportation, Clark was still forced to battle 
powerful foes in the House to gain recognition of Kentucky as a county. Richard Henderson was 
one of the main forces of opposition, as he maintained a large amount of influence as a native 
son of Virginia, as a respected official in North Carolina, and the head of a speculation company. 
Henderson was able to find favor among those speculators who did not stand to gain from an 
enlargement of Virginia and the land its speculating ventures had access to, while he was 
opposed by those that held stock in companies with conflicting claims. Also contesting 
Kentucky’s claim to be a part of Virginia was Arthur Campbell, a representative from the county 
from which Kentucky was carved. Clark was not seated as a voting member, but late in the fall 
session, the Assembly recognized the settlers’ desire to be joined to Virginia as a separate 
county.61 Although he was ultimately unsuccessful, the Virginia Assembly later awarded 
Henderson another large claim as compensation in present day Tennessee.62 Another 
contributing factor in Henderson’s defeat was his unwillingness to allow Patrick Henry and some 
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of the other Virginia gentlemen to buy into the company. Henderson’s fear of being 
overshadowed as the leader of the Transylvania Company meant he alienated powerful political 
allies that resulted in a core of political opposition in Virginia.63  
Clark’s journey was just beginning as he headed to Fort Pitt to escort the gunpowder and 
supplies back to Kentucky. Once safely arrived in the West again, Clark wrote to Patrick Henry 
of his plans for the conquest of the Illinois. The report he received from two spies he had 
dispatched disguised as hunters contained a military report and they also offered a description of 
one of the targeted settlements:
The Town of [Kaskaskia] contains about one hundred families of French and English 
[who] carry on an extensive trade with the Indians; and they have a considerable number 
of negroes that bear arms…and [they] send a considerable quantity of flour and other 
commodities to New Orleans. The houses are framed and very good, with a small but 
elegant stone fort situated [near] the center of town.64
Not only had Clark worked hard to get supplies and recognition for Kentucky, he had 
also worked behind the scenes to convince Henry of the necessity for an expedition into the 
Illinois. Clark forwarded the reports of his two spies, including accounts of how British officers 
gave “large presents…[to] the Waubash Indians to invade the frontiers of Kentucky; [and that 
he] was daily treating with other nations.” 65 While Clark’s report overstated the activities of the 
British in the Illinois, most attacks were coordinated by Hamilton in Detroit, where he accepted 
scalps and offered abundant presents and trade goods; a letter still illustrates the diplomatic 
ability of Clark to work among the frontier settlers and the elite of Virginia. This letter 
masterfully addressed the main concern of the settlers, and the main source of their expense to 
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Virginia. Kaskaskia and the Illinois were lightly garrisoned and closer to Kentucky compared 
than the post at Detroit. Kaskaskia and its nearby villages, as well as Vincennes, located to the 
east on the Wabash River, were populated with French traders and farmers who had excellent 
relations with many of the natives along the nearby Wabash River and in Illinois, as well as 
nations like the Potawatomi, Sacs, Foxes, and others west of the Mississippi River. Since the 
lands had been ceded to the British in the Treaty of Paris in 1763, there was also a sizeable 
Anglo-American trader population that maintained contact with the other colonies as well. The 
benefits this conquest could draw in commerce and improved relations with Native Americans, 
especially the Miami along the Wabash River, were obvious to Clark. “[Virginia] must either 
take the town of [Kaskaskia], or in less than… twelve month[s] send an army against the Indians 
on [the] Wabash [River], which will cost ten times as much, and not be of half the service.”66
Clark’s objectives in Williamsburg had been met with nearly complete success, and with orders 
in hand, he turned once again to the frontier settlers that had empowered him. Clark now turned 
his attention to raising an army that could conquer the Illinois Country.
George Rogers Clark was authorized to recruit his soldiers from the western counties of 
Virginia and the frontier settlements of Kentucky. In this regard, Clark met resistance from his 
potential soldiers on many different occasions. Since Clark was ordered to recruit in the west, 
specifically in the Fort Pitt area, he ran into jurisdictional problems because of the long-standing 
feud between Virginia and Pennsylvania. The situation on the frontier was never clear to any of 
the settlers or to the seats of government in Philadelphia, Williamsburg, or London. Not only 
were there a multitude of purchases for land around and west of the Fort Pitt frontier, most 
overlapping one claim or another, but the Proclamation of 1763 had forbidden white settlement 
                                                
66 Ibid., 30-32.
25
beyond the Alleghany Mountains. This in turn meant that the crown had not recognized or 
mediated any of the conflicting claims. As the British-American conflict broke out, any hope for 
a royal settlement of the border was abandoned. All of these conditions generally proved harmful 
to state and Continental efforts toward recruiting and supplying troops around Fort Pitt.
The initial push into the Ohio Valley, via Fort Pitt, was aimed at capturing the Native 
American fur trade, with traders from as far away as the Carolinas and New York competing 
with traders from Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, and those from New France. Although the 
Carolinians, Marylanders, and New Yorkers quickly fell out of the race, this vital western trade 
and territory immediately became a source of conflict and suspicion between Virginia and 
Pennsylvania, even amidst the French threat.67 The threat from French traders did cause Virginia 
and Pennsylvania to meet with the different groups of Native Americans at Logstown. Virginians 
and Pennsylvanians were competing directly with each other as early as 1748 and continued to 
do so up into the American Revolution. At this early meeting, the Virginians almost failed to 
send any official representatives, but the Ohio Company saw to it that its interests were at the 
forefront of the discussions. Following the French abandonment of Fort Duquesne and the 
building of Fort Pitt by the British, the fur trade flourished, and as Pennsylvania traders gained 
greater control, the Virginians responded by creating the Ohio Company with a land grant and a 
monopoly over the Virginia traders. Pennsylvanian traders countered by spreading stories 
claiming that the Virginians were more interested in stealing land than trading.68
The early trades and negotiations served to open up the region for increased white 
settlement and these tensions between settlers and Native American groups, especially the 
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Shawnee, began to heat up leading to conflicting claims between all the parties involved in three 
decades of deals. The authority to raise a militia also came into focus, as part of a chain of events 
that led to Dunmore’s War of 1774. The problem was simple for many of the settlers. They 
viewed an attack by the Shawnee or other Ohio tribes as imminent, and they sought protection 
from a higher authority. Confusion reigned and loyalties shifted as no clear boundaries existed, 
and colonists aligned with whichever colony they believed could best protect them and allow 
trade to flourish.69 Although Pennsylvania began drawing up counties near Fort Pitt in 1771 and 
had issued land titles, they had previously refused to extend protection to many of the settlers 
based on a claim that they were stationed beyond the boundaries of Pennsylvania. The 
Pennsylvania Assembly, dominated by pacifist Quakers, also refused to vote funds to form any 
militia companies and twice refused to build a fort at the spot that would become Fort Pitt.70 As 
Pennsylvania now attempted to extend its claims westward, many of the settlers who had 
migrated from Virginia turned to that colony for protection, allowing John Connelly to receive a 
commission from Virginia to grant land and offices, and to tax the fur trade. Connelly also 
attacked and jailed those who refused to recognize the sovereignty of Virginia. This attempt to 
strengthen Virginia’s claim gained support among many settlers because of the inaction of the 
Pennsylvania government.71
While the claims of Pennsylvania persisted, despite holding a somewhat weaker position, 
the settlers of the area were caught up in a propaganda war between the two sides. This 
propaganda war blurred and weakened authority, making it very difficult for military leaders like 
Clark to recruit or collect supplies under the aegis  of particular state without coming into 
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conflict with at least a segment of the populace. An agent for Pennsylvania, Arthur St. Clair, took 
action in 1774 to keep Connelly from acting in favor of Virginia. St. Clair ordered Connelly 
arrested, but “about eighty persons in arms assembled themselves…proceeded to the Fort where 
a cask of rum was produced…I thought it most prudent to keep out of their way.”72 As St. Clair 
had reported to Governor John Penn, controlling the settlers was not an easy task. One year later 
in 1775, the violence still continued as Robert Hanna reported to Governor Penn that “a number 
of armed men…demanded entrance in the jail…On the Jailer refusing to admit them, they in a 
violent manner broke said jail with a sledge, which they took…without leave.” The leaders of the 
mob assured Hanna they were acting “by the authority of Virginia.”73 Mobs and public 
gatherings were becoming more common as the colonies moved towards a break with Britain. 
Especially in Pennsylvania, the disenfranchised citizens began to gather and work outside of the 
normal political system to force changes in policy. This was especially true as the military threat 
from the British increased and Pennsylvanians joined the independence movement.74
During this time, Lord Dunmore was still the governor of Virginia, and as a proponent 
and investor in the western expansion of his colony, he sanctioned men like Connelly and their 
violent methods, by proclaiming the prohibition of the “execution of any act of authority on 
behalf of the Province of Pennsylvania.”75 In fact, Governor Penn had little recourse, “As the 
government of Virginia hath the power of raising militia, and there is not any such in this 
province, it will be in vain to contend with them in the way of force.”76
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Although Pennsylvania could not match the force of the Virginians, the escalation of the 
Revolutionary conflict, increased raids from the Shawnees and Cherokees, the stationing of 
Continental troops at Fort Pitt, and finally the ability to raise militias in Pennsylvania stopped the 
actual inter-colonial violence. The overthrow of Lord Dunmore by Virginians who feared the 
Governor would unleash an army of slaves against them after he removed the colonists’ access to 
militia gunpowder stores combined with a number emancipated slaves willing to enlist in the 
army, created fear and suspension and led to the installation of a pro-independence minded 
government.77 Regardless, this did little to cool the rivalry or increase the ease with which 
officers could raise and supply troops.
The earliest attempts by Continental forces operating in the Fort Pitt area to defend the 
region from Indian raids and to supply them turned into difficult balancing acts. The first officer 
sent to command at Fort Pitt was General Edward Hand. George Washington selected Hand 
because of his familiarity with the area, but this turned out to be a serious drawback as he was 
eventually forced out of his command because it was believed he was playing favorites with the 
Pennsylvania faction.78 Despite his eventual removal, Hand demonstrated the need for officers to 
be wary of becoming involved in the border dispute even though he did not take his own advice. 
One of his first acts was to declare anyone who would “foment the present unhappy disputes 
between the states of Virginia and Pennsylvania to public injury” as “dangerous and disaffected 
to the American Cause.” His subordinate Daniel Brodhead repeated these orders in later 
operations.79 In fact, the settlers were reported as being in a “great confusion and Distress at 
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present. The prospects of fixing a permanent boundary between Virginia and Pennsylvania, gives 
the people much satisfaction. Next to Chastising the Indians they desire that may take 
place.”80As these troubles continued to ferment, Clark found it difficult to avoid the rivalry. 
I found opposition to our Interest in the Pittsburgh Cuntrey as the whole was divided into 
Violent parties between the Virginians and pensilvanians respecting Territory [and] each 
trying to Counter Act the [other.] [The] Idea of men being for the state of Virginia 
affected the Vulgar of the one party, and as my Real instruction was [kept] 
conseald…Boath parties conceived it to be Injurious to the publick Interest to draw men 
at so Critical a moment.81
Clark and other officers were frustrated repeatedly. As the war continued, attempts at 
recruiting in and around Fort Pitt grew only more difficult. Militia service was not as reliable as 
in the New England colonies and the nature of the warfare was different. Settlers were concerned 
with the need to protect their families from frontier warfare with Native Americans. The unique 
demands of the frontier limited a commander’s ability to operate traditional campaigns. The local 
population on the frontier was first and foremost concerned with Indian raids and establishing 
their new homesteads. Fighting the British in far away posts like Detroit was unlikely to garner 
much enthusiasm amongst the general population.82
These conflicting boundaries and jurisdictions created a long-term problem of command, 
control, and supply in the Fort Pitt area, one that hampered the formation of all expeditions that 
set out towards the West. These were not new problems. Fort Pitt had always been a difficult 
post to maintain, both for the French and later for the assortment of Virginian, Pennsylvanian, 
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and royal forces that tried to hold Fort Pitt during the French and Indian War.83 The area was 
especially vulnerable to attack from the nearby Shawnees and Delawares, who could cut off 
supplies and prevent crops and livestock from being maintained in the area, not to mention the 
terror and havoc they had the potential to wreak upon the frontiers. Just as settlers had found 
during the French and Indian War, it did not take long for native raids to empty the British 
frontier of settlers.84 The potential for complete disruption of society on the frontier at any time 
made recruiting and maintaining soldiers along the frontier a difficult task at best.
When Clark set out from Williamsburg to begin gathering his forces, he had two sets of 
instructions. The public instructions spoke about raising men for the defense of Kentucky, while 
the secret instructions identified the Illinois posts as the real objective of the expedition.85 One of 
Clark’s immediate problems was that since the public did not know his real objective, he could 
not over-ride existing recruiting orders from his own state. While Virginia opposed recruiting 
men for a Continental expedition to Detroit, they did authorize the new commander at Fort Pitt, 
Lachlan McIntosh, a Continental General with experience dealing with southern Indians, to 
recruit men for an Indian expedition aimed at attacking nearby villages, all at the same time 
Clark and his officers were trying to recruit as well.86 Within the bounds of Virginia, conflicts of 
authority appear to have been unavoidable. The issue was even more complicated as Clark was 
only recruiting state units. The Illinois Regiment was a long term enlistment unit, or regular unit. 
This unit formed the core of Clark’s army and was considered part of the Virginia State Line, 
                                                
83 Anderson, Crucible of War, 325-326.
84 Ibid.,108-109, 204-205.
85 “Secret Instructions to Clark ,” 2 January 1778, in James, Clark Papers, , 34-36. 
86 “Resolution of Virginia Council,” 7 July 1778, in Kellogg, Frontier Advance, 104; McIntosh was experienced in 
dealing with natives along the Georgia frontier, had performed well militarily under George Washington in the 
Continental Army, and was recommended for the command by Henry Laurens. He was removed by his own request 
to return to help with the defense of Georgia the following spring. Kellogg and Thwaites, Frontier Defense, 297-
298. 
31
which consisted of regular army units. The location of some counties and their ability to fulfill 
the required quota of men for the Virginia units serving in the Continental army meant that there 
was often confusion about who was eligible, because those men that joined Clark would not have 
been exempt from the Continental draft. Most of the settlers living along the frontier preferred 
the short-term militia service to any type of regular service anyway, making it all the more 
difficult to obtain recruits.87
By the summer of 1778, as Clark was preparing his expedition, things had not improved 
in the area. An earlier plea by members of the Pennsylvanian and Virginian delegations to the 
Continental Congress had asked the settlers to set aside “all animosities which have heretofore 
subsisted among you as inhabitants of distinct Colonies, [and] may now give place to generous 
and concurring efforts for the preservation of every thing that can make our common Country 
dear to us.”88 Despite this plea, the commanders at Fort Pitt continued to struggle.  Lachlan 
McIntosh, who replaced General Hand in May, 1778, was forced to ask for men and supplies by 
implying he supported one colony’s claim over the others, especially when speaking to leaders of 
the local county governments. In a request for supplies from a Pennsylvania county, he reasoned, 
“I have the more reason to expect your assistance in this, as the people of Virginia think me 
Partial to your State.”89 Difficulties with calling up the militia arose in nearly every county 
because of the frequent call-ups that disrupted the planting and harvesting schedule of farmers. 
In addition, it was common for a unit to be called up it while it had not received pay from an 
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earlier term of service. Also supplies were not available to properly equip the unit for its new 
mission.90
While Clark was initially able to raise men to take to the Illinois, his later attempts at 
recruiting illustrate the problems that were never completely solved throughout the course of the 
war. In 1781, Clark had approval from the President of the Pennsylvania Council, Joseph Reed, 
to recruit men for an expedition to Detroit. Reed declared that “[Pennsylvania] authorizes you to 
declare, that so far from giving offence to this Government, we shall consider [Pennsylvanians] 
service with you, as highly meritorious.”91 Although Reed stopped short of offering any direct 
help, he did give Clark his approval to carry on his recruiting efforts. Clark’s efforts to enlist 
soldiers were met with a draft riot because of complaints about high taxes and long tours of 
military duty that kept men away from their vulnerable farms and families. An apology from 
local officials followed, but Clark wrote to Thomas Jefferson explaining his great frustration at 
the resistance against service in a cause that was of so much potential benefit to the local 
population who thwarted it:
Whoever undertakes to Raise an army in this Quarter will find himself 
disappointed…This country calls aloud for an Expedition wishing me to put it into 
Execution but so strangely Infatuated that all the methods I have been able to persue will 
not draw them into the field.92
Nephew to the famous American trader and Indian agent George Croghan, William 
Croghan summarized the situation well: “The reason so few went with him from this place, is 
Owing to the dispute that Subsists here between the Virginians and Pennsylvanians respecting 
                                                
90 Philip Ranlet, “Did Revolutionary Era Farmers Avoid the Draft?,” Continuity, Vol. 22 (1), 79-80; David Shepherd 
to Edward Hand, 22 August 1777, in Kellogg and Thwaites, Frontier Defense, , 47.
91 Joseph Reed to G.R. Clark, 15 May 1781, in James, Clark Papers, 550.
92 “Agreement on the Part of Some of the Inhabitants of Monogalia County to Submit to Future Military Orders,” 19 
June 1781; and G.R. Clark to Thomas Jefferson , 4 August 1781, both in Ibid., 568, 579.
33
the true bounds of the Latter, And the General [Clark] being a Virginian was Oppos’d by the 
most noted men here of the Pennsylvania party.”93 Even the acquisition of supplies could be 
difficult as John Canon wrote to Clark in reply to an inquiry about supplies when he was 
stationed in Illinois: “I Could wish you had been a Continantal officer instead of a state one for 
the good of the whole it would [have] prevented jelosies from ariveing and you would been 
Better supported.”94  Despite the difficulties involved, Clark was able to recruit an army large 
enough to attack and capture the Illinois posts, and he managed to hold his men together against 
dangerous odds once assembled.
The recruiting environment along the western frontier of the colonies was clearly not an 
ideal one for creating or supplying armies, especially given the type of service and hardship that 
were required for Clark’s expedition. Although Clark struggled to recruit for some of his later 
expeditions, he did have more success with his initial recruitment efforts.  Despite resistance 
from frontier settlers, Clark was able to find creative ways of filling his recruiting quotas.
The Virginia militia, like the militia in other southern colonies, predominately consisted 
of people from the lower classes. There was a long history, beginning in England and transported 
to the South, that called for filling the militias with men who were jobless or homeless. These 
men were often forced to serve, being selected by a draft or by responding to some sort of bounty 
offering from the state. This meant that the overall character of the Virginia militia was not 
vested with the interests of patriotism. Clark had to deal with this legacy directly because he 
relied almost exclusively on Virginians, finding little support from Pennsylvanians, and because 
he was working with a commission and orders from Virginia.  Middling classes, such as the 
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yeoman farmers, and the upper classes refused to enlist in the militia, especially for service in the 
regular army units; they were also hesitant to join their local militia groups because of the 
hardships they perceived or the contributions they had already made.95 Even attempts at 
reforming the militia ended in failure. Virginia proposed that new minutemen units be formed at 
the outbreak of war, but they failed to attract recruits because the Virginia Assembly refused to 
allow the election of officers in these units. The middling classes correctly perceived this as an 
attempt by the gentry to solidify their social control, which caused resentment and a severe lack 
of recruits.96Middling farmers that owned slaves were also reluctant to serve for long periods of 
time because they feared for their families safety should their slaves rise up in the masters 
absence.97
Virginia approached the Revolutionary War just as it had approached earlier conflicts. 
Instead of indiscriminately drafting from the population at large, committees were formed to 
ensure that only the lower classes of people were drafted, and when that began to encompass 
lower class farmers who could not afford to buy a substitute, the drafts were often met with 
violence.98 Throughout the war, the various regions of Virginia had a terrible record of recruiting 
and maintaining men in the field. Even during the attacks from Benedict Arnold and Lord 
Cornwallis in 1781, the yeoman and upper class farmers failed to meet their militia call-ups, 
leaving few men from Virginia present to meet the threat of a direct invasion.99
As established earlier, Virginia did place an onerous task before the state’s militias in the 
form of frequent call-ups, drafts, and lack of supplies. Simply put, there were too few men to fill 
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the ranks, and the ones that could be coaxed into any type of long term service usually deserted 
before their time of service was up. A failure by the state military to adequately protect the farms 
and towns angered the non-serving citizens that paid a hefty taxes for protection that they did not 
receive.100
Clark himself had to battle with the desertion of his men, especially while he was 
stationed at the Illinois posts. There was a “great…incouragement for Disertions when a soldier 
has only to cross the [Mississippi] to free himself from the service of his Country.”101 As Clark 
was forced to recruit mostly among the settlers who were from Virginia, he faced the same types 
of problems as officers did further to the east. He could promise his soldiers “three hundred 
Acres of Land…out of the Lands which may be conquered,” along with normal pay and bounty 
for volunteers, and not be able to meet his quotas. Interestingly, in a rare moment of concern for 
some Indians, the Virginia council was explicit in saying the lands should come from the 
conquered territory “so as not to interfere with the Claims of any friendly Indians.”102 The 
politicians were already licking their lips at the lands held by the Miamis and Illinois, while they 
also hoped to calm the irritated Shawnees and Cherokees. Land bounties were included in 
recruiting ploys to attract the type of landless lower class soldiers desired for the regular service 
(they also helped to offset the high cash demands of enlisting soldiers), yet keeping soldiers in 
the service was an expensive proposition. 
By the end of Clark’s initial capture of the Illinois posts, he was forced to offer soldiers 
$750 for service covering the duration of the war, and $100 for one year of service. This cost 
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Clark and the State of Virginia $15,400 in bonuses to keep just seventeen men in the service.103
When Clark ran into these types of difficulties, he was willing to try to work around his orders to 
fill up his recruiting quotas. Unfortunately for Clark his attempts at recruiting in counties away 
from the frontier caused Governor Henry to express his “Concern at [Clark’s] Conduct,” 
claiming the men from other regions were not well suited to the type of service Clark desired.104
While recruiting was not easy for Clark, he did have a number of options available to him, 
including his efforts to work around the spirit of his orders to recruit what would become the 
core of the Illinois Regiment.
One of they key motivations for frontier settlers who were willing to serve in the militia 
was their hatred of Native Americans. Settlers and various Native Americans had been pushing 
against one another along the frontier boundary since the earliest days of European settlement. 
Over time, this conflict evolved into a hatred of Native Americans and their customs, along with 
the refusal to recognize their rights to the land they occupied. 
This was especially true of the English who never developed the type of Métis population 
that the French used to integrate themselves into native cultures. The French were comfortable 
seeking a “middle ground” as Richard White describes it, the meeting of two different cultures, 
where an understanding regarding trade and diplomacy can be created and understood as a new, 
common culture.105 While the British did not utilize the middle ground as the French Métis did 
through living in native communities, there were British traders that were familiar enough with 
native customs to begin constructing a new middle ground. This never occurred on a large scale 
because Pontiac’s resistance to the British caused the death of many of the most skilled traders, 
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and therefore left the British with few people capable of constructing a middle ground 
environment.106 The American colonial attitude had little room for accommodation, and 
Americans were unwilling to accept native customs and culture. Americans were interested in 
controlling the land; something they eventually achieved based on their numerical superiority 
and unwillingness to work with native groups. There also was never a long “native ground” 
period, which historian Kathleen DuVal has shown to be a period when Europeans must adapt to 
native practices, not create a new middle ground. 107 The closest group to maintaining a native 
ground balance was the Miamis, but even in their protected villages along the Wabash River they 
were subject to the trading and military desires of whoever the strongest European at the time 
was.
The hatred was part of a cycle of unending violence, as French supplied natives had 
attacked settlers during the French and Indian War, and the settlers in turn retaliated after 
Pontiac’s uprising, leaving both sides filled with hatred and revenge after witnessing years of 
violence.108 By 1776-1777, the settlers had real motivation to desire action against the natives. 
Clark recorded seventeen casualties, killed, wounded, and captured in native raids in a five-
month period, a considerable number for the sparsely settled Kentucky posts.109 Settlers were so 
incensed against the natives that even the thought of supporting friendly groups was out of the 
question. When Daniel Broadhead sought support from Pennsylvania for the friendly Delawares, 
Pennsylvania’s President Joseph Reed replied that it was impossible to help because of a lack of 
funds and his doubting “whether the People in the back Counties would suffer [trading goods] to 
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proceed [through their territory], so violent are the Prejudices against the Indians.”110 Any attack 
against natives was generally well received along the frontier, but at times, this hatred could also 
dominate the outcome of other campaigns. Throughout the war, the desire to attack native 
settlements often directly prevented supplies and men from being gathered for larger pushes 
against posts like British held Detroit, but when this hatred was harnessed, it proved to be a 
major motivating force. Clark found both success and failure. He used the settlers’ hatred to his 
benefit during his initial campaigns, yet he found it to be a hindrance later on.
Clark felt he was hindered initially in his recruiting efforts because of the secretive nature 
of his orders, as it was difficult to convince volunteers from Fort Pitt to advance into Kentucky. 
In order to keep his army together, he wisely chose to keep the secret goal of capturing the 
Illinois posts from his men until they were well on their way to their objective. This made 
desertion a dangerous gamble, with the men being so far into enemy territory. This decision was 
crucial in holding his meager army together. Clark also had to act with speed because most of his 
men were raised under short terms of enlistment.
While Clark struggled to recruit Pennsylvanians to join his cause, it is doubtful whether 
they would have been of much use, as the Continental commander at Fort Pitt discovered. In 
addition, as various officers found, the Pennsylvanians closest to Fort Pitt in Westmoreland 
County refused to answer their militia call-ups, and they would not offer supplies at their own 
expense. At the same time they were quick to call for help from other quarters. The short three 
month terms of enlistment hampered their effectiveness in anything other than short term and 
nearby raids against natives. The constant fear of native raids, similar to the ones taking place in 
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Kentucky, and the necessity of protecting families and farms, made it nearly impossible to draw 
men into the service111  
The same types of problems were common for the Virginian men Clark recruited as well. 
Clark, who did not want to give up the element of surprise, refused to offer any explanation to 
recruits other than that stated in his public orders. He was authorized by Governor Henry to 
“inlist Seven Companies of Men…[and] to proceed to Kentucky.”112 This authorization provided 
little motivation as the recruitment of men for the defense of Kentucky drew protests from both 
sides of the border from men who did not consider it worthwhile to protect a “few detached 
Inhabitants [in Kentucky] that had better be removed.”113 Nonetheless, Clark did manage to 
recruit about 150 soldiers, with an additional 25 joining the expedition en route as they passed 
through Kentucky.
Clark’s secret instructions were much more detailed than the public ones. Again, he was 
authorized to recruit seven companies, but this time the object was clearly stated; to “attack the 
British post at [Kaskaskia]. The orders also included instructions to “keep the true Destination of 
your Force secret.” Also included were instructions to be kind to the French citizens of Illinois if 
they proved loyal and for establishing a fort at the mouth of the Ohio River.114 Clark knew there 
would be trouble once he revealed the true goal of the expedition, and he planned to stop the 
“desertion [that he] knew would ensue on Troops knowing their Destination.” He was “sensible 
of the impression it would have on many, to be taken near a thousand miles [from the Body of 
their Country to attact a People five times their number and merciless[ly] [to face] Tribes of 
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Indians[,] their Allies[,] and determine[d] Enemies to us.” Clark had held his small army together 
thus far by not revealing their true mission, but in order to prevent desertions, he made camp on 
Corn Island, which was located at the Falls of the Ohio near present day Louisville, Kentucky. 
This island was large enough to construct a blockhouse on and had room enough to begin 
cultivation of a crop as well. While being an island, it also allowed Clark to issue patrols that 
prevented men from deserting upon learning their real destination. 115 Clark thus managed to 
bring together a reluctant group of men to serve in his army and went to great lengths to make 
sure they could not leave against his will.
While there were many challenges involved in gaining first the recognition of Kentucky, 
and then in creating an army amidst the anti-recruiting environment that existed along the 
frontier, Clark was remarkably successful, both politically and militarily. Clark, with 
creditability among the gentry and among the frontier settlers, was uniquely positioned to not 
only assure the recognition of Kentucky as a Virginia county, but he was also adept at winning 
over the opinions of the frontier settlers towards opposing the rule of Henderson’s proprietors. 
As help was dispatched, and with the acceptance of plans for an Illinois expedition, Clark was 
able to navigate the difficult situation involved with recruiting and gathering supplies around 
Fort Pitt. He used his knowledge of frontier settlers to entice or trick them into serving in his 
force. Clark’s experiences had taught him the skills necessary to work with disparate groups of 
people and find ways to unite them in their goals.
The beginnings of George Rogers Clark’s expedition gave him, or in a sense forced upon 
him, situations in which different types of people had to be brought together. This included 
people with different goals in mind, and Clark needed to meld these together in order to achieve 
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a greater goal that none could reach on their own. If Clark had sided with Richard Henderson, 
with the formers attachment to North Carolina, it is doubtful that less populated North Carolina 
could have offered the support necessary for the Illinois expedition, as the wealthier and more 
populous Virginia barely had the resources to spare itself. In addition, it is doubtful Clark would 
have played any meaningful role because his connections to government were in Virginia. Clark 
was decisive in his actions and used his connections with people of different classes to find a 
common cause for the defense of Kentucky, for personal financial reasons, and eventually for the 
long-term safety of the settlers, which he expected to achieve through an invasion and 
occupation of the Illinois Country. The genesis of these and other western conflicts of the period 
can be pinpointed in the aggressive behavior of whites toward Native Americans. The battle for 
land between the Kentucky settlers, or the existing arguments concerning titles to land purchases 
involving Native Americans, led natives to defend their lands. These conflicts widened the scope 
of players involved considerably, to include British royal authority, the French, and the Spanish. 
Nearly every decision or obstacle Clark had to face was in some way related to the various 
groups of Native Americans living along the Ohio Valley, while the many villages themselves 
faced an array of options upon the arrival of George Rogers Clark as well.
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CHAPTER 2 - Life on the Frontier: The French, Indians, and 
Spanish in the Illinois Country
The settlers of Kentucky had sparked conflict with the various native nations of the Ohio 
Valley, leading George Rogers Clark to form an expedition aimed at occupying the Illinois 
Country, which he hoped would curb the raids into Kentucky. Upon his capture of Vincennes, 
Clark proclaimed to the citizens that they were guilty of exciting Indians to “assassinate the 
inhabitants of the frontiers” and his army was the result of a “cry for vengeance” from the United 
States.116 There were many different factors at work during Clark’s expedition to the Illinois 
Country. The situation was very complex, involving large numbers of Native Americans from 
the far western edge of the Great Lakes to eastern Ohio. The influence of the Spanish Empire and 
the remnants of France’s North American Empire also loomed large in any expedition headed for 
the Illinois Country.  Not only were Native Americans struggling to deal with the profound shifts 
in power that occurred following British victory in the French and Indian War, but the remaining 
French settlers and the Spanish who were struggling to take control of the vast land concessions 
gained from France also faced radically different situations on the North American continent. 
Clark had honed his abilities as a leader and cultural negotiator by the time he set out for the 
Illinois Country, but on the far western frontier, he faced more diversity than ever before. While 
the situation near Fort Pitt was somewhat convoluted, the situation in the Illinois was more so as 
Clark faced, exotic Indians likes the Sacs, Iowas, and Illini and was as French and Spanish 
settlers. The Illinois Expedition highlights the greatest achievement of Clark’s career and also 
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highlights his ability to gain the cooperation of diverse groups of populations to work towards 
his own goals. To understand the complexity of the situation Clark encountered it is necessary to 
look at the conditions on the ground in the Illinois Country prior to his arrival and how that 
situation came to exist as Clark would meld to gather alliances that had never existed before or 
after his arrival. Therefore, this chapter will look at each group separately, beginning with 
Indians to illustrate why they were not hostile to Clark and then move on to examine why the 
French and Spanish were willing to work with Clark as well.
The long-standing conflicts over land among various groups of settlers and Native Americans 
continued to fester, at times hampering recruitment. This chapter will primarily focus on British 
Indian policy following Pontiac’s War when natives in the resisted British power and 
subsequently rose up to fight against encroachment. According to Colin Calloway, this was 
because of a lack of gift giving and British “disregard for the strength of…Indian sentiments.”117
These resentments survived a British victory over Pontiac and his allies and continued to fuel 
native resistance against the advances of colonial society. The French remained to try and 
maintain their ways of life under British dominion, while the Spanish struggled to find a balance 
between economic progress and the huge expenses involved in managing the newly acquired and 
sparsely settled Louisiana territory.118 The British victory ensured an English-speaking North 
America, but by the time that Clark’s expedition set out, he was still dealing with the failed 
efforts of assimilation and subjugation of the British and the divide in the British Atlantic 
Community.119 The question of how Indians fit into the British Empire as subjects and efforts to 
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protect the land promised to them by the Treaty of Paris, along with the failure to do so, left 
many hard feelings between whites and Indians.120 The British found it difficult to subjugate the 
conquered French as they had done in Acadia, but rather learned with their occupation of Canada 
that assimilation into the British Empire was a much more viable alternative. The Illinois French 
were mostly isolated fearing neither British authority nor any widespread assimilation campaign 
because of their remote location and the lack of clear British policy in what they considered 
Indian Country. 121 Clark was forced to deal with all these different cultural forces as he prepared 
for his invasion. He also needed to find a way to work with the other groups, especially the 
French settlers, who could help neutralize the advantages the British and their native allies could 
muster if properly mobilized. Once the rift between Britain and the colonies was clearly 
understood, Indians would have the diplomatic options that two rival powers provided. The 
former allies of France could not help but remember how their diplomatic options were reduced 
when there was only one trading partner available.
Pontiac’s War and the continuing influence of the French were just two of the factors that 
Clark had to deal with upon his arrival in the Illinois. One of the key groups for Clark during his 
expedition were natives, both nearby groups like the Illini and the more distant Miamis. These 
groups had their own long and complicated histories and by the time Clark arrived in the Illinois 
they had shifted alliances numerous times over the previous thirty years. Clark’s ability to 
capitalize on the discontentment of the natives was impressive on his part since had no real 
supplies to share. His diplomatic accomplishments though were not simplistic as this chapter will 
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illustrate, native people long endured poor relations with supposed allies. Although the scope of 
this chapter is large, covering various Indian nations, the French, and Spanish, all of those groups 
played a key role in Clark’s success. Without an understanding of the situation in the Illinois, it 
is impossible to understand how Clark was able to gain the support of various groups. Clark’s 
abilities as a diplomat and negotiator were enhanced tremendously by the situation that existed in 
the Illinois. Clark believed that by capturing the French-inhabited posts in the Illinois Country, 
he would cut off the British supplies that passed through the region’s trading posts. The Illinois 
could also serve as a staging point for a campaign aimed at capturing British held Detroit. The 
purpose of this chapter is to examine why key native peoples in the Illinois Country acquiesced 
to the presence of George Rogers Clark’s army and to establish what favorable conditions 
existed in the French towns of the Illinois and the Spanish controlled colonies on the west bank 
of the Mississippi River. 
British Indian policy failed to supply adequately their Indian allies and trading partners 
caused some native leaders, especially those most impacted by Clark’s arrival like the Illini and 
Miamis, to support the Americans or remain neutral. Some nations, particularly those west of 
present day Ohio, even overlooked the aggressiveness of American settlers for a short period of 
time. By presenting a temporary alternative to the neglectful British, Clark was able to gain some 
acceptance in native circles. 
Also critical to Clark’s success were the French settlers living throughout the Illinois. Despite 
British and Spanish political authority over the area, the French had retained, for the most part, 
control of the fur trade, and continued to be the largest European population in the region. 
Conflicts between French and British merchants were common, and in the face of the constant 
threat of Spanish invasion, Britain chose to withdraw the garrison stationed in the Illinois. This 
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left the region vulnerable to foreign or native attack or even rebellion by the French inhabitants. 
This weakness was rooted in the British policy of cutting expenses, in this case the expensive 
frontier garrisons, to make the occupation of America more profitable. 
Finally, the Spanish used their new position of authority in Louisiana to employ French 
traders and encourage the development of French towns in Spanish territory. The Spanish 
courted Indians in Missouri and Iowa as military and trading partners, while also negotiating 
with the Miamis, Illini, and others living in British territory hoping to prevent them from 
becoming British allies. They attempted to control the trade of nations in the British sphere of 
influence as well. Spain also sought to increase its power in the Mississippi Valley and was 
willing to aid the Americans if doing so presented a strategic opportunity to increase Spanish 
influence.122
To understand the decision made by natives near the Illinois, such as the Illini, Miamis, and 
Potawatomi, to initially aid George Rogers Clark, it is important to understand the state of affairs 
between the various native peoples and the British Empire prior to Clark’s invasion. Following 
the French and Indian War (1754-1763), the British were in a position where they needed to win 
over the former French allied Indians. They had failed to win the allegiance of most native 
nations who had the opportunity to ally with the French, and the British realized a new effort was 
necessary to secure their western territories. While the British looked to improve their methods 
of trade and management, they moved towards a system of imperial control, rather than the 
previous practice of colonial control. When put into practice, this system of trade and control 
failed because it was poorly funded, unable to control American frontier settlers, and undermined 
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by the influence of French and Spanish traders. This in turn left the native peoples open to 
outside influences. British Indian policy and the British system of trade failed because of the lack 
of funding from London conflicts between the imperial center and various colonial governments, 
and competition from French and Spanish traders continued to weaken a British system had not 
been strong from its inception.
The withdrawal of the French from east of the Mississippi River left a partial void in Indian 
trade and diplomacy that the British attempted to fill with their new trade system and an influx of 
British merchants. The history of Britain’s Indian trade and management policy is a long and 
complex tale, filled with dialogue between North American commanders and officials in 
London. Efforts were made to pacify the native peoples, provide new lands for American 
settlers, reap the benefits of the fur trade, and cut back on the huge expense of maintaining 
military posts throughout North America. Tracking the changes in British policy from the end of 
French rule to the American Revolution is easily entire an work in itself; in fact, Jack Sosin’s 
Whitehall and the Wilderness is an excellent study of British policy decisions during the period. 
Here we will examine only the final phase of Indian management that led to increasing hostilities 
between native peoples and American settlers at the time of Clark’s invasion.123
A consistent theme in British officials’ discussions of Indian trade and diplomacy was the 
need to cut expenses. Budgetary constraints meant that none of the interior forts or Indian agents 
were allowed to give out the customary presents, such as gunpowder for hunting, leaving many 
peoples desperate for their everyday goods. Complicating the situation was the lack of regular 
Indian agents in the interior, as George Croghan who operated out of Fort Pitt, was responsible 
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for relations with nearly every nation in the Ohio Valley, meaning everyday relationships were 
managed by the post commanders at Vincennes and Kaskaskia who had few resources with 
which to work. The British did not make a major effort to fully supply their Indian allies until 
after the Clark expedition. Traders and their merchandise initially flowed through British posts 
specifically designated by the government, instead of the traditional method taking goods to the 
Indian villages. They were also policed by imperial soldiers. This created decreased trading 
opportunities for British and American traders because the French were willing to illegally trade 
goods in the Indian villages. The Commander of British forces in North American, General 
Thomas Gage felt this system allowed “The Officers Commanding…to protect the traders, to 
prevent the Indians from being cheated or defrauded, [and] to take precautions respecting 
Rum.”124
As early as 1766, the idea of abandoning some of the interior posts to cut expenses became 
popular. “By evacuating Such Posts as shall be deemed not worth Maintaining” Gage wrote, “a 
Saving will be made in the Article of Expense.”125  Northern Indian Superintendent William 
Johnson opposed closing the posts warning that the “Expedient” was “fraught with many 
dangers, and…will open a door for Fraud on our sides[,] Chicane on that of the French[, and]… 
may end in much bloodshed and infinite Expence.”126 While the system of imperial control was 
not perfect and abuses occurred, it did give the imperial government a constant presence in the 
interior and provided a larger degree of control than if the trade were administered by the 
colonial governments.
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Eventually most of the western posts were abandoned, and the Indian trade, though not 
Indian diplomacy, was turned over to the individual colonies. These gradual changes a decade 
before Clark’s expedition set the stage for his eventual success in winning Indian allies. The 
results of this new policy of colonial control at that time though quickly became evident to the 
men who dealt with Indians the most, William Johnson and his agents. Responding to a report 
from William Johnson, his nephew and deputy Guy Johnson complained that the colonies 
“would do little or nothing with regard to Establishments for the Indian Trade, and that a Union 
of Sentiments thereon could not be expected from them.”127 Even the natives were apprehensive 
of colonial management. Appealing to the king through William Johnson, who “gave them many 
assurances…that these matters…were under consideration…sent to the Gov. of this 
Province…they answered that they had no expectation from that quarter, and that their 
application to his Majesty’s was founded on a certainty that they could expect no redress 
elsewhere.”128 Alexander McKee, a British agent of half-Shawnee ancestry, who had worked in 
the Northern Indian Department since 1759 and was intimately connected with events in Ohio, 
lamented the failure of decentralized control, complaining that he lacked resources and was 
isolated because of the withdrawal of the British military from the interior.129 These were the 
policies that affected the nations of the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes. Clark would fail to match 
the British when it came offer adequate supplies and trading goods, but a show of force and the 
hope that the Americans offered something better than the British were powerful motivators.
The area known as the Illinois Country constituted a large area of the present day state of 
Illinois. The western border was along the Mississippi River with the territory encompassing 
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prairies east to the Wabash River, which originates in North-Central Indiana and flows 
Southwesterly towards the Ohio River. North to South, the territory stretched from Lake 
Michigan to the conjunction of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.
Figure 2.1: Source: University of Texas Libraries
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/united_states/early_indian_east.jpg, accessed on May 9, 
2009
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The Indians of the Illinois Country constantly shifted locations and participated in local 
rivalries, but the various villages and cultures can be divided into three geographic groupings. 
Central and Southern Illinois was populated by the Illinwek Confederation, made up of various 
groups like the Peoria. Along the Wabash River on the eastern edge of the territory villages can 
be labeled as the Wabash Nations, consisting mainly of Kickapoos, Mascoutens, Miamis, Weas, 
and Piakenshaw nations. In the north, the Potawatomi were the most active in the Illinois 
Country, but they were closely allied with their northern neighbors the Ottawa and Chippewa 
nations. The Shawnee, Delaware, and Mingo nations also played an important role in the area, 
but they mainly operated out of the Ohio area to the east. Throughout the period prior to the 
American Revolution and even throughout that war, dividing these nations as either pro or anti 
British is problematic. Many of the nations and villages were split throughout the war while 
others changed sides several times. Therefore despite many internal divisions, most of the 
nations not directly under American military control sided with the British as the war continued. 
Even though most ended up on the British side, enough dissatisfaction with British policy existed 
for Clark to successfully argue the American case, if only temporarily.
Clark faced a variety of cultures with a variety of problems. Typically of those nations that 
had felt the constant pressure of white expansion was the Shawnees, and as Clark found warfare 
was the only exchange he would have with these alienated nations. Lord Dunmore’s War pushed 
the Shawnees out of their Kentucky hunting grounds, and the eruption of the American 
Revolution offered a chance for the Shawnees to renew their war against American settlers, but 
many Shawnees were resistant to the war calls. The Shawnees are a good example of how Indian 
nations remained divided throughout the war as they sought out self-preservation in a war zone. 
The Shawnees were not totally committed to war against the Americans until the final year of the 
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Revolution in 1783, and many chose to migrate west rather than stay and fight. Being located 
between pro-British nations around the lakes and aggressive frontiersmen made neutrality a 
difficult and often bloody path to steer.130 Efforts across the continent to create a pan-Indian 
alliance to resist white settlers gained momentum as nativists and those that favored British 
alliances and trade now had a common cause to champion, while those who favored peace often 
left their villages and settled at neutral outposts like the Delaware village at Coshocton. Self-
interest and preservation served as powerful motivators that left many villages divided about 
how to deal with this conflict.131
The nation in most immediate contact with Clark and his soldiers came from the Illini, who 
nominally controlled a large swath of land in the Illinois, but were weak militarily. The Illini are 
typical of some of the smaller nations that were extremely dependent on Euro-American forces 
and therefore were easier for Clark to control. The constant pressure from other native raiders 
had dispersed the Illini, and their fondness for the French led to increased trade with the Spanish, 
not the British. Clark found a weak confederation, many years removed from being a military 
power. They were, therefore, willing to negotiate with him. 
Finally, the third type of nation Clark dealt with were those groups that were far enough 
away from Clark in the Illinois, the British at Detroit, and the American settlers in Kentucky that 
were able to maintain their independence without restoring to outright warfare. At Vincennes 
along the Wabash River, the powerful and independent minded Miamis were Clark’s main 
concern. The Miamis had moved frequently and by 1776 had migrated from area around present-
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day Chicago into the lower Wabash Valley, and encounters with British traders along the Ohio 
River.132  This created a long history of French and British competition for their trade.
 When Louisbourg fell to British forces in King George’s War, 1744-1748, it created a 
demand for goods in the Ohio Valley that British trader George Croghan filled by setting up a 
trading post at Pickawillany with the support of Miami Chief Memeskia. In 1752 the French 
reacted to British intrusions into the Ohio Valley with an attack led by the French-Ottawa officer 
Charles-Michel Mouet de Langlade on the native village and trading post of Pickawillany, 
located in present day Ohio. The Miamis stayed in the French sphere of influence because the 
colonies of Pennsylvania and Virginia elected not to aid their newly acquired trading partners.133  
However, in the aftermath of the French and Indian war, the Miamis proved much less hostile to 
the British than many of the other western nations. Despite their friendliness towards the British, 
they also maintained friendly relations with French traders. The Miami were adept at playing the 
game of diplomacy, as demonstrated during Pontiac’s War when they balanced British interests 
with those of their western relatives who supported the war, all to maintain a semblance of 
Miami neutrality.134  Despite the Miami efforts at neutrality, the Pinkashaws, closely related to 
the Miamis, preferred to deal with the Spanish and the French. 135
The Miamis occupied a position which greatly aided their efforts to remain sovereign. Along 
the Wabash River, the Miamis were located far enough away from Detroit to resist direct British
control, but were far enough north of the Ohio River and west of Pennsylvania and Virginia to 
only be slightly affected by frontier settlers before and during the American Revolution. In fact, 
most of the Miamis’ hostility towards the frontiersmen emanated from the bitter warriors of the 
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eastern nations like the Mingoes, Shawnees, and eventually the Delawares who were bearing the 
full brunt of Anglo-American western expansion.136 In the end, only the Piankeshaws, farthest 
south along the Wabash River and closest to Clark’s invasion, allied with the Americans, but 
overall the Miamis’ advantageous location allowed them to treat with both sides during the 
conflict. Although the Miamis were to some extent more independent in their actions than other 
nations in the Ohio Valley, their close blood ties to the French and the dominance the French had 
exerted in trade over them prior to the British occupation, meant that they were still dependent 
on European powers for necessary trade goods.  
Clark’s army was made up of men that played a large role in igniting frontier violence. 
Conflict between white settlers and Indians had taken place since the first Europeans landed on 
the Atlantic coast, and as Clark built up his army, his soldiers had been the lead wave of an 
invasion of the Indian land in the backcountry. Both Indian hating culture, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter, and the Indian resistance to white settlers along the frontier and 
their willingness to negotiate with Euro-Americans had deep roots in colonial history. This was 
just another layer of conflict Clark had to manage as he created his alliances. The failure of the 
British to manage the Indian trade created major problems, but the British failure to control the 
American settlers pushing into Indian Country created even more tension between Native 
Americans and Euro-Americans, often erupting in armed conflict. Problems started from the very 
beginning with the Proclamation of 1763, which forbid new settlement in the interior of North 
America as a temporary act, and through the events of 1774, which saw Lord Dunmore’s War, 
1773-1774, and the passage of the Quebec Act, which officially locked speculators out of title to 
the western land they coveted.
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Following the conclusion of the French and Indian War, Britain issued the Proclamation of 
1763 which forbade white settlement, with the exception of some veterans, west of the 
Alleghany Mountains. The British Commander in Chief for North America, General Thomas 
Gage, was optimistic about the Proclamation’s effects on the restless native population, believing 
his Indian agents would “make the best use of this, and it must convince [the natives] of His 
Majesty’s Sincere Intentions to favor and protect Them.”137 Despite his early optimism, Gage 
showed a shrewd understanding of the frontier just two years later, as “Indian Affairs seem to 
take a favorable turn, and there is a very good Prospect of a General Pacification, unless it is 
interrupted by the lawless and Licentious Proceedings of the Frontier Inhabitants.”138 Gage could 
see the big picture from his position and correctly saw that his greatest challenge was in 
controlling the frontier settlers.
Lawlessness on the frontier was one of the primary complaints that General Gage and his 
Northern Indian Superintendent, William Johnson, reported. Johnson, for example, related to one 
of his agents an account of how difficult it was to force the Governor of Pennsylvania to bring a 
particular murderer to justice: this incident “with the rest of the conduct of the back settlers will 
render a peace very uncertain and of a short duration.”139 Traders and natives often had violent 
conflicts that resulted in murder; the effects of alcohol and profit were ever present. Giving the 
local Indians justice was difficult because, prior to 1774. there was no colonial law in effect in 
the interior. So when “two Squaws were barbarously murdered…by an English Negro,” Johnson 
wished “with all [his] heart he could be tried here and if condemned to suffer death, his being 
made an example of in the presence of the Indians…and convince them that we never skreen bad 
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people from Justice. Whereas if the Negro is sent down…the Indians will…believe he is sent on 
purpose out of the way.”140 Johnson’s immediate superior, North American Commander in Chief 
Thomas Gage, sent his report to London. In the report he mentioned “fresh Complaints from the 
Indians of Murthers committed,” in relation to this incident. Gage also illustrated his proactive 
attempts at governance by offering “Assistance to drive the settlers off Indian Lands…but 
whether the Councils [colonial governments] would…apply for Military Aid, may be rather 
doubtful.”141
The problem only became more acute as time passed. In 1768, Indian Agent George Croghan 
noted a tremendous influx of settlers into the Ohio Valley following the Fort Stanwix Treaty, 
while he also claimed credit for defusing a possible Indian uprising.142 In 1769, Gage wrote to 
Johnson complaining that the settlement boundary lines were not being observed, and that “The 
Frontier People are too Numerous, too Lawless and Licentious ever to be restrained…[despite] 
the most severe Laws to restrain their People, but those Laws will never be executed.” Johnson 
wholeheartedly agreed with “[Gage’s] opinion as to the Conduct which may be expected from 
the Frontier Inhabitants, particularly the Virginians.”143 In response to the continued conflict 
between settlers and Indians, Johnson was a supporter of establishing a permanent boundary 
between White and Indian settlements.144
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By 1774 William Johnson described the continuous pattern of encroachment as “so many and 
encreased so fast that they alone would be sufficient to bring on a War.”145 Johnson’s agent, 
Alexander McKee, squarely placed blame for the 1774 war (Lord Dunmore’s War) on the 
“Expeditious Settlement of this Country.”146 Agent George Croghan concurred: “[The 
Shawnees] earnestly remonstrated to me—That the country westward of the Allegany Mountains 
was their property.”147 Thomas Gage also received reports from several agents in the field that 
the Shawnees, Delawares, and Mingoes “threatened an open Rupture with Virginia.”148 The 
native peoples’ continued violence was led by the Shawnees, Mingos,  and Delawares, who 
suffered the most from settlers moving west after the Fort Stanwix Treaty, which the Shawnees 
had refused to recognize. In response the Shawnees were defeated in Lord Dunmore’s War and 
were forced to cede their Kentucky hunting grounds.149 Encroachment by settlers led directly to 
Lord Dunmore’s War in 1774 and left a lasting bitterness with many nations.
Another key to Clark’s victory was the dislike of the British common among all of his allies. 
As with Indians nations, the French settlers under British control were also unhappy and their 
history of discontent with the British illustrates how Clark was able to gain their cooperation and 
then loose it when he made his own management mistakes. As the British failed to control their 
own subjects from encroaching on Indian lands, they faced other threats as well, namely those 
from French and Spanish traders positioned deep in the interior of the Mississippi Valley. 
Besides the hindrances caused by British policy that restricted traders to specific outposts instead 
of trading directly in Indian villages, there were long established relationships that existed 
between the natives and the French, and traders in New Orleans paid better prices for furs. The 
                                                
145 Ibid., 115.
146 Nelson, A Man of Distinction, 76.
147 George Croghan to William Johnson, 3 June 1767, in Flick, Johnson Papers, Volume V, 560.
148 Thomas Gage to William Johnson, 28 June 1767, in Ibid., 574.
149 White, The Middle Ground, 362-365.
58
British had to face all these disadvantages when fighting for the trade and loyalty of the former 
French allies. This failure to secure the trade meant that many tribes, despite being in British 
territory, were more loyal to the seemingly borderless French traders.
One of the biggest problems for British traders was their inability to become a part of native 
culture or actively participate in both a Euro-American and native world. Richard White has 
termed this the “middle ground,” a place where natives and whites came together and through 
common experience created a new culture or a modicum of understanding. British traders did not 
integrate into Indian society, and even the British cultural mediators (closest equivalent to the 
French Métis) were not multi-cultural, but tended to only be a part of one or the other group’s 
culture.150 These British “go-betweens” were the men working behind the scenes, the men who 
actually accomplished the hard work of negotiations. Unlike the French who became part of a 
new culture, the British tended to simply facilitate communication between two distinct cultures, 
and as the colonists pushed harder for land cessions, there was less and less need for talk, 
illustrating the fragile position the go-betweens maintained.151 This left British traders at a severe 
disadvantage when competing for trade away from the designated military outposts. This 
creation of a “middle ground” was not unique to the Ohio Valley, but the idea of a new cultural 
creation and the role of mediators have been proven to be present throughout New France, as 
Jennifer Brown has illustrated in The New People. Bruce Trigger has also illustrated that the 
French fur trade companies were aware of the need for cultural mediators, despite the ignorance 
of the governing officials.152
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Besides losing valuable trade revenues, British officials were worried that the French and 
Spanish were inciting the natives against Britain as well. The Illinois Country was particularly 
vulnerable to foreign influence as George Croghan dispatched more deputies to “remove 
dangerous Jealousies, and Suspicions, which the French had Industriously propagated against 
us.”153 Here economics also came into play for Britain because the French, with easy access to 
trade goods from New Orleans could more easily attract Indian trading partners: “it [would have 
been] very difficult, if not impossible, except at a vast Annual Expence in Presents, to retain the 
Indians, in our Interest.” Croghan was convinced that “the Skins and Furs, received [from Illinois 
and New Orleans are] Shipped to France,” as opposed to Britain.154
While attempting to occupy and pacify the Illinois Country, General Gage thought that “the 
French may contribute greatly to our Success, or by secret Endeavors create as much 
Disturbance and Opposition.”155 Gage also reported that the Spanish were quick to take 
advantage of the Franco-Indian connection, as they adopted “the Plan of the French with respect 
to Indian Affairs, and the Agents employed by the latter, will continue in the Service of the 
Spaniards…It is reported that [the Spanish Governor] has already engaged in the Trading 
Company of the Illinois.”156 Interestingly enough the Spanish worried about losing control of 
their trade to residents in British Illinois, though they frequently courted many of the native 
peoples from British territory.157
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Prior to the American Revolution there were many different influences active in the Illinois 
Country. The British were unable to control effectively such a complex and fluid situation, 
especially on a tight budget. While the Native Americans were not fully being provided for as 
they expected, they did have options to circumvent the British system of trade. While the British 
had to contend with Native Americans and their needs, they also had to deal with the 
expansionistic minded American frontiersmen and the profit minded French and Spanish 
merchants. British Indian policy and the British system of trade proved unsuccessful due to a 
lack of money, unwieldy settlers, and foreign competition. This situation created the opportunity 
for the right man at the right time to shift the balance of power in the Illinois Country by courting 
native peoples who were anxious to improve their lot.
France ceded all of her land claims west of the Mississippi in 1763 to Spain, while all of the 
French colonies east of the Mississippi River, Quebec and part of Louisiana, were ceded to Great 
Britain. Settlement in the interior of the continent was sparse, with the French concentrating in 
several settlements in the Illinois Country that the British occupied. The three primary 
settlements were located at Cahokia, just across the Mississippi from modern St. Louis; at 
Kaskaskia, to the south and along the Mississippi; and at Vincennes, on the eastern edge of 
Illinois on the Wabash River. Throughout the American Revolution and despite British control 
and trade regulations, these settlements remained predominately French, even enduring an 
exodus of many Frenchmen west of the Mississippi River into Spanish territory. They also 
continued to hold tremendous influence among many of the nearby nations of the Illini, 
northward to the Potawatomi, and east to Miamis and their relatives along the Wabash River. 
The influence and cooperation of these settlers was a vital part of the efforts of both the British 
and Americans in maintaining control of the settlements and conducting successful diplomacy 
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with natives, as well as for the maintenance of any garrison in the country. The need for French 
support was evidenced by their continued dominance of the fur trade and later their ability to 
influence whether or not their trading partners initially supported Clark and his men.158
The population grew little in the Illinois. The French settlers in the area were attracted to 
fur trading or missionary efforts along the Mississippi, which did not create a population of 
families and farmers. The Illini and Miamis came from all directions to the French towns to 
conduct trade, further strengthening their cultural ties.159 The slow development of town sites 
and agricultural led to a perception of laziness and incompetence that colored outside 
interpretations of the region. Contemporary visitors, as well as historians, have described the 
French males in the Illinois as having “habits of indolence,” and their wives as “indolent and 
shiftless as their husbands.”160 Many historians from the first half of the twentieth century, such 
as James Alton James and Clarence W. Alvord, continued to use the prevalent Anglo bias of 
British observers in the eighteenth century. Alvord, much like James, considered the French 
settlers, despite their experience as woodsmen, hunters, traders, and soldiers, to be “generally 
timid and resourceless,” or unable to exhibit “boldness and initiative in action.” Alvord even 
goes so far as to attribute the formation of villages, rather than individual farmsteads across the 
landscape, as due to the “social character” of the settlers.161 Voluminous accounts of British 
opinions back up these claims, such as those contained in the reports and letters of British agents 
like Alexander Fraser and George Croghan who claimed that the French were “unconsciencious 
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Rascals” and an “idle and lazy people [,] a Parcel of Renegadoes from Canada and much worse 
than Indians.”162
A closer look at the French settlements shows a reality that was much different from the 
British and American stereotypes that have survived in the historical record. The Illinois initially 
attracted the French as traders and missionaries. As agriculturally based communities appeared 
in support of the traders and priests, the settlers gathered in villages for defensive purposes, not 
because of their “social character.” This allowed the settlers to live with protection and to work 
in their fields as groups, fostering the creation of a common field that each settler had the right to 
sow and harvest. A collective right to put livestock to pasture on the fields in the winter existed. 
A common pasture area for livestock and woodcutting developed all around a nuclear village. 
This common land usage was unique in French North America. Most of the unsavory reputations 
attributed to the French are because of the more transient population of traders that moved 
through the area, not the permanently settled farmers, or habitants.163
The French maintained a spirit of independence, possibly due to their distance from 
central authority for most of the settlements’ existence. Most settlers saw political independence 
as the status quo in the Illinois Country despite the stereotype that the French were unfamiliar 
with democracy when the Americans arrived. The French community traditionally made 
involved in decisions involving the local government, the church, and trade affairs. The French 
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also had a tradition of successful military service.164 The French conducted in inter-continental 
commerce, exporting wheat to New Orleans as early as 1710, while the Illinois was known for 
producing the best wheat in North America, quite a compliment since the French relied heavily 
upon a wheat bread diet. Wheat was an important part of the economy, both for the Illinois as an 
export and for provisions in New Orleans. Around sixty-eight percent of Illinois farmers used 
some sort of non-family labor (black and native slaves and hired), illustrating how valuable the 
large grain exports were to the area.165
Following the British occupation of the Illinois, many of French settlers moved into 
Spanish territory. These new settlers established St. Louis in 1764, opposite Cahokia and to the 
south; opposite of Kaskaskia, St. Genevieve grew in population, after initially serving as a 
satellite farming community to the former throughout the 1750s.166 Approximately 2,000 settlers 
fled into Spanish territory, leaving nearly 1,600 on the British side of the Mississippi, consisting 
of 1,000 white settlers and 600 black slaves.167 Although British and American traders and 
merchants began to take control of the trade, in both furs and grain as intermediaries, the French 
still did most of the actual production.168 Production continued to be significant as well. In 1773, 
Thomas Hutchins wrote that “The inhabitants raise large Quantities of Grain and yet they don’t 
neglect carrying on a constant commerce with the Savages. The Peltrys they get…may amount to 
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the Sum of 3,000 pounds sterling – This exclusive of the Profits of Agriculture, which are 
sometimes more and sometimes less.”169
This uncontrolled economic power left the British suspicious of French activities. The 
settlers continued their loyalty to the French Crown, because people of circulated rumors of the 
French returning to take possession of the country. British officers worried about the French 
“power to spread reports and poison the minds of the Indians.”170 While the French remained 
critical to the success of an Imperial British presence in the Illinois, their loyalty was constantly 
questioned, probably with good reason. British officers feared what would happen should the 
French militia be called upon. Lt. Governor Henry Hamilton felt that of all the “French 
inhabitants, at all the out Posts…not one in twenty[‘s]…oath of Allegiance would have force 
enough to bind him to his duty.” While “An Officer’s presence with Troops is much wanted, for 
the minds of the Indians [specifically the Wabash nations], in remote posts are poisoned by the 
falsehoods and misrepresentations of the French.”171 Hamilton stressed the loyalty of the Wabash 
nations because of the need to employ them as a defense against any advance on Detroit.172
During their occupation of the Illinois Country, 1766-1778, the British failed to gain the 
loyalty of the French settlers or to control the fur trade, leaving an opening for Clark to exploit 
upon his arrival. Much of the conflict undermining British authority was due to squabbles 
between French and British traders. The squabbling in the Illinois Country made it even more 
likely, that should an outside threat, like Clark arrive, it would be easy to gain the initial 
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cooperation of at least a faction of the French. Although Clark went much further and gained 
near total cooperation during his early actions. When the British withdrew their forces from the 
Illinois to counter the American invasion of Canada in 1775, they left Philippe-François de 
Rastel de Rocheblave as the administrative commander of all the Illinois Country. Rocheblave 
endured difficult circumstances because of his lack of military authority and small budget. He 
was also criticized by many British traders because he had recently been employed by the 
Spanish as commandant at St. Genevieve before returning to Kaskaskia. Around 1774 he 
returned to Kaskaskia, where he was named commandant by the British. Born into the minor 
nobility of France, he was one of the few noblemen to permanently reside in the Illinois. He 
seemed to get along well with the French inhabitants, but had trouble controlling the British and 
American traders that began arriving.
In April of 1777, Rocheblave’s superiors received a petition from the Kennedy and 
Bentley trading company. The company agent complained that “Mr. De Rocheblave’s being 
vested with the Government…[we] find to Our most bitter Grief our Liberties trampled upon and 
common Justice in almost all cases refused us.” The accusers claimed that Rocheblave favored 
the French and their customs; when complaints were filed, he was accused of informing the 
merchants that he would take no action because “such are the laws of France which he orders us 
to follow telling us he knows no other refusing the English Laws.” Rocheblave was operating as 
the French had always done in their dealings in the fur trade, and his refusal to completely open 
up the fur trade to non-French traders left many British and American traders frustrated.
The community had also passed laws forbidding the sale of alcohol to the natives for its 
own safety. The British traders also resented the connections the Frenchmen had with the 
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surrounding Indians.173 Writing to Lt. Governor Hamilton, Rocheblave was clearly frustrated 
with the multicultural situation he faced. “At present one is obliged every day to imprison young 
men who demand that if the English law is favorable to them it should be followed; on another 
occasion the same people will the very next day demand the old French laws which have always 
been followed. If I were not a little crazed already, I believe they would cause me to become 
entirely so.”174 Just the fact of being French made Rocheblave feel he was now at a disadvantage, 
“I beg of you to give [my responsibilities] to some other person[,] a native Englishman, in order 
to escape the too common jealousies of some.”175 Conflict was constant throughout this period 
between the merchant Thomas Bentley and Rocheblave. Bentley was a British merchant who had 
recently moved to the Illinois County after trading near New Orleans, and he accused 
Rocheblave of outright disloyalty, saying it was impossible to trust a man after he has “taken the 
Oaths of Allegiance to the three Kingdoms of France Spain and Great Britain.”176
Bentley created some serious problems for Rocheblave’s regime. Upon his arrival, 
Bentley went into competition with the already established French traders, engaging them at 
times in legal disputes. Bentley also maintained his connections to the British colonies and was 
suspiciously knowledgeable about American activities on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers in 
1776 and1777.177 Lieutenant Governor Hamilton was well informed of Bentley’s meeting with 
Americans at the mouth of the Ohio, believing him to have delivered “Powder and other Stores” 
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to the Americans.178 It was not uncommon to have suspect loyalties in the region, especially 
among the French citizens and the independent minded traders. Even after Clark took control of 
the Illinois, the British were still worried about sedition. In June, 1779, the commander at Detroit 
was authorized to “apprehend any person or persons whom you may have cause to believe is in 
any matters directly, or indirectly, aiding or abetting the Rebels.”179 Jealousies existed on both 
sides as Bentley certainly went out of his way to aggressively challenge the well-established 
French, and he did cause problems for Rocheblave by trading alcohol to the natives. It also 
seems clear that Rocheblave did business almost entirely with the French merchants when he 
purchased goods for diplomacy and trade with the natives that came to Kaskaskia.180
Tensions ran high in the Illinois Country, yet the British believed it was too expensive to 
maintain a garrison in the region. Garrisons in the West was had fallen victim to cost-cutting 
efforts of the British following the French and Indian War. This policy and general way of 
thinking was still in place right up to the Clark’s capture of the Illinois Country. Not only did this 
effectively eliminate the enforcement power of the commandant, but also left the area vulnerable 
to attack by the Americans and their native allies or by the Spanish.
Rocheblave with his small budget of two hundred pounds sterling a year had few options. 
Knowing that French loyalty to Britain was tenuous at best, he remarked that without a 
significant increase in his resources, any troops in the region could be attacked by the 
“inhabitants [probably French and natives], all foreign relations could be cut off and travel on the 
[Ohio] river rendered somewhat dangerous.”181 Relations with the local Illini and Wabash 
nations also created problems for Rocheblave. The removal of all other officers from the Illinois 
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Country by 1778 left Rocheblave isolated, and the refusal to reimburse him for the continued 
expenses of diplomacy left the Illinois commandant working on his own credit. While attempting 
to thwart the “evil intentions” of the Spanish, the cheapness of the British high command led 
Rocheblave to issue a warning that their current plan “runs the risk of having the doors shut upon 
[us] for a long time to come by the Indians who have been tampered with by our neighbors 
[Spanish and Americans].”182 Rocheblave throughout his command wrote frequently to varied 
officers for help, ranging from his immediate superiors in Detroit to cabinet ministers in London. 
Rocheblave, though not a general, was not afraid to discuss military affairs. Concerning the 
withdrawal of soldiers in 1775 to meet the American invasion of Canada, Rocheblave in 1778 
wrote that the absence of soldiers in the Illinois “should have been remedied when the face of 
affairs had changed…this country…will soon become the center of communication between the 
Colonists and the Spaniards.”183
Rocheblave turned out to be correct in all accounts. The Americans and Spanish did use 
the waterways on the Illinois to maintain communication and transport supplies, while the native 
allies of the British were neutralized by Clark’s arrival in the summer of 1778. Lt. Governor 
Hamilton, after the capture of the Illinois, reported that if “the [Wabash] Indians are supported 
properly it will curtail a considerable additional expence, at the same time it is well known to 
your Excellency that these nations are the only barrier to…the inroads of the Rebels.”184 The lack 
of foresight left the British in an extremely vulnerable position in the Illinois Country prior to 
and following the arrival of Clark’s expedition.
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The Spanish presence in the West was critically important to Clark because while the 
Spanish struggled to solidify their authority they were well supplied when compared to Clark, 
and without their support, Clark might have failed. Understanding the motives of the Spanish is 
also critical because while Clark gained Spanish support, they were the most independent and 
potentially aloof of all Clark’s allies. Clark and the Spanish were able to use one another, but the 
by the end of the Revolution, the Spanish had the strength to act on their own, although an eager 
ally until British were thrown out of the Illinois Country. At the outset of the Revolutionary War, 
Spain was not in a position to capture the Illinois or take on the British, that came later, but
understanding Spanish goals, leading up to Clark’s arrival puts their actions and willingness to 
support Clark in an important light.  Upon the conclusion of the French and Indian War, France 
ceded all of Louisiana west of the Mississippi River to Spain. Most of this territory was sparsely 
populated by Europeans, but was well traversed by fur traders who integrated themselves into 
different native cultures ranging from the Missouri River to Spanish Texas. This wilderness, as 
Europeans saw it, was one that was dominated by Native Americans. Along other parts of the 
frontier, groups like the Quapaws at the mouth of the Arkansas River could force European 
traders to accept their societal norms and authority.185 The Spanish, unlike the British and French 
in the Ohio Valley, also had to deal with a native population that was strong enough to make 
demands upon Spain and prevent excessive penetration of Spanish power. Spain had a 
particularly difficult time controlling groups like the Osages, but also struggled to reign in the 
actions of faraway groups of Kansas, Otoes, and Pawnees. As Spain inherited this land 
dominated by natives, with few French inhabitants and virtually no Spanish, they sought to 
maintain control by encouraging French immigration west of the Mississippi River, using the 
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established Franco-Native connections, and finally by subverting British influence in the Upper 
Mississippi Valley.
The Spanish quickly learned that the British would aggressively attempt to take control of 
the native trade now that the French were no longer in possession of Louisiana. Spain was 
vigilant in the fight against the British, as a report from a Spanish official reveals that “two 
Englishmen” had “one thousand, four hundred and seventy-three pounds of deer skins” 
confiscated and then were convicted of “contrabanding.”186 In other efforts to control trade, 
Spain looked to the French residents of the territory, many of whom chose to settle in Spanish 
territory upon the ascension of British rule in Illinois. In St. Louis Monsieur de St. Ange, an 
“elderly commandant of the Illinois,” was placed in command because of the “credit he 
maintains with Indians.” To the south of St. Louis, at St. Genevieve, Monsieur de Rocheblave, 
“another retired officer,” was also put in control because of the growing French population and 
proximity to the British at Fort Chartres.187 The Spanish never did find a better way to interact 
with natives or maintain a militia than by using the French. In 1777 with the death of St. Ange, 
another Frenchmen, who had served as a “captain in the Illinois for twenty-five years,” was 
appointed.188 The Spanish militia in 1780 was also dominated by Frenchmen, with officers like 
the traders Auguste Chouteau and Eugenio Pouree. Twelve of the thirteen officers listed in the 
troop return were born in a French possession. The enlisted men were similarly dominated by 
men born in Canada, Illinois or France, with fully 212 of 214 enlisted men of French 
background, and the other two being listed as Americans by birth.189 Even as Fernando De Leyba 
                                                
186 Fernando de Leyba to Bernardo Galvez, 9 December 1778, in Lawrence Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi 
Valley, Part I, 1765-1781. Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1945, Volume II, 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949), 317. (Hereafter cited as SPM)
187 Antonio de Ulloa to Grimaldi, 4 August 1768, in Sienke, The George Rogers Clark Adventure , 121.
188 Bernardo de Galvez to Jose de Galvez, 21 March 1777, in Ibid., 195.
189 “Roster of St. Louis Militia Companies in 1780,” in Houck, Spanish Regime, 182-189.
71
began making plans as the new Commandant of St. Louis in 1778, he lamented, “The plan and 
the explanation thereof are in French because of my poor writing and since there is not at this 
post anyone who can write Spanish even moderately well.”190
Maintaining and supplying troops in the interior of North America was an expensive and 
difficult process. The British learned this very early as they took over the former French posts in 
the Illinois, and the Spanish learned the same lessons. The only local source of provisions was 
the French population scattered across the Illinois Country, although many were primarily 
traders, there was a considerable quantity of wheat milled into flour and it made up a valuable 
part of the French trading system at New Orleans. De Leyba noted in 1778 “There is not a foot of 
soil in this country which is not suitable for all kinds of crops,” but the “settlers are interested 
only in trading with the Indians and neglect their farming.” His solution was to post more 
soldiers in the region, which would enlarge the gain market and spur production.191 Leyba was 
also under special instructions to act with “zeal” in his efforts to lure “Apostolic Roman 
Catholics in English territory” into the colony, especially Acadians, Irish, Canadians, and 
Germans. Additionally, the Spanish government also provided the necessary lands and tools for 
settlers to begin farming.192 Even as the American Revolution was being waged, Spain was still 
acting aggressively to increase the population into their territories, making them more viable 
economically as well as making it easier to support military garrisons. As the Revolution pitted 
the British against her colonies, Spain was presented with the potential to secure control of the 
North American interior.
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Countering British influence in the Mississippi Valley was one of the major concerns of 
the several Spanish commandants that served at St. Louis, from acquisition of the territory to the 
end of the American Revolution. From the time Spain took control of Louisiana, the colony 
which produced limited profits was seen as a defensive barrier to keep British soldiers and 
traders away from the valuable colony of Mexico.193 British meddling in Spanish territory arose 
frequently in correspondence with the Governor of Louisiana who commanded from New 
Orleans and the commandant at St. Louis. Traders from both British and Spanish territories 
competed in the names of Spain and Great Britain even though many of the traders were French. 
The British pushed the hardest to win over the trade of the Sacs, Mesquakies, and Iowas in the 
present day state of Iowa, while the Spanish maintained relations with the Illini, Miamis, 
Kickapoos, and other tribes of the Illinois Country and Wabash River.194
A high level of distrust existed even when the local Spanish and British commandants 
worked together to end native conflict for the sake of commerce and peace. In 1777 Francisco 
Cruzat, Commandant of St. Louis, received a pass to British territory from the Illinois 
Commandant, Monsieur de Rocheblave, to help restore peaceful relations between the Illini and 
Missouri nations, both of which traded heavily with the Spanish. Although the mission was a 
success and both commandants agreed that it was good for both territories to restore peace, it 
was viewed very suspiciously. Cruzat was accused of “sending subjects to [British Illinois] draw 
away the tribes located in their domains.”195  Perhaps those that were suspicious of Cruzat may 
have been right, for he was reappointed commandant three years later with instructions from 
New Orleans that ordered him to continue “attracting to our devotion those tribes of the English 
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district, making use, for that purpose, of whatever ways and means conduce to its attainment.”196
While it is impossible to say for sure what may have happened on Cruzat’s mission to the 
Illinois, both the Spanish and British engaged in a fair amount of intrigue during peacetime. 
The outbreak of armed conflict between Great Britain and the American colonies placed 
Spain in a delicate situation. The two nations shared a long border along the Mississippi, yet 
Spain was much more vulnerable than Britain because, should the port of New Orleans be 
seized, then the only way for Spain to communicate with its Mississippi Valley colonies was 
overland from Texas, a perilous journey to say the least. Spain did not officially enter the war 
until June 1779, and entered only as an ally of France, despite an already long history of aid to 
the Americans. The risks involved in war with Britain were obvious, as well as the risk of 
angering native allies by helping the land hungry Americans. Nevertheless, Spain, driven by its 
ambition to expand its power in the Mississippi Valley, aided the American cause even before 
George Rogers Clark took possession of the Illinois Country.197
In early 1778, James Willing, an American agent charged with capturing the British posts 
on the lower Mississippi if possible and securing supplies, was dispatched from Fort Pitt to New 
Orleans in order to retrieve the supplies that Spanish authorities were holding for the Americans. 
Willing floated down the Ohio and the Mississippi, wreaking havoc along the way. Several 
traders were taken along the Ohio River, as rumors swirled in the Illinois that these were secret 
meetings designed to plan attacks on the British. Further south, Willing sacked the British post at 
Natchez as he continued toward New Orleans. The American presence, not to mention violence, 
left the Governor of Louisiana, Bernardo de Galvez, in a possibly explosive situation.198 Despite 
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this, the Spanish offered asylum to the American ships, as well as to British refugees from 
Natchez on the Mississippi. The Americans were also trusted with delivering letters between 
Spanish commanders in St. Louis and New Orleans.199 By this time, there was already a history 
of communication and willingness to help existed between Galvez and the various colonies. 
Galvez had been corresponding with Governors Patrick Henry of Virginia and John Rutledge of 
South Carolina, both of whom emphasized the need for military supplies, loans, and the opening 
of free trade in New Orleans and along the Mississippi. Galvez responded warmly to these 
overtures by offering any help he could offer.200 Confidential orders were also dispatched from 
Galvez to de Leyba in St. Louis with instructions that in case there was any “correspondence 
with any American chief of the American provinces, he shall observe the greatest secrecy, and 
report [the] same to me.”201
Plenty of risks existed in any scheme Spain employed to aid the Americans. The British 
grew more suspicious and Spain’s native allies grew uneasy with every bit of assistance that 
gave to the Americans. Both Indian allies and the British were being told Spain was neutral, but 
they could see the Spanish were leaning towards the Americans. Willing’s raiders attained 
sanctuary in New Orleans, but fears of retaliation from southern natives concerned with the 
attack on Natchez grew. As Galvez described the situation, it was necessary to use “zeal and 
prudence in knowing what measures to take to prevent the attacks of the Chickasaw Indians, on 
account of the aid you gave those Americans.”202 Henry Hamilton at Detroit also grew nervous 
about the Spanish, especially considering the lack of defenses in the Illinois Country. An 
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American presence in the West also caused worry for Hamilton as he warned the Spanish that “it 
is important that the Honorable Governor not ignite the flames of war without authority from 
[his] court.” Hamilton also cited various instances of the Spanish providing supplies for 
Americans and allowing them to incite the natives to war against the British.203 He also feared 
the effects the Spanish were having on the natives. In the case of conflict between Spain and 
Britain, Hamilton feared that the Wabash nations would “no doubt be courted by the Spaniards,” 
a sobering thought for Hamilton, as he considered the nations along the Wabash as essential to 
the defense of Detroit.204 The Miamis and Kickapoos, and the other groups living on the Wabash, 
presented a challenge to Hamilton because of their strategic location. Since the Wabash River 
served as the easiest route to attack Detroit from the south (also the best route for the Americans 
to use), Hamilton attempted to justify to his superiors the “considerable additional Expence” 
required to maintain the loyalty of the those nations because they served as the “only Barrier 
to…the Inroads of the Rebels.” Not only was increased expense required to offer gifts to the 
Wabash nations, but their loyalty also required in the “neighborhood…some force to keep them 
to their professions.”205 Increased gifting and military outposts were exactly the type of things 
the British had refused to bear the expense for in the previous decade, and because of their 
delayed effort to ensure the loyalty of the Wabash nations, they remained neutral for much of the 
Revolutionary War.
The Spanish acted aggressively in their desire to protect and expand Louisiana upon 
acquisition from the French. They successfully lured French citizens into new settlements upon 
the west bank of the Mississippi, while also employing them in their relations with Native 
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Americans and in controlling the fur trade. The French also proved to be enthusiastic in their 
support of Spain, joining militias and actually taking part in successful combat against British 
forces in 1780. Spain’s ambitions or at least the ambitions of Louisiana’s Governor Bernardo de 
Galvez led to an aggressive policy of support for the American cause. Despite the risks involved 
to Spanish possessions, Spain was established as a firm friend of the Americans before the 
arrival of George Rogers Clark.
The situation in the Illinois Country prior to the arrival of George Rogers Clark was 
complicated to say the least. The Americans sought to end the raids of the Shawnees and 
Mingoes by attacking the British held posts in the Illinois. Despite nominal control by the 
British, primarily French settlers who had good relations with the Miamis on the Wabash River, 
the Illini, and other western nations occupied the Illinois. The Spanish also had an eye on the 
Illinois Country and worked hard to gain the trade and influence of nations ranging from the 
Missouri River to the Wabash. The nations along the Great Lakes, like the Wyandots and 
Potawatomi, were the most dependent on the British because of their proximity to Detroit. On 
top of all this, the American frontier settlers tended to blame their problems on all natives, not 
just those that made up the majority of the war parties invading the American frontiers. Clark 
could not have neatly ended the raids on Kentucky with one fell swoop, but he did take 
advantage of the weakness of British control over both the French and the natives in the Illinois, 
while also working with the Spanish to expel Britain from the Mississippi Valley by uniting 
these disperse groups into a common cause against the British. 
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CHAPTER 3 - Surprised Twice: Clark’s Expedition to the Illinois 
Country
George Rogers Clark was able to seize control of Kaskaskia, the most important town in 
the Illinois Country, by attacking it in the middle of the night, and catching the town’s 
commandant and militia unprepared for an attack. Although historians have disputed just how 
much Clark surprised the French villagers, the next day Clark found himself and his army 
surrounded and outnumbered in potentially hostile territory. In forming the expedition, Clark had 
shown his ability for cajoling different groups of people to cooperate in achieving his goal of 
capturing the Illinois Country, including the governing class of Virginia and the frontier settlers 
who hesitated to leave their farmsteads and endure long terms of service. While he sometimes 
had to bend the rules or the truth to achieve his goals, Clark managed to recruit and hold together 
his small army during the considerable voyage from Fort Pitt to Kaskaskia. Upon the acquisition 
of Kaskaskia, Clark again had to depend on his skills as a diplomat to preserve the image of 
conqueror and even to gain the support of the different populations of natives and French in the 
area. James Willing, an American officer in the West who had battled the British along the 
Mississippi and who potentially worked to sow the seeds of rebellion in the Illinois, illustrated 
just how difficult finding loyal allies was in the Illinois Country. He was “pleased” that Clark 
peacefully spoke with some Indian nations upon his arrival in the Illinois, but warned him to 
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“beware of them [,] they are a Treacherous People and when you least expect will fall on you.”  
Clark was even warned about the French whom Willing considered “damn’d Rogues.”206
George Rogers Clark’s ability to seize control of the Illinois Country and maintain his 
position depended on his skills as a diplomat in gaining the cooperation of the French, the 
Spanish, and the Native Americans. Clark recruited a small army and set out from Kentucky 
down the Ohio, making surprise appearance and seizing the posts in the Illinois without a fight 
from the French militias charged with their defense. He then launched a second surprise attack 
against British forces that had reclaimed one of the Illinois posts, forever knocking the British 
out of the Illinois Country. This chapter details Clark’s expedition chronologically from its outset 
to his final expulsion of the British with an examination of how history remembers one of the 
most iconic moments of frontier warfare. Just as he worked with the gentry of Virginia and the 
frontiersman in Kentucky, now Clark exercised his considerable skills of diplomacy on a new set 
of potential friends and enemies, and in accomplishing this, he sought to unite them in common 
cause against Great Britain. He successfully used the existing trade relations and movement of 
people between the American colonies and the French settlements and sent spies to the area to 
gain valuable intelligence. He capitalized on the French resentment of British control to gain 
volunteers and provisions, while he used the villagers’ influence with their relatives and 
neighbors to gain the surrender of the other towns in the Illinois Country. He convinced the 
French population to help make peace with the Native Americans that came to see him. He 
persuaded the existing French militias to help capture Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton after 
his reoccupation of Vincennes. While at Vincennes, Clark used the capture of several of 
Hamilton’s native allies to send a powerful message to the allies of the British, yet he also 
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revealed the different mentalities of the French and Americans for the first time during the 
campaign. Finally, Clark depended on the friendship of the Spanish, especially the extensive 
personal efforts of help extended by the Lieutenant Governor, Fernando de Leyba, and the 
supplies and intelligence from merchants operating from Spanish territory like Francis Vigo. 
Overall Clark was particularly effective at assimilating the goals of diverse groups into his own.
Clark was as well informed as possible when he proposed his campaign to Governor 
Henry, and as he set out, prospects were good that he would learn even more about the situation 
in the Illinois Country before his arrival there. About a year before the expedition, Clark had 
dispatched two spies that moved in and out of Kaskaskia unnoticed because they were disguised 
as hunters. Not only did Clark take advantage of the existing traffic to and from the Illinois 
Country, but upon his arrival he leaned heavily upon the generosity and kindness of the French 
settlers as well. This free flow of information and people was critical to Clark’s preparations for 
the attack on Kaskaskia. He also acted in a brazen manner toward the French villagers to ensure 
their cooperation against the British and their native allies. Then, after a shift toward a more 
generous occupation strategy, he accepted French help in the form of supplies and influence in 
his efforts to secure the other towns in the Illinois Country.
Despite the remote location of the Illinois Country, British and American traders had 
pushed down the Ohio River and settled in the area hoping to capture the fur trade revenues 
previously controlled by the French. Despite their failure to control the trade, these merchants 
maintained influence in the Illinois, and the movement of people and furs back up the Ohio was 
not uncommon, allowing Clark to gain valuable intelligence about the colony. Therefore, in 
April 1777, Clark dispatched two young Kentuckians, Samuel Moore and Benjamin Linn, who 
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would later be officers under his command, disguised as hunters and carrying the latest express 
mail to gather information.207
Clark dispatched his scouts with “proper Instructions for their conduct to prevent 
suspition;” he also withheld any information pertaining to his proposed expedition. Upon their 
return to Kentucky, Clark noted they brought “all the information I could have Reasonably 
expected,” with a report that the inhabitants of the Illinois “had but little expectation of a visit 
from us” and that the “greatest pains were taken to inflame the minds of the French Inhabitants 
against the Americans” by the British authorities. While it appears Rocheblave was working to 
repel any American penetration into the Illinois, one finds it difficult to ascertain the overall 
attitude of the French as even Clark was told that his men had discovered “traces of affection” 
towards the American cause, despite reports of anti-American propaganda.208
While there were some people in the Illinois who sympathized with the Americans, it 
appears unlikely that Linn and Moore knew the need to seek out contact with any of the pro-
American parties because they did not know why they were gathering information.209 Whether 
Linn and Moore sought out sympathizers is doubtful, but they gained information pertaining to 
one of Rocheblave’s councils with the Wabash nations. Without any knowledge of French, they 
misinterpreted an attempt to maintain the natives’ loyalty to the British cause as encouragement 
to go to war against the American frontier.210 Despite their misinterpretations, this was the type 
of information that Clark was looking for to justify an attack against the Illinois. From Clark’s 
perspective, Moore and Linn fulfilled their objectives by reinforcing his previously held views. 
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While Linn and Moore appear to have been poorly informed, the merchants who favored 
America were not. As discussed earlier, Thomas Bentley had been accused of giving aid to 
Americans on the Ohio River, an act he staunchly denied when accused by British authorities.211
British authorities from Rocheblave to Hamilton believed he was implicated with the Americans 
in some way. Although they had little concrete evidence to justify his arrest, they nonetheless did 
imprison him based on their suspicions. Despite being out of town on business when Linn and 
Moore arrived, Bentley did write back to fellow merchant Daniel Murray asking about the 
appearance of any traders. Murray confirmed their arrival but had no other news to report. 
Historian David G. Thompson has proposed that this is evidence of Bentley’s cooperation with 
the Americans, and one cannot know for sure, Bentley appears to have been the sort of character 
who always served his own interests before attaching loyalty to any greater cause. Later in the 
war, as American power began to wane in the Illinois, he began a correspondence with Governor 
Haldimand of Quebec professing his loyalty to the British cause and securing forgiveness for his 
earlier miss-steps.212
While men like Bentley are difficult to pin down, Rocheblave had no problem imagining 
the growing threat against the Illinois. In March, 1778, Rocheblave wrote to Hamilton, “I think 
more and more that this country is to become [the Americans] retreat.” His pessimism about 
holding onto the Illinois was clear, ending the letter with the promise that “If the rebels should 
take possession I will warn you in time.”213 While he was still concerned about the Willing Raid, 
the possibility of American and Spanish intrigues never left his mind. Suspicions lingered, as just 
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one month later Hamilton interrogated some “Traders [headed] to [Sandusky] having given room 
for suspecting they were carrying on a correspondence with the Rebels.”214
Both officers were right to be suspicious, for as Clark descended the Ohio River on his 
way to the Illinois Country, he received exactly the type of help that they feared. Just past the 
mouth of the Tennessee River, Clark’s men “took a Boat of Hunters,” and required an oath of 
allegiance from them before questioning could begin. The traders were not from Kentucky, but 
“appear’d to be in our Interest,” according to Clark. Although their “intiligence was not 
favourable,” the men requested to join the expedition which raised the morale of the men.215
Clark worried about the report that the “Militia was [kept] in good order, and [there were] spies 
on the Mississippi, and that all Hunters boath Indians and others ware ordered to keep a good 
lookout for the rebels.” Despite the fact that the “fort [at Kaskaskia] was [kept] in good 
order…they believed the whole to proceed more from the fondness of perade than the 
expectation of a visit…but that if we could supprize the place…they made no doubt of our being 
able to do as we pleased.”216 From the earliest stages of planning to the final days before the 
capture of Kaskaskia, Clark had found many of the British traders willing to aid the American 
cause, but he did not know whether the French would be as helpful.
The actual capture of Kaskaskia proved an easy task for Clark, as he described in his 
letter to George Mason written in November 1779. On 4 July 1778, Clark’s men approached a 
farmhouse about one mile north of town, where his men commandeered some boats and 
transported themselves across the Kaskaskia River in about two hours. Around midnight Clark 
split his command into two or three groups, and “broke into the Fort, secured the Governour Mr 
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Rochlblave [and] in 15 minutes had every Street Secured.”217 After disarming the citizens, Clark 
felt that “nothing could excel the Confusion these People seemed to be in, being taught to expect 
nothing but Savage treatment from the Americans.” After his men secured the town, Clark met 
with the Catholic Priest, Pierre Gibault, and some of the town elders, offering them freedom of 
religion and the protection of Virginia if they would take an oath he would give in a few days 
time. Clark informed them that the Roman Catholic faith has as “great Previledges as any other” 
in Virginia. This was a great relief to Gibault and the inhabitants, since they were now controlled 
by Virginia, and this helped to secure their allegiance.218 The citizens of Kaskaskia also had not 
heard that France and America had entered into an alliance, news of which Clark brought with 
him. Clark reported later that “Our alliance with France has entirely devoted this people to our 
interest.”219
While the letter to Mason in November 1779 contains Clark’s earliest complete account 
of the expedition, the description in his Memoir, written in 1791, recreated the scene in a less 
benevolent light. Once across the river, the Clark of the Memoir sent “men of each detachmt that 
could speak the French Language to Run through every streat and proclaim what had happened 
and inform the Inhabitants that every person that appeared in the streats would be shot down.”220
Next, as the citizens began to fraternize with one another, Clark had a “few of the principal 
militia officers put in Irons without Hinting a reason,” so that the “worst was now expected by 
the whole.” When Father Gibault and the town elders met with Clark to discuss what would 
happen next, Clark’s “savage appearance” left them “shocked and it was some time before they 
would Venture to…speak.” The citizens, after assembling at the church with Clark’s permission, 
                                                
217 “Mason Letter,” in Ibid., 120.
218 Ibid., 120-1.
219 GR Clark to Patrick Henry, 29 April 1779, “Memoir,” Patrick Henry to GR Clark, 15 December 1778, all in 
James, Clark Papers, 174, 231, 87; James, The Life of George Rogers Clark, 120.
220 “Memoir,“ in James, Clark Papers, 227.
84
thought that the “loss of their property they could reconcile but was in hopes that I would not 
part them from their families.” Once they reached “the point [Clark] wished to bring them to –
[he] asked them very abruptly whether or not they thought they were speaking to savages.” Clark 
had no doubts about their convictions, as he “was certain they did from the tenor of their 
conversation.” At this point Clark began to play the role of benevolent conqueror and promised 
the citizens their property and their religion.221
Some historians have challenged Clark’s later description, most notably Clarence Alvord, 
who discounts any French fears based on the frequent contact between Illinois and the colonies, 
the knowledge of the Franco-American alliance, and the toughness of frontier settlers that had 
developed in the Illinois.222 James A. James in his narrative of the events, bases his description 
on the earlier letter to Mason as well.223 At the same time, Joseph Donnelly makes the case that 
there may have been some legitimate concerns among the French because they knew of the 
experience of the Acadians, who had been harshly expelled from their lands after conquest by the 
British in the French and Indian War.224 As for contemporary accounts, Lieutenant Governor de 
Leyba in St. Louis noted that Clark deserved the “greatest courtesy” from the inhabitants of the 
Illinois because they were “debtors to him for his pleasant manner, clemency, and upright 
administration of justice.”225
While Clark may have over emphasized the amount of terror that he inflicted upon the 
French inhabitants in his later recollection of the capture of Kaskaskia, a grain of truth common 
to both versions probably exists. The basic timeline for events is almost identical in the Mason 
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Letter and the Memoir, and the same people are involved. Clark identified the same waiting 
period before administering the oath of allegiance to the citizens, and the same meetings as well. 
Most likely Clark did enter the town and achieved a certain degree of surprise. Knowing the 
citizens outnumbered him, he chose to play the part of a conqueror first, and once he came to the 
realization that he was among friends and not foes, he quickly changed his ways and accepted 
the French views as genuine and welcomed their service to the State of Virginia.
Once Clark captured Kaskaskia and accepted the loyalty of the citizens, he next had to 
occupy the other prominent posts of the Illinois, including Cahokia to the north and Vincennes to 
the east. Both settlements were smaller than Kaskaskia in population, but Cahokia was an 
important trading post for the nations to the north and west of the Illinois such as the 
Potawatomi, Saks, Mesquakies. Vincennes contained the most formidable fortifications as well 
as being the key to controlling access to the Wabash nations from the south. In this task, Clark 
found the French at Kaskaskia to be helpful as they offered their services in gaining the 
capitulation of the other towns.
Clark’s descriptions of the capture of Cahokia and Vincennes in both the Mason letter 
and the Memoir were very similar, and will here be used in tandem to provide as complete a 
picture of events as possible. Rather than strike out immediately for Cahokia, the next target, 
Clark lingered in Kaskaskia and allowed more freedom of movement in and out of that town, 
having “no doubt but that any Report that would be now made of us thrugh the Cuntrey would be 
favourable.” At the same time he “prepar’d a Deatchment on Horseback, under Capt Bowman to 
make a Descent on [Cahokia], the men traveled on horses loaned by the French to assist the 
fatigued soldiers. In addition to the horses, some of the citizens of Kaskaskia also volunteered to 
go along as “their friends and relations [in Cahokia] would follow their Example [in 
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surrendering].” The French provided a welcome addition to Bowman’s men, whom Clark praised 
as soldiers “but little Inferior to the one we had Marched into the Cuntrey,” but the expedition 
was slow to depart. The French were “so Elated at [the] thought of the Perade they ware to make 
at [Cahokia] that they ware too much Ingaged in Equiping themselves to appear to the best 
advantage.” Clark appears to have felt the French militia was more concerned with a proper 
military appearance as opposed to their actual fighting ability. Cahokia surrendered when
Bowman and the French arrived, taking an oath of allegiance. The various Indians that had been 
in town scattered away from the American force as well.226 Clark displayed an interesting pattern 
in his descriptions concerning the French, both complimenting them and their officers as good 
soldiers, yet criticizing them as well. It appears that Clark used the French to his advantage but 
had little respect for their culture overall. Clark made it clear on numerous occasions that he 
needed the help of the French, and throughout his occupation of the Illinois, gaining their 
cooperation appeared foremost in his surviving notes, but he never showed more than a 
begrudging respect for them in a military sense. 
Vincennes also proved to be willing to capitulate to Clark quite easily as well. Here Clark 
found even more influential help in securing that post’s surrender. Father Gibault, the only active 
Catholic priest working in the area, offered his help if Clark would also send someone else under 
his authority to help, such as one of his officers to officially represent American power. In order 
to secure cooperation from the Kaskaskians, Clark bluffed that he was about to “send an Express 
to the falls of the Ohio for a Body of Troops” in order to aid in an attack on Vincennes. This 
bluff produced several “Advocates…among the people in [Vincennes] behalf.” Among those 
who offered services, Father Gibault now stepped forward. Although he swore he had nothing to 
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do with “temporal business,” he gave Clark every indication that he would give the inhabitants of 
Vincennes “such hints in the Spiritual way that would be very conducive to the business” at 
hand.227 The help received from Gibault should not have come as surprise since he had a history 
of rocky relations with his British superiors in Quebec, and he had shown a willingness to work 
with other cultures, especially the Irish soldiers that served at Fort Gage before its abandonment 
by the British Army. Gibault, highly respected in Vincennes, became a natural choice to go there 
as well.228
Clark chose Dr. Jean Laffont to lead the mission to Vincennes, reminding him that should 
Vincennes choose to resist his peace offering, they would shortly “feel the miseries of…war.” He 
also ordered Laffont to “act in concert with the priest [Gibault],” who was to “prepare the 
inhabitants to grant you your demands.”229 Clark also noted that he had given Gibault “Verbal 
Instructions [concerning] how to act in certain cases.”230 Clark, while still using the bluff of force 
to maintain his position as a conqueror, clearly controlled of the situation, understanding the 
absolute necessity of gaining French help. The mention of private verbal instructions coupled 
with the influence of Father Gibault also shows Clark developing intimate relationships with the 
French while still maintaining power over them. In fact, Clarence Alvord has hypothesized that 
Father Gibault was a particularly easy target, as he considered him as so emotional and high 
strung an individual that a man with such strong fortitude as Clark may have been able to easily 
influence him. 231 It should also be noted that although no evidence of anti-Catholicism in 
Alvord’s writings exists, it was still a pervasive belief when he was writing and may have 
influenced his interpretations, as well as stereotypes about the volatile emotional nature of 
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French settlers as well. While this may be true, Clark also had clearly won over the support of 
Dr. Laffont who eagerly offered his services, as well as the other French who “Set about 
preparing…a great numbers of Letters…to the Inhabitants” of Vincennes.232 Vincennes, like 
Cahokia, quickly submitted to the State of Virginia and swore an oath of loyalty.233 Again, news 
of the Franco-American alliance proved to be helpful as Clark carefully mentioned it in his 
proclamation asking Vincennes to submit to his authority.234
George Rogers Clark used the elements of surprise, force, and bluff to ensure that he 
would have the support of the French villagers in the Illinois Country. Once the French settlers 
had submitted to Clark’s control and even showed a tendency to support the American cause, 
Clark, in the same persuasive way that he had gained support for his expedition and recruited 
along the frontier, encouraged and accepted all the help that the French offered. While the 
French were helpful in convincing their neighbors and relatives to surrender without a fight, they 
proved even more helpful in Clark’s next goal, which was to achieve peace with natives from the 
Wabash River to the Great Lakes.
Long after gaining the surrender of the Illinois posts, the French villagers continued to give 
aid to Clark. He used them to influence the different Native Americans he encountered, gaining 
peace and neutrality from nearly all the nations that visited him. He also convinced the French to 
aid in the defeat of Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton’s counter attack against Vincennes 
because of their dislike of British authority. Clark also capitalized on the American soldiers’ 
hatred of Indians and used the capture of Hamilton to temporarily end any threat from his Indian 
allies. This also highlighted some of the cultural differences among the French and Americans.
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The Natives in and around the Illinois Country did not unanimously support for either the 
British or the Americans. Although Clark believed that the Indians were “generally at War 
against us,” and he immediately set out to take care of Indian affairs in the area.235 The sudden 
appearance of Clark and his army forced the hand of the weak Illini who “immediately treated 
for peace.”236  Clark then sent out a speech to the various tribes, who had assembled for a council 
at Cahokia. Clark felt his speech had a “greater effect than [he] could have imagined” as Natives 
flocked to the town from as far as five-hundred miles away, including tribes from Spanish 
territory.237 His speech compared “The Big Knife” (Virginians) and the “Red peoples” as both 
being dependent on the British for manufactured goods, and portrayed the British as evil for 
trying to stop the Americans from learning to make these goods themselves.238 Certainly the 
Natives could relate to the need for an external source for goods and the problems caused by the 
external control of those goods. Clark’s speech had the desired effect, completing a treaty which 
stretched American influence “among the Nations even to the Border of the Lakes.” After the 
conference, he remained in Cahokia settling peace “with ten or twelve different Nations.”239
The sudden appearance of an American army in an area that had never seen more than a 
token force of British soldiers, plus the dominance of French traders (now favoring the United 
States) left many nations willing to sue for peace in the hope of securing a new source of supply. 
They saw this as an appealing option considering the lack of British trading supplies since their 
accession to power in the region.  Weak nations like the Illini and those in close proximity like 
the southern Wabash nations were the quickest to make peace because they had the most to gain 
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from trade with the Americans, and the most to lose in combat.240 A reliable source of supplies 
was one of the key factors in how Indians aligned in war, and as the nations in the West looked 
to increase their own power and protection, they needed a steady European supplier. A lack of 
promised supplies made Indians willing to desert their allies because of unfulfilled promises and 
new options for trade and supply where none existed proved powerful motivators.241
The influence of the French and Spanish contributed to the success of George Rogers Clark’s 
efforts to limit the participation of native nations. Henry Hamilton understood native customs 
and was prepared to offer much more in the way of presents than Clark ever was willing or able 
to. Only with the support of the ever influential French enabled him to solidify the early shock 
value of his army’s appearance. 
Clark believed that the British did not deal effectively with the Indians. He instead strove 
“to make [himself] acquainted fully with the French and Spanish Methods of Treating Indians.” 
To his credit, Clark understood the close relationship between the French traders and Indians, 
and quickly admitted that “in a short time the Indians of Vareous Tribes Inhabiting this Region at 
Illinois…came to make peace with us from the Information they Generally got from the French.” 
The Spanish, though operating mainly through French traders, provided an important source of 
supply and offered a decidedly anti-British opinion and Clark saw them as possessing “great 
influence” as well. 242
Finally, the Franco-American alliance had a tremendous impact on both the French 
willingness to aid Clark and for the legitimization of the American cause for the native peoples, 
most of whom were old allies of France. Clark counseled the native peoples that “The French 
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King…sent to the Americans and told them to be strong and fight the English like Men,” leading 
to the large turnout of peoples seeking peace at Cahokia.243 While Clark used the Franco-
American Alliance and a little fear to “win their affection,” he was “to weak to treat them any 
other way,” especially considering the strength Spanish influence among the native peoples, and 
their abundance in trade goods and gifts when compared to what the Americans had to offer.244
The British commander at Michilinmakinac, located west of Detroit, understood the 
problems involved in mobilizing the Great Lakes Indians to counter attack in the Illinois. “The 
Inhabitants [French] of that country are not to be depended upon should [they] offer to interfere; 
otherwise should they join the rebels, it would be thro’ fear of being plundered by the stranger 
Indians.”245 While Clark faced difficulties in maintaining the friendship of the French and their 
Indian allies, the two tasks closely related, as the Indians often followed the French example. 
Clark early in the occupation had constantly to work to keep both the French and the natives 
pacified. While Clark was holding council among the nations that came to Cahokia, several 
Winnebagos made an attempt to capture Clark in his lodging.246 The natives though were 
deterred and captured thanks to the “elacrity of the Serget” and the quick reaction of the French 
militia assembling in reaction to this threat, which “convinced the Savages that French were in 
[Clark’s] interest.” It appears the natives were not entirely wowed by Clark’s appearance and his 
loud talk at the conference table, and in a matter that most of Clark’s backcountry soldiers would 
recognize, the Winnebago warriors decided to test the personal manhood and power that Clark 
held. In foiling the plot, it appears the rest of the Indians accepted Clark’s leadership role for the 
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time. Clark held his attackers prisoners and declared that the natives and their associates were a 
“set of Villians, that they had Joined the Inglish and they were welcome to continue in the Cause 
they had espoused…that I did not care who was my Friends or Foes.” The French in Cahokia 
who hosted these nations from far away, suddenly were “Alarmed” by Clark’s brashness, but to 
soothe them over Clark “assembled a Number of Gentlemen and Ladies, and danced nearly the 
whole Night.” The next day, he met with the leaders of the assembled nations, and in ceremonial 
event set the captives free, and gained the support of many of the natives. 247 Clark served two 
purposes in this; first he showed indifference to any threat the natives could muster ,and this in 
turn gave the French confidence that Clark actually controlled the situation.
While historians such as Richard White have criticized Clark’s brazen native diplomacy, 
some like James A. Thom have defended his brand of diplomacy. White is most critical 
concerning Clark’s attempts to negotiate as a “warrior” and not a “counselor,” saying Clark did 
not fully understand his own actions and what they meant diplomatically in his “middle ground.” 
White presents Clark as a violent racist immersed in an Indian hating culture and bent upon the 
destruction of native societies and the British whom Clark saw as enabling the Indian warriors.248
Thom, on the other hand, rebuts the idea that Clark was a proven Indian hater, citing many of his 
later interactions with natives. He also maintains that the Anglo-centric viewpoint of both Clark 
and Hamilton made it very unlikely that they would have viewed any other race or culture as 
equal to the heritage of being British or American; whether the other group was native or French 
did not really matter to them.249 This clearly did influence the way Clark approached the world, 
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and one of the pressing concerns for Clark was that he had no supplies or gifts for the natives. If 
he acted any other part than that of the conqueror, his true weaknesses would have been 
discovered much sooner. Clark also must have made a positive impression on the natives he dealt 
with. They regarded him highly as an agent of the government later in his career, and he also 
wrote notes on the mounds near Cahokia, giving credit to ancestors of Native Americans for the 
construction, not attributing it to another race like many did at the time.250 In fact it seems that 
Clark’s opinion toward the Indians he negotiated and fought with was more complicated than is 
commonly allowed.  On one hand he was undeniably a member of a culture that fostered Indian-
hating along the frontier, but many Indians respected Clark, and his admiration for their 
accomplishments indicates that he probably realized the need to understand his opponents, but it 
does not indicate anything more than ambivalence towards their culture overall. Clark’s 
ambivalence may also be attached to his opportunistic neighbor as there was much for Clark to 
gain by his actions, and Clark often looked toward his best interests, whether that was forging a 
native alliance or ordering the death of native prisoners. Clark’s need to control situations and 
people of often dictated his actions, such as at Vincennes, leaving us with an unclear record in 
many ways about Clark’s real feelings.
Once the threat of native attack was removed, war and conflict with natives was 
romanticized to large degree by later generations; native combatants  initially labeled savages 
began to be presented as an idealized and romantic reminder of the past whose extinction was 
inevitable. Conflict during King Philip’s War created the language that is used to justify the 
frontier expansionism of America against all those Europeans and Natives that stood in the 
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way.251 The situations of New England in 1676 and the Kentucky frontier in 1778 were 
analogous, as isolated settlers were forced into small stockades, allowing Shawnee raiding 
parties and their allies to plunder their farms and attempt to cut off and starve the settlers, just as 
King Philip did in New England.252 This created a situation where the colonists used their written 
language to justify the conflict, but with the threat of native attack removed, it was easy for 
Americans to think of the noble savage and the vanishing Indian stereotypes as inevitable fates 
that justified their exile to reservations. Of course, few native writers had the opportunity or 
means to offer written counter-narrative.253 The time and environment in which memories of the 
past are recovered plays a role in how past events are remembered; that is if events are studied in 
a time when racism is prevalent and minorities are ignored, then that affects how history is 
studied and written without the author or reader realizing it much of the time.254 Bringing these 
views on history and memory into focus concerning Clark is complicated, but he was a product 
of his environment, yet was not completely immersed in the prevalent Indian-hating culture. 
When much of the historical work on Clark was compiled in the early twentieth Century, no 
prominent role for natives existed in the tale of American expansion, and therefore Clark’s 
victories were emphasized while his scientific notes on the achievements of earlier cultures was 
not. Clark’s observations and actions in dealing with Indians show, if not sympathy, at least a 
respect for native culture and accomplishments. When Clark made his notes on the mound 
builders of the Mississippi Valley he disputed the claim of some historians that a different race or 
even a European like Hernando DeSoto built the mounds. Many of the Illini Clark had close 
contact with told stories about the mounds and their ancestors and Clark could “see no reason 
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why it should be received as good History,” at least as accurate as many of the stories passed 
down in the Euro-American tradition.255 Perhaps Clark was speaking in the same frame of mind 
as many of the New Englanders did when they spoke about the Indian’s past greatness that was 
only the inevitable fate of that culture. Many of the harsh words Clark uttered about Indians and 
ways to destroy them were from the viewpoint of a successful military commander. Clark never
expressed any regret at the lose of native culture, and throughout his Illinois Campaign his 
efforts were directed keeping Indian warriors on the sidelines, so perhaps it is a safe conclusion 
that Clark cared little one way or another if native culture was annihilated or not. At the same 
time, these views do not necessarily represent anything more than how to win an Indian 
campaign, which Clark spent most of his life conducting at the request of local, state, and 
national governments.
Despite Clark’s success in working with the natives and the French, Lieutenant Governor 
Hamilton quickly challenged his position and authority. While the core of Clark’s force was 
comprised of American frontier settlers, by the time Hamilton arrived in the Illinois he was 
dependent on French volunteers to replace the soldiers who left when their terms of service had 
expired. His opponent however was even more dependent on other cultural groups to maintain 
his force. Henry Hamilton, with his base of operations to the north in Detroit, relied almost 
exclusively on Indian allies and French militias because of the small number of regular soldiers 
in Detroit, which increased his reliance on militias and Indians because he did not even have 
direct military control over that garrison.256
Hamilton also had the supplies and influence among native peoples to challenge the gains 
Clark had made in native diplomacy as well. Through extensive dealings with various native 
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nations at Detroit, Hamilton had mastered the ceremonial rituals of trade and war and was well 
positioned to re-assert British influence among the native nations. Hamilton journeyed southward 
from Detroit to the Wabash and then followed that river to the fort at Vincennes. His counter-
attack expedition consisted of about one-hundred and seventy-five white troops, two-thirds of 
them French volunteers and militia from Detroit. They were also joined by a large number of 
natives in their march along the Wabash, eventually consisting of about eight-hundred men.257
Most native peoples along the route were quick to reassert their loyalty to Hamilton, including 
the Miamis, Piankashaws, and Kickapoos, while they offered excuses for their recent flirtations 
with Clark. In fact, much of Hamilton’s time was spent in various feasts, councils, and 
ceremonies, as Captain Norman MacLeod, leading the army, often stopped for the “Shaking of 
hands and lighting [of] the Pipes,” promising that “Your father {Hamilton} at Detroit is Coming 
Meirly to assist you.”258
Hamilton busily rearranged his Native alliances. He ordered supplies delivered to the Miamis 
and then sent out Alexander McKee to persuade the Shawnees and Delawares to attack the 
frontier; while the Potawatomi, Ottawas, and Chippewas all offered to accompany the 
expedition.259 Hamilton illustrated the previous lack of British influence in the area as he noted 
in his journal “These Indians as well as the Illinois, and Misouri Tribes have been kept almost 
altogether in the dark with respect to the power of the British Nation.”260 Many of the villages 
along the Wabash feared the Americans because “their families were exposed too much to the 
inroads of the Virginians,” but after talking with Hamilton they pledged in the spring to “appear 
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like Musquetoes and infest the Ohio, and all the rebel frontier,” after complaining of American 
desires for their land.261 These were common reactions all along Hamilton’s journey.
On December 17, 1778, Hamilton easily reclaimed Vincennes as the French militia guarded 
the fort and seemed to have no stomach for fighting. When one contrasts Hamilton’s and Clark’s 
assessments of Indians as allies in warfare. Clark used little or no native help in his original 
conquest or his following re-conquest, while Hamilton’s “Indians sent out a few Runners” to 
scout, and they made up the left column of his move into Vincennes.262 The lateness of the 
season meant winter had reached the Illinois Country and flooded the overland prairie routes to 
Kaskaskia, so Hamilton settled in for the winter dismissing most of the Detroit French militia 
and his native allies to their homes. He was not inactive during the winter, working to assemble 
nearby allies and even trying to coordinate action with the Cherokee and Chickasaw nations far 
to the South.263
The French had proven to be an important factor each time one of their villages was 
seized by an outside force. They offered no resistance to Clark’s forces or even his messengers, 
and they also proved unwilling initially to fight the British. As Hamilton approached the fort at 
Vincennes, Leonard Helm, the American commander, was surprised and hurriedly sent out a 
message to Clark that was intercepted. Helm’s situation, as he reported it, was critical. Helm had 
“calld the militia and had all assurance of their integrity” but when he fired the fort’s cannon, a 
signal for the militia to assemble, “not one of the militia” appeared at the fort, causing Helm to 
sarcastically remark that “before sight of the [enemy’s] army [there were] no braver men.”264 As 
had happened earlier, once Helm was forced to surrender, the citizens of Vincennes renounced 
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their oath to the Americans and reaffirmed their loyalty to the British, although Hamilton 
anxiously hoped his “Lenity…might induce” other Frenchmen to follow the example of those at 
Vincennes, the “conduct of the Canadians at large was but poor encouragement.”265 The French 
were required to make quick decisions concerning the best interests of their families; it is not out 
of reach to imagine the French put their families far ahead of either cause since their loyalties 
still were tied to France. Just as the divided Indians, like the Shawnee and Miamis, and the 
citizens of British occupied New York City had to do, decisions were about profit, family, and 
self-preservation before patriotism.266
Clark also needed the loyalty of the French and welcomed them into his ranks. After the 
capture of Kaskaskia and before the native councils at Cahokia, Clark found “Many of the 
French fond of the service,” allowing them to serve as replacements for the recruits that were 
gone home.267 When Clark needed men to retake Vincennes in January, 1779, he was joined by 
“two Volunteer Compys of the Principal Young Men of the Illinois,” who had been encouraged 
by the “Ladies” of the country who showed a “spirited…interest…in the Expedition, which had 
great Effect on the Young men.”268 Clark set out with one-hundred and seventy-two men, nearly 
half of whom were French.269 During the course of the journey, Clark and his officers privately 
criticized the stammina of the French, but their support turned out to be vital to the success of the 
campaign.
The journey was intense as much of the Illinois prairie was submerged by flooded rivers. 
Clark ordered his men to march across the flooded prairies “frequently to the arm pits in water.” 
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As they neared Vincennes, morale was at a low point, but Clark led by force of example. 
According to his own account, when he “Viewed their confution for about one minute” he 
“Whispered to those near me to do as I did – amediately took some water in my hand poured on 
Powder Blacked my face gave the war hoop and marched into the water without saying a word.” 
No records exist of any soldiers refusing to go forward, but Clark described this endurance test 
as “so far Superior to any thing the French Men had an Idea of that they were backward in 
speaking.”270 Joseph Bowman described “Many of the Men” as “much cast down,” especially the 
“Creols Volunteers [who are] talking of returning.”271
Although Clark singled out the French volunteers in their recollections of the march, they 
were the key to the recapture of Vincennes. In defense of the volunteers, it is doubtful that 
Clark’s American volunteers handled marching for days in water up to their armpits with no food 
any better than their French counterparts. The officers chose to single out the French because 
they were more likely to speak up as a return to their homes was feasible, while those from 
Kentucky or Virginia had no such options available. Either the American soldiers bore their 
burden more quietly because they had no realistic route home, or Clark and Bowman simply 
chose not to report their own men’s misgivings. 
On the approach to the town, Clark sent out “active young French men to decoy and 
take…prisoner” some hunters who could provide intelligence, which the soldiers achieved in 
“such a manner as not to alarm the other.” When the hunters were sent back into Vincennes, they 
informed the citizens that Clark was approaching the town, but no one informed the British. 
Clark was also aided by several men in the town as the French had “buried the Greatest part of 
their powder and ball,” to hide it from Hamilton, and “this was amediately produced and we 
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found our selves well supplyed.” 272 Although Clark did not always inwardly respect his French 
soldiers, he did make sure they served in roles that served to emphasize their skills and by so 
doing he managed to garner their respect, which was critical to holding his army together. This 
re-supply was important because most of the powder Clark’s men had carried with them had 
gotten wet during the journey to Vincennes. 
The men inside the fort meanwhile grew uneasy, especially the French volunteers from 
Detroit who had remained with Hamilton. The British garrison consisted of seventy-nine men in 
all, with the French making up half the force. Once they spoke up, the chance of effective 
resistance was greatly reduced, as they “began to murmur, saying it was very hard to be obliged 
to fight against their countrymen and relations, who they now perceived had joined the 
Americans.”273
Although the French were perceived by both the Americans and the British as less than 
useful in actual combat, their decisions to fight or not were the key in every engagement that 
took place in the Illinois in 1778 and 1779. These pragmatic soldiers were not willing to die for 
an Imperial contest that concerned them but little, although when motivated in their own 
interests, they proved to be valuable soldiers, especially in terms of their endurance and military 
support, which Clark employed much more effectively than Hamilton. Clark’s capture of 
Vincennes was the high point of his military career and of his ability to effectively harness the 
energies of different cultural groups in the Illinois. It also revealed some of the differences that 
slowly began to make it difficult for the French and Americans to work together in the coming 
years.
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Clark’s capture of Vincennes has provided history with one of the most gruesome events 
of the Revolutionary War. The fort at Vincennes was surrounded during the night, and Clark’s 
men kept up a steady fire upon the fort until morning. Around nine o’clock Clark sent a message 
to Hamilton asking for an unconditional surrender: Hamilton refused. After another two hours of 
shooting, Hamilton sent a messenger to Clark indicating he was willing to talk about the terms of 
surrender. Clark again asked for an unconditional surrender, which Hamilton countered by 
proposing a three-day truce. Clark rejected the truce but invited Hamilton to come out of the fort 
and negotiate one on one at the French church in town. Hamilton accepted, but during the truce a 
party of native and white raiders returned to town and was captured by Clark’s men, setting the 
stage for a massacre that followed at the gate of the fort, where Clark ordered the grisly deaths of 
his captives to dissuade the British from further resistance.274 This event has become the singular 
event that is associated with George Rogers Clark and his expedition. Therefore, it has been 
common to view Clark only through his actions at Vincennes, but this thesis maintains that 
Clark’s actions at Vincennes were really in response to the growing pressures Clark faced in 
keeping his culturally diverse army united.
In the Mason Letter, Clark stated that he was unwilling to negotiate with Hamilton
because he considered Hamilton and his officers “murderers, And intended to treat them as 
such.” Apparently, Clark had fully absorbed the persona of his frontier army, holding Hamilton 
and his white officers personally responsible for the native attacks on Kentucky. When Hamilton 
inquired as to the rationale for such harsh terms of surrender, Clark replied that he “wanted a 
sufficient excuse to put all the Indians and partisans to death” --  the common sort of bravado 
Clark had already used during the occupation of the French villages. While Hamilton returned to 
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consult his officers, the truce continued, and the incoming party of warriors and white officers 
was surprised and taken prisoner entering the town because the British flag flew over the fort and 
there was no sound of battle. Clark noted that six men were taken and thought he had “now a fair 
opportunity of making an impression on the Indians that I could have wished for; that of 
convincing them that Governour Hamilton could not give them that protection that he made them 
to believe he could.” Clark wanted to “insence the Indians” against Hamilton for not “exerting 
himself to save their Friends:” so he “Ordered the Prisoners to be Tomahawked in the face of the 
Garrisson.” Having the effect Clark desired, the warriors “upbraided the English Parties in not 
trying to save their friends” and “believed them to be liers and no Warriers.” One of the white 
leaders of the native party was spared from the massacre because his father recognized him, 
although Clark “had…little mercy for such Murderers,” as he considered white partisans, but the 
Frenchmen’s father had “behaved so exceedingly well in [Clark’s] service,” that he was freed. 
Hamilton quickly surrendered after this event was reported to him.275
Clark’s recollection in his Memoir contains many of the same details. He refused to give 
generous terms of surrender because he knew the “greatest part of the principal Indian partisans 
of DeTroit was with [Hamilton] [and he] wanted an excuse to put them to Death.” In this latter 
report it is interesting that Clark went into more detail, possibly hinting at the importance of 
maintaining the morale of his soldiers: “that the Cries of the Widows and Fatherless on the 
Frontiers that they had occationed now Required their Blood…that I would rather Loose Fifty 
Men” in storming the fort and “Risque the massacre of [Hamilton’s] Garison” than allow the 
opportunity to pass. He even claimed to have entertained the idea of sending “for some of those 
Widows to see it executed.” Clark reported that this encounter left the British officers flustered. 
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Clark’s motives are clear, but nearly twenty years after the event described, Clark placed much 
less emphasis on the effects of the massacre, as he wrote just one line, “and [the] Indians [were] 
Tomahawked by the Soldiers and flung into the River.”276
Other contemporary accounts from the American side include the journal kept by Clark’s 
trusted lieutenant, Joseph Bowman. Bowman wrote that the white prisoners were released and 
then they “brought the Indians to the Main Street before the Fort Gate there tomahawked them 
and threw them into the River.”277 Following the victory, Clark wrote back to Governor Henry in 
Virginia to report, but while he mentioned the taking prisoner of the native party during the 
truce, he made no mention of the massacre.278 The American sources overall seem to downplay 
the massacre, but it appears to be a safe conclusion that Clark did in fact order the killings in an 
attempt to force Hamilton’s hand.
Henry Hamilton and his officers did not recount events exactly as Clark portrayed them. 
While his general account of the events was very similar to other accounts, he placed much more 
emphasis on the massacre. Hamilton explained that “the manner [of death] (was related to me by 
different people and among others by the man at whose door this execrable feat was 
perpetrated),” and described the events as follows:
One of them was tomahawk’d immediately. The rest sitting on the ground in a ring 
bound—seeing by the fate of their comrade what they had to expect, the next on his left 
sung his death song, and was in turn thomahawk’d, the rest underwent the same 
fate…The Chief of this party after having had the hatchet stuck in head, took it out 
himself and deliver’d it to the inhuman monster who struck him first, who repeated his 
stroke a second and a third time, after which the miserable spectacle was dragged by the 
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rope about his neck to the River, thrown in, and suffer’d to spend still a few moments of 
life in fruitless struglings. 
Hamilton squarely placed the blame on Clark’s shoulders, claiming he actually 
committed the murders. When the two officers met again, “Colonel Clarke yet reeking with the 
blood of these unhappy Victims came…before the Fort Gate…He spoke with rapture of his late 
achievement, while he washed off the blood from his hands stained in this inhuman sacrifice.”279
One of the key points in any interpretation of Clark is to what extent he was a part of the 
Indian-hating culture. Leaders on the frontier, like Clark, could become powerful by offering 
protection from native attacks and by leading retaliatory raids. At the same time a failure to live 
up to expectations resulted in a loss of power and influence as well.280 The frontier culture also 
emphasized the links between natives and the Europeans that they saw as empowering the native 
warriors, which in turn created a special hatred first for the French and then the British. As all 
enemies on the frontier eventually became linked to or were themselves “savages,” it was 
particularly important for the frontier settlers to believe Clark was an Indian-hater whether he 
actually was or not.281
At the time of the massacre, there were different points of view on what exactly took place, 
and historians have offered various opinions about the massacre and Clark. James A. James 
briefly describes the events similar to Clark’s short version, while he offers no analysis or 
justification of any kind for the events. John Bakeless retells the entire narrative in a way that 
justifies Clark’s deed, by focusing on the native attacks that had taken place in Kentucky and the 
commonness of Indian hating; Bakeless justifies Clark with an eye for an eye approach. Richard 
White reconstructs the scene as a battle of symbols that took place over the following years, 
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when both Clark and Hamilton attempted to paint each other as the true savage. He concludes 
that Hamilton had more success painting Clark as the “chief priest” of the sacrifice as opposed to 
Clark painting Hamilton as the “savage Hair Buyer.” Bernard W. Sheenhan finds both men 
guilty and a bit hypocritical in the process. Noting that Hamilton had taken the time to 
understand and participate in native culture, Sheehan maintains he was self-delusional when it 
came time to take responsibility for sending out native raiders to the frontier. Clark is portrayed 
as the classical Indian hater who turns into a “savage” himself and therefore has no right to 
accuse Hamilton of savagery.282
Most of the debate then has focused on just who was more savage or who was more 
deserving of his fate. From the works above and the primary sources, it is clear that both sides 
felt justified in their claims, and for anyone looking to throw around the accusation of savagery, 
no shortage of evidence exists for either side. Sheehan is probably most correct in his analysis of 
Hamilton, who attempted to remain aloof from the realities of frontier warfare. He issued 
scalping knives, and scalps were brought to him in Detroit, yet it is not surprising that he was 
shocked at Clark’s conduct, because what Clark did was completely unacceptable by any 
standards of European war, and while Hamilton understood native culture, he did not wish to get 
his hands dirty. 
Clark, on the other hand, can not be as easily justified as he is by Bakeless. Clark clearly did 
not revel in his act the way Hamilton described because he gives it such small emphasis in all his 
written accounts, but Clark was in many ways taking a desperate gamble. He had only about 
seventy or eighty more men than Hamilton (depending on one you accounts for the French 
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volunteers serving with Hamilton), and their supplies and reinforcements were coming down the 
Wabash River to aid Hamilton as the siege was underway. Clark was also extremely vulnerable 
to any British led effort that might gather native warriors from the Wabash. While he could take 
some comfort in believing the French inside the fort would not resist because the town of 
Vincennes had turned on Hamilton, he had no such guarantee about the natives, with the 
exception of the nearby Pinkashaw nation, which most likely would not be willing to protect 
Clark from their Miami relatives. Clark therefore gambled, albeit gruesomely and in terms of 
human life, unjustifiably, to force Hamilton into surrendering and to scare away any natives that 
might consider fighting the Americans. 
The most important factor to consider was Clark’s personality. Overall he was willing to take 
risks because he was opportunists and he found himself in this leadership situation because he 
was initially trying to secure the best title to his lands possible. Maybe Clark was an Indian-hater 
and maybe not, but his ability to see what others needed and provide that without alienating 
another group is what is important about Clark’s interactions here. Although he did please the 
Indian-hating tendencies of his men, he acted as he had in the past, in a brazen manner, using 
fear to bluff his enemies into submission and cooperation and wanted to serve the immediate 
goal of humiliating Hamilton as well. 
Clark was in a delicate situation, while he needed satisfy the Kentuckians he led, especially 
to keep his claim to power and influence, he also needed to work with the French during his 
occupation. Clark’s solution was to kill the captured natives while he released the captured 
whites. The White members of the party were a vital example of French integration into native 
culture, and sparing them was an attempt to win favor with all of this followers. While Clark’s 
men may have relished the efforts Clark put into intimidating the white partisans and natives in 
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the British service, it was certainly a much scarier prospect for the French. They had worried 
about Clark’s diplomacy with the natives since the Cahokia councils, and the capture and release 
of some of their men that had been serving with the native raiding party further highlighted the 
divide that existed between the French and American settlers.
The entire episode of violence and the defeat of Hamilton, whom Clark described as 
“Deified” by the Natives, had the desired effect. Various nations, especially those along the 
Wabash along Hamilton’s route, now returned to Clark’s orbit and “begged [him] to excuse their 
blindness and take them into favour.” Clark, maintaining his consistent policy of neutrality for 
the native peoples spoke to the various nations chastising them for listening to “the bad talks and 
deceit of the English…The Big Knives then resolved to shew no mercy to any people that 
hereafter would refuse the belt of Peace.” The immediate result was clear, “Every thing having 
the Appearance of Tranquility” throughout the Illinois Country.283 Across the West, Clark’s 
victory had tremendous effect. The natives, upon hearing of the capture of Hamilton quit the 
siege of Fort Laurens, and officers as far away as Fort Pitt began to receive Indian reports about 
the event. 284
While Clark was occupying the Illinois, gaining the support of the French, pacifying the 
natives, and reacting to Hamilton’s invasion, the Spanish were also acting in cooperation with 
Clark. From Clark’s first arrival through his march to Vincennes, he found a welcome friend in 
the Spanish Lieutenant Governor at St. Louis, Fernando de Leyba, along with many of the 
merchants that worked under Spanish jurisdiction. As discussed earlier, Spain’s policy in the 
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Mississippi Valley was pro-American, but Spanish agents acted more out of a desire to hurt the 
British than to help the Americans.
Clark was warmly received once Kaskaskia was captured, and part of this may have been
because the Spanish had actually expected Clark’s arrival. Don Juan de Miralles, a Spanish 
diplomat, had been informed by Patrick Henry that an expedition was underway to the Illinois. 
Although no proof exists that de Leyba knew of this, it certainly highlights the inclinations of the 
Spanish in general.285 In fact de Leyba was quick to welcome “The Commanding Colonel [who] 
arrived at [Kaskaskia] in shirt and breeches, barefooted and bare of limb, with his bedding, 
provisions and gun on his shoulder.” Clark’s men wore “nothing but breeches, powder horn, gun 
and knapsack.” They could not have inspired much confidence in de Leyba, who even in remote 
St. Louis had a well provisioned garrison, but he sought cooperation with Clark to show that he 
was himself “free of charges of being a Royalist.”286
Clark immediately returned de Leyba’s correspondence, describing the Spanish as “Our 
friends,” and doing “every thing in their power to convince me of their friendship. Clearly there 
was a friendship and respect growing between the two men as de Leyba “omitted nothing in his 
Power to prove his Attachment to the Americans, with such openness as left no room for a 
doubt.” Clark also frequently offered his best wishes to de Leyba’s family when writing to 
him.287 In one of their earliest exchanges, de Leyba informed Clark he would “come in person to 
congratulate you on your happy arrival at…Kaskaskia,” while he offered to be “useful to you so 
as to prove to you the perfect consideration with which I have the honor of being.” He also held a 
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number of supplies shipped up from New Orleans for Clark to pick up at his convenience.288
Both officers also facilitated communications between their superiors, and worked together 
defensively, as de Leyba offered Clark “all the force that he could raise in case of an attack by 
Indians from Detroit.”289 The men worked so closely together that they frequently shared 
intelligence, and de Leyba almost despised Hamilton as much as the American frontiersmen did. 
He described him as a “depraved man who has countless Indians at his service and great ill will 
toward the Spaniards.”290
While de Leyba and other officials in the Spanish government played a vital role in 
maintaining Clark’s forces, Francis Vigo, a St. Louis merchant also filled a critical role, both for 
collecting provisions to feed the army and for military intelligence. Not only did Vigo willingly 
sell his merchandise to Clark and offer him generous credit, but he also supported the other 
merchants of both the Spanish and American sides of the Mississippi River. In fact, some have 
proposed that Clark would not have been able to procure supplies without great difficulty had 
Vigo not advanced money to the local inhabitants.291 Vigo was very important, and Clark was 
very conscious of his activities. When Clark learned of the fall of Vincennes, he passed along the 
intelligence to de Leyba about Hamilton, but also that “Mr. [Vigo] I expect is detained.”292 Not 
only was Vigo important to Clark, but he was in business with de Leyba so his status was a 
major concern to both men. Hamilton detained Vigo, but being a Spanish civilian, Vigo was 
given a passport to continue with his business and allowed to return to St. Louis.293 This he 
dutifully did, but then he re-crossed the Mississippi to Kaskaskia and provided Clark with “every 
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peace of Inteligence that [he] could wish for.” Clark had been waiting for the return of scouts he 
sent out, but Vigo provided him with the exact number of men Hamilton had and the news that 
he was settling in for the winter and repairing the fort rather than risking an attack on Kaskaskia 
before the spring.294
The Spaniards’ friendship with Clark and the Americans eventually cost them dearly. 
Even before the arrival of Clark and his men, supplies, while not in critically short supply, were 
nonetheless not always easily attainable. For example, in July 1777, the Governor of Louisiana 
was forced to set prices throughout the colony to counter the “abuses committed by the 
monopolies” and the “excessive and usurious prices at which they sell the food supplies and farm 
products to this province,” and “because of the complaint of the public in general that high cost 
curtails subsistence.”295 Supplies were also critically short as gifts for the natives, and for traders 
to exchange for furs as well. When de Leyba lacked provisions to feed all the nations coming to 
council with him at St. Louis, he was disappointed to learn that Governor Galvez in New Orleans 
had “no authority to increase the number of…rations.” His advice was simply to give fewer 
away, despite the increased activities of the British. That was in September 1778. Less than one 
year later in July 1779 supply boats from New Orleans had failed to bring up adequate supplies. 
To de Leyba, it was “indispensable that our Indian tribes be provided with their accustomed 
goods. There are not enough in this post to supply the smallest of them. If nothing is sent to 
them…they will come furiously to this town.”296 The situation became worse when the 1778 
harvest was destroyed by “constant rains which…has caused the loss of half the wheat.” This “in 
conjunction with the many soldiers on the other side [of the Mississippi], has made bread and 
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other provisions dear.” Eventually de Leyba had little recourse but to allow Spanish traders to 
purchase “some goods from the other side…but…they have bought them dearly.”297
Times had become very difficult economically, especially with the spike in demand of 
the occupation of the Illinois by Clark’s army. De Leyba felt that it had been his “good works 
which forced [the Americans] to live in harmony with the Spanish government…but…dearly this 
little bit of splendor” cost him. De Leyba suffered from “undermined health” and worried that his 
daughters would be forced to “beggary” should he die. Not only was de Leyba overextended in 
credit, but “Several of the inhabitants of [St. Louis], who put their property in the hand of the 
Americans to please [him], find themselves in the same situation.” De Leyba felt he had little 
recourse though, considering “orders…to come to [the Americans] aid in view of the fact that 
even the principal leader…had not a shirt to cover his nakedness.” Even the defenses of St. Louis 
were in question because if de Leyba defaulted on his large loans, he would be unable to acquire 
any “unexpected aid” for the troops in an emergency. In the end de Leyba lost his wife, and 
shortly afterwards he died as well, mired in the debt acquired securing the conquests of George 
Rogers Clark.298
The Spanish were vital to Clark both economically and militarily, offering intelligence 
and a plan of shared defense. Unfortunately, this friendly stance destroyed the financial standing 
of many Spanish officials and merchants because Virginia could not and would not pay the 
expenses of occupying the Illinois. Despite personal tragedy, men like de Leyba and Vigo 
amazingly extended themselves to such a great extent to support a man who appeared as a 
conqueror yet could barely feed or clothe himself. De Leyba only spoke highly of Clark; even as 
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his sickness became worse, he did not criticize him directly. While Spain was interested in 
gaining power and influence in the Mississippi Valley, the flair and confidence of meeting 
George Rogers Clark must have influenced these men to place their own fortunes on the line. 
Perhaps, like the Indians that Clark had bluffed into peace at Cahokia, the Spanish also feared his 
apparent violent streak. Spanish authorities at times were indeed afraid of a combined Anglo 
offensive against Spanish possessions.299
Although George Rogers Clark successfully seized the French town of Kaskaskia, he 
found himself in a precarious situation. Clark had only one-hundred and seventy-five men in his 
small army and was surrounded by 1,600 French settlers as well as thousands of natives within a 
journey of a day or two. Clark, as he had previously done, demonstrated the ability to work 
among different cultural groups to achieve his goals. Clark successfully united the French, 
Spanish, and many of the Native Americans against the interest of Great Britain. Clark did make 
some mistakes, especially in misunderstanding the possible motivations of the French, but he did 
successfully achieve his goals, and from an American perspective, Clark did an excellent job of 
gaining the cooperation on non-Americans, whether it was by free cooperation, or the threat of 
violence that gained cooperation, he was excellent at gaining the respect and cooperation of 
outside groups.
Unfortunately for Clark, his success proved to be rather short-lived. While he united his 
soldiers against a common enemy, once that common enemy was removed, all of the different 
cultural groups involved proved too unwieldy for one man with limited resources to control. 
Although it was not clear in 1779, fractures in the understandings between the Americans and the 
French, Spanish, and their Indian allies were beginning to appear. Even as Clark was achieving 
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his greatest success, the signs of French resentment at American methods, exhaustion of Spanish 
credit, and the lack of gifts and supplies for Indian allies, boded ill for future prospects.
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CHAPTER 4 - It Would Have Been Mine: Clark’s Goals Never 
Realized
The peak of George Rogers Clark’s career came early in his life, as he would never again 
be as successful, popular, or influential than he was in the immediate aftermath of his victory 
over Henry Hamilton at Vincennes in February, 1779. His success was far reaching but short 
lived. Clark’s main objective had been to relieve Kentucky from native raids, many of which had 
originated in Ohio. The capture of the Illinois towns put Clark in a strong position to negotiate 
with the nations located on the Wabash River, the Illini Confederation, and nations to the north 
and west of the Illinois, while also allowing him to threaten Detroit, which was the main supply 
depot for the Ohio based Shawnees, Mingoes, and Delawares. The victory, and especially the 
capture of Hamilton, threw British plans for a native based offensive during the spring of 1779 
into disarray, as the nations around the Great Lakes instead focused on attacking American posts 
in the Illinois Country. The Wabash nations remained largely neutral, and the Ohio nations 
temporarily restrained their attacks on Kentucky. The real problem for Clark was that he did not 
have the means to maintain his strong position, and he proved unable to protect Kentucky and 
the Illinois in the long term. The opportunity to take Detroit slipped away from Clark, and for the 
rest of his life he would say “it would have been Mine…”300
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The removal of British forces from the Illinois Country led to fragmentation of the 
French, Spanish, Native, and American forces. The removal of the British as a common enemy 
meant Clark was no longer able to coordinate these groups and this chapter examines the 
breakdowns by cultural group as Indians, French, and Spanish all turn away from Clark. Once 
the members of Clark’s coalition realized that removal of their original antagonist, the British, 
did not validate any claim to land economic supremacy other than the Americans, even the 
nimble gestures of Clark proved especially empty when he ran out of food and supplies. He 
could only address the needs of one group at the expense of others. As Larry Nelson has noted in 
his study of the British trader and diplomat Alexander McKee, this fragmentation of political 
interests in the Ohio Valley had been common for much of the 18th century.301 Once the British 
were expelled from Vincennes, Clark continued to maintain his army as an occupation force, 
both to ensure the cooperation of the French and the peaceful intentions of the natives. The army 
also served as protection against any attack against the French towns and as a staging area for 
any attack on British held Detroit. Clark had a difficult time maintaining a standing army, as he 
could barely supply his men, let alone offer them the promised pay. This led to resentment 
among the French, who had to deal with an unsupplied army with no money or credit. Eventually 
supplies were simply commandeered by the Americans, forcing the French began to look 
elsewhere for protection. While Clark never was able to organize an attack on Detroit, he 
continued to advocate that strategy. Frustratingly for Clark, though, he found himself unable to 
coordinate all the cultural groups required to pull off an expedition and against his will was 
forced to compromise his plans by instead leading a militia against the Shawnee towns in Ohio. 
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Finally, the Spanish remained active in the Mississippi Valley as well. Once it was clear that the 
Americans were struggling to maintain their presence in the Illinois, relations between the two 
countries grew strained, and Spain launched its own offensives against the British, without 
cooperation of the American officials, but with the support of the French settlers in American 
territory. As the Ohio Valley fell back into the political fragmentation that had ruled it for so 
long, the importance of Clark’s achievements become all the more magnified because he was 
able to achieve so much working among so many different interests.
Clark’s hopes for even greater successes fueled his desire to maintain an army in the 
Illinois. It was the most logical staging point for an attack against Detroit, via the Wabash River, 
while soldiers stationed there also served to deter any major attacks against the French habitants 
by British or native forces. The hoped-for expedition against Detroit never fully materialized, 
and the strain of maintaining an army in the Illinois was most prevalent in the relationship 
between the American soldiers and French habitants. Virginia could not afford to support the 
soldiers sent to the Illinois, and as Clark exhausted his credit, the French – exasperated with first 
the American failure to repay bad debts and then with the impressment policy for provisions –
began to appeal to outside sources of power for relief. When Clark had arrived in the Illinois, he 
was at the head of a poorly supplied army and one that had few (if any) prospects for improving 
the logistical support it would receive. The cost of supplies in the west was high and the 
quantities were low. Despite initial help from American agents in New Orleans and generous 
credit from the French and Spanish, the necessity of living off the French inhabitants created 
much conflict and misunderstanding between the two groups.
The desperate predicament of Clark’s occupation force is well documented in the 
available records. As his men arrived with nothing more than what they could carry on their 
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backs, they quickly had to find sources of supply while communication was established with 
Virginia and New Orleans.302 The situation began to grow more difficult for Clark to manage 
following the recapture of Vincennes in spring 1779. While Clark wrote to Patrick Henry that the 
French were cooperating and natives were seeking peace, he reported one “circumstance very 
distressing.” The French and Spanish “conceived [American money] to be of no value” while 
they “refused to take a farthing of it. Provision is three times the price it was two months past.” 
The situation was not yet critical as “Several merchants are now advancing considerable sums of 
their own property…by which I am sensible they must lose greatly.” Clark recommended that his 
debts at New Orleans be paid or something else be done by Virginia to improve the value of the 
currency.303 When Clark composed this letter, inflation of the American dollar as compared to a 
Spanish milled dollar was near one-hundred seventy-five percent. One year later inflation had 
risen to four-thousand percent, making it almost impossible to buy goods with cash, much less 
get credit.304
Within two year’s of Clark’s victory, his lack of supplies led to the collapse of his plans 
for an effective garrison force in the Illinois Country. The year 1780 was difficult as numerous 
American posts reported shortages. Colonel John Montgomery at Kaskaskia described the severe 
privation at his post: “Every thing animate and in animate Grones under amost unseportible 
Burden of a Severe Winter,” leaving little food for the inhabitants themselves. At Vincennes, 
Captain Valentine Thomas Dalton wrote that there “was not one pound of Meat in the 
Store…[and] not one pound of Flour Salt and [etc] was sent here last fall.”305 Clark’s efforts to 
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procure more meat had proven ineffective, as his “affixing and limiting me [Captain Robert 
Todd] to a certain price to offer for meat has put it out of my power to procure any.”306
Necessities for the day-to-day business of the outpost were also in short supply as orders and 
provision returns issued from the fort at Vincennes were often written on playing cards.307
John Todd, the senior civil authority in the Illinois, attempted to supply Clark’s army by 
controlling the export market of the region. In a proclamation to the citizens of the Illinois, he 
announced new stringent rules that affected their trade: “the Demands of the State require that a 
Stock of Provision be immediately laid for the use of the Troops of the Common-Wealth 
[Virginia] and that an Embargo be laid upon such Provision for a limited time.” Exceptions to 
the export proclamation were allowed, but only with approval from the government and the 
existence of enough supplies in the territory already, which was an unlikely scenario.308 Despite 
enacting severe economic controls, both George Rogers Clark and John Todd continued to fight 
for the allegiance of increasingly resentful French inhabitants. Clark was sympathetic to the 
plight of the French and explained the dire situation to Thomas Jefferson, requesting that 
Virginia provision the troops and alleviate the pressure on local colonists.
The Illinois under its present Circumstances is by no means able to Supply the Troops 
that you Expect in this department with provitions as the Crops at [Vincennes]…so 
exceedingly bad that upwards of Five Hundred Souls will have to depend on their 
neighbours for Bread[.] I should be exceedingly glad that you would Commission Some 
person to furnish the troops in this Quarter with provitions.309
Todd also wrote to Jefferson that he received
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complaints from the Illinois. [and] that department suffers I fear…they [the French 
inhabitants and traders and the American soldiers] all vent complaints against each 
other—I believe our French friends have the justest grounds of dissatisfaction.310
Tensions continued to rise, and the French became more vocal in their protests against 
the Americans. The merchant class was the first to take action, with Gabriel Cerré and Charles 
Gratiot seeking refuge in St. Louis after the confiscation of their trading goods.311 Cerré felt he 
had been particularly wronged as he had been “employed…to buy different supplies for the 
States,” doing so with “all the zeal possible,” and he had “spared neither pains nor…purse.” He 
had first politely requested that merchandise equal to the value of his contributions to the 
Americans be given him because the “discredit” of American letters of exchange prevented him 
from settling his personal debts, and with no relief in sight fled to St. Louis.312 Acts of 
impressment eventually became common as the citizens of Kaskaskia complained that the 
soldiers would seize animals from the common fields “without paying any attention either to the 
mark or to him to whom they might belong…and killed them, without giving notice of this to 
any one.” The arbitrary acts of American soldiers became so common that eventually the citizens 
of Kaskaskia were compelled to plea for a “glimpse of that liberty which has been so many times 
promised to us.” They felt the soldiers were committing “brigandage and tyranny” on a “day to 
day” basis. 313 Whether it was merchants or farmers, self-interest and in some cases starvation 
served as reasons for resisting impressments of supplies for the greater good of a cause. These 
patterns of resistance to military supply were common to the American colonists and were 
evident in the French and Indian War and as well as throughout the conflict with Britain. Things 
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were even worse in the West because there was no established local government. No justices of 
the peace or magistrates existed to ease civil and military relations since the military essentially 
ran the Illinois Country, leaving many of the French residences complaining about abuses to no 
avail. No matter what theater of operation, there were not enough supplies to go around, 
especially after 1780 and the result was that the cost of provisioning an army was usually 
extracted from the civilian population.314
Predictably enough, this fostered a deep resentment among the inhabitants of the Illinois. 
In Cahokia, the French soldiers had deserted the garrison, and the “Inhabitants [were] So Saucey 
they threaten[ed] to drive…[the] soldiers away.”315 Other reports also blamed the occupying 
army for making life difficult in the region. The Americans had “in short…become the Hated 
Beasts of a whole people by [Im]Pressing horses, Boats…killing cattle, and…for which no 
valuable consideration is given.”316 Not all officers were so sympathetic with the needs of the 
French. John Montgomery, commander at Kaskaskia and highest ranking military officer in the 
territory when Clark later removed to Kentucky, told one of his deputies who struggled to 
acquire provisions, to “Allso remind [the French] of the Bad Consequence of Selling their 
provisions Elsewhre, as it may be a means of Their Familly’s Suffering.”317 Tension and anger 
existed on both sides, but the Americans still managed to do more to alienate their newly 
acquired French citizens.
Amidst the strain in Franco-American relations, the Americans failed to protect the 
French inhabitants from the natives who surrounded the Illinois Country, nor, if the British could 
organize another counterattack, was it likely that the Americans could muster much resistance in 
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that scenario either.  The French certainly felt vulnerable as the Americans became weaker, 
describing themselves as “surrounded by Indians some of whom are our enemies by the changes 
of war.” The gifts the natives received from the British were widely recognized as a “fatal 
obstacle” to the safety of the French.318
Clark himself was worried about defending the Illinois, as he recognized in March, 1780, 
that the British were “Regaining the Interest of many Tribes of Indians, and their designs [is] 
agst the Illinois.” Making matters worse, Clark did not think his forces amounted to more than 
one-hundred fifty men, which he considered “too few under our present circumstances to think 
of Deffending the different post we now occupy.” Instead of trying to defend the Illinois, he 
proposed that the Americans should endeavor to become “Tolerably formidable at any one post 
that we could subsist at,” and he felt that “Amediatley Evacuating our present posts,” to the 
Mouth of the Ohio would be the most strategically advantageous.319 Clark’s plan was based on 
the complaints of his officers who also advocated consolidating forces at one defensive post . 
James Shelby was ready to leave the Illinois in October 1779, reporting, “We are in an 
Exceeding Bad Condition at Present and am afeard that Nesessity will oblig avacuation of this 
Post [Vincennes].”320 The natives, especially the nations to the northwest of the Illinois were 
active against the Americans and the French, as the Potawatomi “brought to the Sauk and 
Fox321…and two Bostonian scalps.”322 The situation was difficult for both sides to manage: the 
French required the defense the soldiers provided, yet they did not have the resources to 
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provision them. The Americans meanwhile wanted to maintain the advantages they had gained 
by occupying the Illinois, but without more provisions, their only real option was to draw down 
the number troops deployed to the various posts in the West.
The French found themselves in a desperate situation, not eager to return to British 
power, but completely disenchanted with the American occupation. In their search for help, they 
turned to a Frenchmen to redress their many grievances. Their hero arrived in the form of 
Augustin Mottin de la Balme, a French cavalry officer, who ventured west after having been 
denied command of the American cavalry under George Washington. De la Balme listened to 
their complaints and promised to deliver them to the French minister to America. 
From the bottom of their hearts and with the frankness which characterizes all good 
Frenchmen, the Inhabitants of the Post Vincennes, formerly faithful subjects of the King 
of France, dare to avow to your Excellency, that they are ready to join the troops of this 
monarch their former and most worthy lord to act sincerely against his enemies whoever 
they may be.
The French went on to list their common complaints, especially the American’s 
confiscation of provisions and supplies, their worthless currency, and lack of a properly 
functioning civil government. They explained that it was “not on the assistance of the United 
States troops that we count to break the yoke which oppresses us,” but rather on those of France 
or even Spain. Things were made even more difficult because the Indian “aversion towards [the 
Americans] seems unbreakable,” while American settlers were becoming a problem “where 
English blood is already too abundant.”323 While France and America worked together, de la 
Balme saw that he could use the patriotic Frenchmen of the Illinois for his own ends, despite any 
consequences to the Franco-American alliance, and in fact the call of Frenchmen to arms against 
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the British was an effort to keep French citizens as clients of France. No evidence shows that de 
la Balme was planned a Spanish alliance, so although it is not entirely clear, it seems that de la 
Balme wanted to bring the Illinois back into the French orbit in some fashion.
De la Balme had arrived in June, 1780, and was warmly received by the French in the 
Illinois. De la Balme was interested in self-promotion and his own glory, having refused to serve 
in the Continental Army once he learned they would not place him at the head of the cavalry.. 
While it is easy in hindsight to assume he was primarily selfish in his motives, one can 
conjecture that he felt some sort of sympathy for the “nation-less” French being abused in the 
Illinois.  After promising to help them and drafting a memorial addressing their complaints, to be 
delivered to the French minister to America, he began recruiting soldiers for an attack on Detroit 
that would liberate the French there from British rule. He recruited about eighty French and 
native volunteers and set out for Detroit from Vincennes. He first stopped at the trading post at 
present day Fort Wayne, Indiana, which he captured and plundered. De la Balme waited for 
reinforcements, as he expected about fifty men from Cahokia. The Chahokians never arrived, 
however, and de la Balme and his men were attacked by a group of Miamis and were massacred. 
The Miamis, acting consistently with their political history, had sat out most of the war waiting 
to see who was more powerful and by this point decided that British supplies from Detroit 
combined with the pressure from Americans at Vincennes was reason enough to join the British. 
All but three men were killed or taken captive.324
De le Balme revealed the resentment towards the Americans and the French willingness 
to support their former country but in the end he did little to alleviate the problems the French 
inhabitants faced, and even exacerbated the problem in Illinois. The fact that the habitants never 
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assimilated into the British Empire, unlike those in the St. Lawrence Valley, and as recently as 
1768 rose up against Spanish rule, showed their attachment to France even before they appealed 
for help to the King of France.325 While the habitants’ desire to be a part of France were constant, 
French policy also did not rule out the idea of reclaiming Louisiana, but it was the necessity of 
an alliance with Spain that kept the French government from taking action.326  After the defeat, a 
French merchant wrote that this “affair has thrown us into a good deal of consternation, for there 
is a great scarcity of provisions and ammunition.”327 The defeat of de la Balme made many of the 
French even more dependent on what few supplies the Americans had. Although the Lieutenant 
Governor of St. Louis rebuffed them when they appealed to him for aid, the people of Vincennes 
had been bold enough and desperate enough to appeal to Spain for assistance.  As good French 
subjects, and allies of the court of Spain “they feared the nations on the Miami River, whom they 
informed the Spanish, have “not ceased during the whole of last summer to give us trouble and 
raise scalps in our villages.” Their request for “whatever aid you may desire” was rejected based 
on the inhabitants’ status as American citizens.328
One American felt that the appearance of de la Balme actually did “some good, [as] he 
Pacified the Indians, [and] he was received by the Inhabitants as the Hebrews would receive the 
Messiah.” Although the Americans saw him as a “Mal Content much disgusted with the 
Virginian,” they were impressed that he could raise morale when the sour relationship between 
the French and Americans made that virtually impossible for an American commander to 
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achieve.329 As the situation between the French and the Americans steadily worsened, military 
cooperation became impossible, Clark also had to contend with intensification of Indian raids 
against the Illinois posts and Kentucky. The frontier militias also hesitated to give up their focus 
on counter-attacking Indian villages.
George Rogers Clark succeeded in winning over the support of many of the Illinois 
Country peoples after his ouster of the British force. Clark, having for the time stopped the 
raiding into Kentucky, won over some villages because of his military presence and won over 
still other peoples because of the influences of the French and Spanish traders in the area. Clark 
temporarily offered a better alliance with America because of his military presence in the Illinois 
Country, and his ability to use the support of the nearby French and Spanish traders to his 
advantage. The Native Americans soon learned that their long-term interests did not coincide 
with those of Clark and looked back to the British for more and better support than the 
Americans could offer.
The American forces, poorly financed and poorly supplied, had a difficult time 
maintaining themselves, not to mention trying to provide for their new Native American allies. 
Since a large American occupation of the Illinois Country could not sustain itself,. Groups like 
the Miamis no longer saw it in their best interest to stand beside American military forces and in 
fact began to take offensive actions in response to the Americans. Continued aggression from 
American settlers and a lack of supplies and money for Clark’s expedition pushed many Indian
groups back to the British side for the remainder of the conflict. Repeatedly, one time native 
allies or neutrals turned against the Americans, when the Americans could not supply warriors 
all across the Old Northwest. As Clark found himself unable to even supply and pay his own 
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army, he drew heavily on the local French population and from Spanish friends in St. Louis and 
New Orleans. The French began to refuse to support the Americans, which in turn led to less 
support among their trading partners. Eventually increased efforts at diplomacy and supply by 
the British would unleash more warfare against Kentucky, while the Americans began to target 
native villages in Ohio instead of British posts like Vincennes and Detroit.330
Although Clark primarily focused on raising an army to move towards Detroit, he had to 
deal with significant supply problems for his garrison of about one-hundred twenty men 
remaining in and around the French settlements. Clark needed supplies for his men and his 
Indian agents. Geoffrey Linctot, one of Clark’s men in the Illinois, wrote in June 1779 of his 
recent “embarrassment,” as he had not been given the promised supplies of “food and other 
articles which would be required in the service of the state.” Linctot reported that the Natives 
currently appeared peaceable but that they were being encouraged “to fall upon us…that as soon 
as we become masters of the country we will poison them all.”331 Another of Clark’s officers, 
John Todd, wrote to the Governor of Virginia reporting that he was “uneasy in knowing that 
the…quantity as well as the bad condition of the goods” available for trading and gifting. He also 
reported that Continental money had been pulled from circulation, as it had been rendered near 
valueless by inflation, making it impossible for Clark’s men to buy anything from the French or 
Spanish.332
The Americans in command in the Illinois sensed the delicate situation that they found 
themselves in, and they issued repeated requests for aid similar to John Todd’s request for more 
money and goods to trade with the Indians, “who I suppose will expect their Cloathing from 
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[me].”333 Most of the appeals to Virginia for supplies went unheeded. Just as supplies for 
Virginia’s own soldiers did not arrive, neither did supplies for native allies. Clark’s men, forced 
to lean more and more on the local inhabitants, found themselves in no position to consider 
sharing their supplies with the native peoples that came to Kaskaskia, Cahokia, or Vincennes to 
trade or council with American leaders.
Slowly but surely the British worked to overcome the loss of Henry Hamilton’s leadership 
role among the natives, making great inroads by the end of the American Revolution under the 
leadership of Arent De Peyster, who replaced Hamilton as commander at Detroit. He poured an 
immense volume of gifts into the area, and kept the Natives from joining with Clark and the 
Americans, although many nations, like the Miami, were still only nominally under British 
control.334
As the Delawares became disenchanted with the unfulfilled promises of the Americans, they 
increased their confrontations with American settlers, which led to Clark dispatching an 
expedition against them in 1779. They continued to fight the Americans until 1785 when they 
moved into Spanish territory.335 Likewise, many of the Miamis remained hostile to the 
Americans and did not settle a peace with them until 1792.336 The Potawatomi were also in 
league with the British, though their distant location kept them out of most of the raiding in 
Kentucky. They maintained their ties to the French, Spanish, and British, and remained hostile 
and suspicious of the Americans.337 Other nations like the Shawnees resisted American 
expansion well into the 1790’s, but some groups like the Illini had few choices but to cooperate 
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or voluntarily move west. The Spanish also continued to increase their influence, as the Sauk and 
Mesquakie, suspicious of the Americans and rejected by the British, looked almost solely to 
Spain for support.338
The American forces did not come to the Illinois Country properly prepared to occupy it, let 
alone fully support the numerous native peoples in the area. As the luster quickly wore off 
Clark’s initial conquest, native allies and enemies alike saw that their best interest lay with the 
British, where they probably always had, and because of the increased nature of violent 
aggression from the Americans, realignment with the British came quickly. Continued 
aggression from American settlers and a lack of supplies and money for Clark’s expedition 
pushed the Native Americans back to the British side for the remainder of the war. Across the 
continent other Indian villages were forced to make the same choices. War appeared inevitable 
for most. 
The Iroquois also faced this situation as their location between settlers and military posts 
from both sides created an attempt to remain neutral, but they were eventually drawn into the 
conflict on the British side. Although the Oneidas and Tuscaroras generally favored the 
Americans, the Iroquois League was racked by civil war, breaking up the long standing alliance 
of the Iroquois groups. The Revolution has been described as a “total disaster” for destroying the 
unity of the Iroquois and unleashing widespread destruction and suffering as villages and 
families fought one another.339 A lack of control over young warriors and the inability of the 
American government to control frontier settlers or provide supplies made many of the Iroquois 
British allies, although their location made the violence and conflict fierce in their territory. The 
lack of clear leadership in New York after the death of indian agent William Johnson also left the 
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nations in a divided state for some time. The need for leadership was especially clear when 
compared to the success Hamilton had in stirring up resentment towards the Americans in the 
West before he was captured.340
In the South some similarities to the Ohio Valley existed as well. The Southern Indian 
Superintendent, John Stuart, like Hamilton, worked hard to maintain British protection of the 
natives across the south and to incite them against the colonies. With the exception of the 
Cherokees, the natives in the South faced less direct pressure from frontier colonists because 
many, similar to the Wabash nations, were not in direct proximity to the white frontier, and 
therefore, had few reasons to ally with the Americans who could not provide them with supplies. 
In addition, Clark’s victory over Hamilton served to stop a large-scale native alliance and 
offensive in 1779.341 While natives certainly had to take the actions of the Americans, British, 
French, and Spanish into account, they were by no means bound to support any one power if it 
seemed disadvantageous at the time.
Following Clark’s seizure of the Illinois posts, his thoughts turned immediately toward the 
capture of Detroit. Clark knew that Detroit was the key to severing the British supply line to the 
natives of the Ohio Valley. Less than a month after capturing Hamilton, Clark wished for “men 
enough to take the advantage of ye present confusion of the Indian Nations, I could silence the 
whole in two months.” Upwards of five-hundred men were reported to be on their way to the 
Illinois, and Clark was confident that he could “do something Clever” with enough men.342 In 
November, 1779, after consolidating his position in the Illinois but not receiving enough soldiers 
to advance on Detroit, Clark held a council of war with his officers to determine their best course 
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of action concerning Detroit. The officers assembled were recorded as believing that “a few well 
discipline troops” could seize Detroit itself, but that a fairly large contingent of “not less than 
one-thousand troops” would nonetheless be necessary because of the “long, tedious and fatiguing 
march all the way through a hostile country, exposed to frequent interruptions and attacks from 
the savages…as well as many unforeseen accidents.”
The council also determined that supplying an army this large would be impossible if 
supplies were drawn only from the Illinois and that the British posts on the Mississippi appeared 
to be an easier target.343 To raise and supply a force that Clark’s officers deemed necessary for 
the capture of Detroit presented a daunting task to these isolated soldiers.
Much of Clark’s correspondence following the capture of the Illinois pertained to plans 
for attacking Detroit. The records show Clark continually appealing for men and supplies and his 
superiors in Virginia claiming there were none to send. Clark was steadfast in his plan and 
showed himself to be knowledgeable when it came to the interests of native peoples. Clark 
understood that as long as Detroit remained in British hands, the frontier settlers could “Expect 
depredations from Many Nations of Indians,” yet he was “surprised at [his] superiours suffering 
those Triffling [British] garisons about Du Troit to exist knowing the Mischief they do by 
exciting the Indians to war and Runing us to Enormus Expencies.” While the frontiersmen 
clamored for retaliatory attacks against the native villages in Ohio, Clark noted that “Carrying 
out armies and destroying their [native’s] Town is little or no use when they Can get four fold for 
what they loose from the English.” Clark wanted to launch a final blow that would isolate the 
natives and force them to give up the conflict, just as the taking of the Illinois had temporarily 
stalled them. Perhaps history also provided a lesson for Clark, for his plan would have had 
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similar effects as the British capture of Fort Frontenac during the French and Indian War. The 
capture of the fort, the key supply post for the western part of France’s colonial empire, forced 
many of the French native allies to seek peace with the British when they became isolated from 
supplies from the St. Lawrence River.
Clark’s plans to attack Detroit, although approved in principle by Governor Thomas 
Jefferson in Virginia, met with difficulties and resistance throughout the Ohio Valley in 1780. 
Raids into Kentucky became much worse as the settlements became a “Mere scene of Carnage 
and Desolation” that “nothing less than a Vigorous expedition against the Shawanee Towns will 
Put an end to.”344 The threat of attack constantly worried the Kentucky settlers, as the natives 
were “still in our woods, and we fear will do more mischief before they return…In short there 
will be no living in this country without Carrying on an Expedition…against them.” Clark, with 
his reputation as an Indian fighter and frontiersmen, was called upon repeatedly to “take the 
command, and Assist,” his leadership leaving “no Doubt of Success.”345
Although Clark was eventually forced to accept command of the Shawnee Expedition, he 
refused that appointment until it was clear the French and the Kentucky militias would not join 
an expedition to Detroit. Up until he reluctantly took on the Shawnee mission, he was adamant in 
promoting his plans to attack Detroit. While he was “hartily sorry for the great loss of Blood and 
property by the Kentuckians,” he was unwilling to “Triffle with Matters” such as an “Expedition 
against the Shawonee Towns.” Clark saw that “The [expedition against the Shawnees] proposed 
would be so far from giving us Peace that it would only Agravate the war by destroying an 
Expedition already planed by his Excellency [Governor of Virginia][.]” Clark was also was 
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frustrated by the unwillingness of the Kentucky militias to aid him in attacking Detroit as success 
against Detroit would “give them an Amediate and Permanient peace with the Savages.” 
Looking at the long term, Clark saw the Shawnee expedition as only a temporary means of relief 
and blamed the Kentuckains for a lack of foresight, as he noted that if there is not “peace by the 
Fall it Shall be their own Faults and not governments.”346
Kaskaskia’s commander John Montgomery described the French for their contributions 
or lack thereof as a “People…Destitute of Patriotic Sentiments.” Although they favored the 
expedition, when called upon to provide supplies it was “out of Their power to do aney thing,” 
unless prompt payment in peltries (not devalued American currency) could be arranged.347 In 
fact, Shawnee knowledge of the attack has been linked to information they gained from the 
disgruntled French.348
Historian James A. James counts the 1780 Shawnee Campaign a great success and 
considers Clark’s actions that year as possibly his best performance as a leader.349 Whether or 
not the Shawnee Campaign was a real success, however, has been challenged by J. Martin West, 
who maintains that it only gave Kentucky a slight break from the native attacks, but it 
permanently pushed the Shawnees towards the British and made that troubled people even more 
bitter towards American expansion than they already were.350 This view reinforces Clark’s own 
attitudes concerning properly conducted Indian warfare, but the resistance of the French and 
shortsightedness of the Kentuckians left him unable to gather the men and supplies he needed to 
attack Detroit. The victory over the Shawnees, which included burning and plundering 
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Chillicothe and Piqua (also known as Pickaway) resulted in the loss of eight-hundred acres of 
corn and many pounds of material possessions, but in the end Clark was prophetic when he 
wrote that if the “Kentuckians have not peace by the Fall it Shall be their own Faults.”
The Spanish, always operating to gain the upper hand in the Mississippi Valley, proved a 
more effective force in the area than the Americans. Although the Spanish post at St. Louis did 
not have everything it needed, especially trade goods for the natives, Spanish soldiers (mainly 
consisting of French militia) were well armed and supplied compared to their counterparts in 
American held territory. On Spain’s entry into the war, they aggressively pursued a plan of 
expansion in both the upper and lower parts of the valley. With the collapse of American power 
in the Illinois, relations between the Americans and Spanish grew weaker, and this at a time 
when the French were more willing to seek help from the Spanish. 
The Spanish under Louisiana’s Governor Bernardo Galvez had prepared an offensive for 
the Mississippi Valley intended to gain control of territory and trade that the British held. This 
aggressive attitude eventually encompassed attacks ranging from Pensacola in West Florida to 
St. Joseph in present-day southern Michigan. Spanish ambitions not only worried the British, but 
Clark and the Americans had to take into account Spain’s plans as well. While Clark worried 
about English and native efforts to drive the Americans out of all their western territories, he 
feared that “the Spaniards would fondly suffer their Settlements in the Illinois to fall with ours 
for the Sake of having the opertunity of retaking Both.” While little evidence exists to suggest 
that Spanish planners entertained such an idea, they clearly did not entirely trust the Americans 
simply because they had been British. 351
                                                
351 GR Clark to John Todd, March 1780, Seineke, The George Rogers Clark Adventure, 429.
134
The British were worried to the Spanish even more than the Americans. Mostly they 
feared losing the loyalty of the many western nations because the British seemed to be better able 
to supply the natives from Detroit. After the defeat of de la Balme, Francisco Cruzat, Lt. 
Governor of St. Louis, feared that his “inhuman enemies who wish to overpower us will not 
forget to spur on the Indians with this example of success, promising them greater returns in the 
future.”352 The activity of de la Balme left the Spanish somewhat confused because the 
Continental Congress had not sanctioned him, but nonetheless they feared the expansion of the 
Americans to the North, which caused them organize their own expedition.353 Not only were the 
British gaining influence, but they also aroused fear from the Spanish. Another Spanish officer 
reported, “While we were under the belief that the English had been falsely charged with the 
atrocities committed in North America,” after meeting them in combat, native allies included, he 
was “left with not the least doubt” of Britain’s “barbarous” practices, as that nation has 
“forgotten how to make war according to the system practiced in Europe.”354
The Spanish plan, well laid out in August, 1779, and distributed via confidential orders to 
the various Spanish governors located in Mexico, Cuba, and Louisiana. The King of Spain 
ordered that:
The Principal objective of his arms in America during the war with the English is to drive 
them from the Gulf of Mexico and the banks of the Mississippi, where their settlements 
are so prejudicial to our commerce, as well as to the security of our richest possessions.
Specifically targeted were the British bases at Mobile and Pensacola, and then following 
their capture, forces were “afterwards to attack and clear the English from the banks of the 
Mississippi.” The main feature of this plan was to maintain Louisiana as a defensive barrier for 
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the rich mines of Mexico and to drive out the British competition in the battle for the limited 
revenues available in the Louisiana fur trade.355
The relationship between the two nations was at its best when Clark and Fernando de 
Leyba maintained their friendly rapport, but on the death of de Leyba and Clark’s removal to the 
falls of the Ohio, suspicions grew on both sides. Conflict over deserters, both Spanish and 
American, had arisen early, but de Leyba and Clark peacefully came to terms over the matter. By 
1780, Clark confessed that he was not a “Sufficient Statesman to Comprehend the Policy of the 
Spanish Gentlemen,” as they were now protecting American deserters “when both Nations are at 
Warr against the same Enemy.”356 John Todd even went so far as to encourage the construction 
of Fort Jefferson at the mouth of the Ohio River to 
serve as a Check to any Incroachmetns from our present Allies the Spaniards whose 
growing power might justly  put us upon our guard and whose fondness for engrossing 
Territory might other wise urge them higher up the River upon our side than we would 
wish.357
The Americans also begrudged the Spanish success in attracting new settlers to their side 
of the river. While neither Virginia nor the Continental Congress could provide any type of 
assistance to newly arriving settlers, the Spanish had instituted a policy of providing land and 
farming implements before the war had started to attract immigrants. Despite the stricter laws 
and Roman Catholic religion in Spanish Louisiana, many appeared willing to take on the 
“Spanish Yoke” because of the poverty on the American side.358
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American attempts to tighten their control over the French and natives who no longer 
respected their dwindling power also kindled conflict with Spain. In November, 1780, at the 
same time that the people of Vincennes wrote to Spain for support, the Wabash nations, 
including the Miamis and Kickapoos, sent belts along with the French delegate, only to have 
them confiscated by John Dodge, the American commander at Kaskaskia. Dodge, while 
forwarding the letter from the inhabitants of Vincennes to St. Louis, withheld the messages from 
the Wabash because he feared the French attempt to “evade the government of America.”359
This directly led to resentment among the Spanish and the feeling that the Americans did 
not acting as proper allies. They reported that the Americans seemed “in their manner of treating 
the Indians and in their coldness toward us, more neutral in the cause which ought to be a 
common one for the allies.”360 By the end of 1780, the Spanish viewed the Americans as “Not 
very just and, on the contrary, somewhat suspicious,” based especially on their withholding of 
the Wabash messages. Although much of the blame for negative influences is accredited to 
British merchants like Thomas Bentley, the one time respect between de Leyba and Clark no 
longer existed. 
The conduct of the Americans with the settlements of their district, which they have 
abandoned without relief or hope of having it, after having impoverished it, keeps them 
[the inhabitants] all in conflict…[and]  the height of the calamity and misery which all 
Ylinneses [Illinois] is at present as well as the unhappy habitants of Post Vincene, whom 
the Americans, after having ruined them refused to protect and defend, without other 
reasons than those which one desires to assert without any foundation.361
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The respect, cooperation, and understanding that had been prominent in the early phases 
of the American-Spanish relationship were foreign to the later relationships between the two 
nations.
Spanish forces achieved success against British outposts in Florida and along the Upper 
Mississippi in the closing years of the war. They reclaimed West Florida under the leadership of 
Governor Galvez by taking Pensacola and Mobile, and as what amounted to a retaliatory strike 
for a British attack on St. Louis, they captured the British post at St. Joseph. The British had 
attempted to attack both St. Louis and Cahokia in 1780, with an army made up mostly of native 
allies from the north and the lake region, but were driven back. Immediately following the attack 
a number of Cahokains joined their fellow French from St. Louis during the Rock River 
Campaign, harassing British traders, and in 1781 around thirty men from Cahokia joined an 
officially sanctioned Spanish attack which captured St. Joseph. The men from Cahokia had been 
primarily motivated to join the Spanish because they sought revenge for the death of many of 
their citizens in the failure of de la Balme’s expedition.362 Because the Spanish routed the British 
on nearly every front, the weakness of the Americans proportionately increased Spain’s 
influence and power among the natives and French.
The successful removal of British power from the Illinois Country, while one of Clark’s 
main objectives, ironically proved to be one of the key factors in the collapse of American power 
in the region as well. Without support from Virginia, Clark had exhausted his credit, leaving the 
French and Spanish unable to support the American force, and, in fact, resentful at the continued 
demands of the Americans. The withdrawal of most of the American soldiers from the Illinois 
highlighted that they could not provide protection as promised.  While Clark continued to focus 
                                                
362 Nasatir, “The Anglo-Spanish Frontier in the Illinois Country,” 322, 330, 348-50. For Spanish report on sacking 
St. Joseph, see Francisco Cruzat to Esteban Miro, 6 August 1781, in Kinnaird, SPM, 431-34.
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on his main objective, Detroit, he could not gather the support he needed in Virginia or along the 
frontier and had to spend the rest of the war protecting a long border from native raids and 
launching ineffective counter-strokes against native villages. The weakness of the Americans 
also led Spain to operate independently and to increase Spanish prestige in the region since they 
had no reason to fear any type of retribution from the scattered frontier forces. 
Without a greater cause to unify the different cultural groups in the region, Clark could 
not forge together a coalition of disperse interests into one common goal. The lack of unity 
meant that any large operation, such as an attack against Detroit, was impossible. Clark’s failure 
after the capture of Hamilton was not due to his shortcomings or to a changing situation. In fact, 
the frontier had always existed in a fragmented fashion, and village politics, whether native, 
Spanish, or French, had long dominated the political and military options available to leaders in 
the middle ground. Clark’s ability to unite these interests in the first place demostrates a 
remarkable achievement in itself, and his ability to mask his weaknesses, to force cooperation 
from strongly independent and often more powerful groups remains truly a testament to his 
ability.
West of the mountains, in the Mississippi Valley, where settlers violently wrested control 
of the land away from its native inhabitants, and where Clark’s adventures have gone into 
historical lore, men seem to have always dreamed big. From the first frontiers and those that 
continued their westward move over the next century, men of ambition, opportunity, and 
grandiose dreams have always been attracted to them. Clark’s talents and accomplishments were 
great. There is no denying his uniqueness in history for maintaining a rare moment of 
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cooperation with a few soldiers and supplies in one of the most diverse environments ever 
created in North America.
Unfortunately, for Clark, he peaked at an early age and ended up destitute, dependant on 
his family for support because of his inability to pay off the Revolutionary War debts that were 
necessary for his success but that Virginia refused to pay. In this sad state, the clearest vision of 
Clark the opportunist is presented. Men like James Wilkinson and Aaron Burr were involved in 
western schemes and intrigues aimed at creating a new empire in the North American interior, 
and Clark was no different, driven by his unending desire for greater and greater 
accomplishments. In the end, he opportunistically accepted a commission in the armies of 
revolutionary France with dreams of redemption and empire. Clark was still willing to take risks, 
just as he had in his early attempts at land speculation and then in his military campaigns, but 
never could put it all together again.
For most historians Clark represents just a tiny footnote in the Revolutionary War, but a 
close look at Clark reveals a man driven by opportunity that united diverse interests, even in 
places where that had never before been accomplished as he did in the Illinois Country. At the 
end of the day there may have been no real chance for Clark to seize and hold Detroit. Maybe the 
capture of Detroit would not have ended native warfare as he hoped, but that is all speculation. 
Clark may not have been realistic in his hope to attack Detroit, but at the very least, no matter 
how temporary his presence was in the fluid history of the region, he did keep the Spanish out of 
the Illinois leaving the young United States with a real claim to the Old Northwest. Despite the 
fact that the French and Indians that lived in that region did not want to be a part of the United 
States, Clark was the first wave in the American assault that eventually overwhelmed the region 
and established an American identity where none existed before.
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Clark was unique and his ability to work with diverse groups of people and unite them for 
his own goals has seldom been accomplished in American history. Clark, like many great men, 
had his flaws, including his opportunistic drive that both produced both his great successes and 
his ultimate failures. History has relegated Clark to footnotes and brief mentions because the 
things that he did well were not the parts of history that Americans were interested in for a long 
time. While Clark did not embrace diversity, he certainly worked with it and that story, the truly 
great part of Clark’s story, did not fit into the narrative of American history. The emphasis on 
Clark’s military victories over the British and his massacre of Indian captives at Vincennes really 
were small affairs in a military sense, but those are the actions that fit the driving narrative in 
American history. Clark should not be remembered for a small military victory and a failed 
attempt to Americanize the Illinois Country. He should be remembered for his ability to build 
coalitions and work in an environment filled with diversity without overwhelming force because 
that diversity and willingness to work without force became rarer in the United States following 
the Revolutionary War, and Clark was one of the last examples of it.
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